This is what Minibonds is all about!

The name "Minibonds" itself is a misleading word for investors. Whatever money you have invested in this "Minibonds" are not invested in bonds of the six reference banks or bonds issued by Lehman Brothers.

This is how it works. Lehman Brothers may or may not buy any bonds from the six reference banks but it is just using these banks as "reference entities", some sort as a "bet" with Minibonds holders. There are basically 5 entities involved in the Minibonds arrangement.

1)First of all, its Lehman Brothers as the credit risk swap (I will explain what credit risk swap entails in this case later) partner.

２）Secondly, Lehman Brothers has created an empty shell company Minibond Ltd which will issue the Minibonds to investors.

３）Third, the investors.

４）Forth, the money taken from investors will be invested in a basket of AA financial products from 150 companies which includes CDOs which is basically collateral debts obligations, some of them are related to SubPrime debts.

5) The reference banks which has nothing to do with investors' investment other than being a betting reference: i.e. if any one of them failed, it would be a credit event that make investors lose money to Lehman Brothers.

For simplicity to understand the whole arrangement, just take it that Lehman Brothers has bought some bonds from these six reference entities (banks) and it needs somebody to insure its risk of exposure to these banks. It did not insure its risks from insurance companies like AIG　but instead, via this Minibonds arrangement, bought insurance from investors like you.

Through the Credit Risk Swap, you as an investor has agreed to sell insurance to Lehman Brothers with regards to the reference entities. In order to become an insurance agents of Lehman Brothers, you will need to come up with money as collateral. This money is collected from you via the financial institutions that you bought the Minibonds and given to Minibond Ltd to invest in a basket of CDOs issued by 150 companies.

Whatever returns from these CDOs issued by these 150 companies (variable returns) are given to Lehman Brothers. In return, Lehman Brothers will give Minibonds Ltd a FIXED premium (most probably higher than 5.1%) and Minibonds Ltd will give investors 5.1% returns for their investment.

Now, the variable returns from the Collateral Assets may be higher or lower than 5.1% but investors will only get back 5.1%. It means that Lehman Brothers will take the risk of variable returns from these Collateral Assets in return for your risk taking on the reference entities. This complete the Credit Risks Swap, swapping your risks of variable returns for a fixed returns, while you in return, insured Lehman Brothers for their risk exposure to the Six reference entities.

The problem is that Minibonds Ltd, under the control of Lehman Brothers, may choose to invest in a higher risk instruments or CDOs because it would be very profitable if the returns from these investment is higher than 5.1% that Lehman Brothers promised you. Especially so, when they do not need to bear the risks of defaults these CDOs or any of the assets in the basket of Collateral Assets. The returns from these Collateral Assets, they take but you bear the risks of defaults from these assets.

Under the contract, once a CREDIT EVENT happens, the whole arrangement will be liquidated. The Credit Event involves:

1) If any one of the reference banks failed, it is considered as a Credit Event and the investors will have to pay Lehman Brothers for the insurance it bought via the Credit Risks Swap. Meaning, investors will lose all money invested.

2) If more than 11 companies of the 150 companies listed in the Collateral Assets failed, or a certain percentage of the CDOs or credit-linked derivatives held as Collateral Assets go into default, the whole Minibonds will be liquidated and any loss from these defaults will be born by investors (not Lehman Brothers).

Afternote: Someone asks me about where does the prospectus point out about Credit Event no. 2. This is the tricky part, when you were sold the product, they did not point out directly the more important risk involved in the collateral assets and in the base prospectus , it was not listed as "Credit Event" or "Risk" but instead it was listed under the section on Mandatory Redemption. I have seen the pricing statement and such important HIGH RISK was not prominently mentioned also. Someone pointed out that under the various series'prospectus, it was mentioned as follows:

- for minibond series 3 if 10 credit events happen to the 150 companies, investor would experience some loss of principal. If there are 12 such credit events investor will loss all principal.
(Prospectus pg 20)

- for minibond series 5, if 11 credit events happen to the 150 companies, investors would experience some loss of principal. If there are 13 such credit events investor will loss all principal.
(Prospectus pg 21)

- for minibond series 7 (they don't even state the numbers now). Investor will experience some loss of principal if a "specified amount" of loss from the unknown number of companies.
(Prospectus pg 22)

Most important of all, the prospectus did not list out the 150 companies


But the definition of Credit Event does not includes the failing of Lehman Brothers as the Credit Risks Swap partner. Thus, at this moment, investors do no face immediate liquidation of the Minibonds and suffer immediate losses.

However, investors RISK losing a lot of money due to the fact that the value of the basket of CDOs and other credit-linked derivatives held as Collateral Assets has devalued tremendously due to the present financial crisis. The likelihood of a credit event triggered by the failing of a substantial number of companies within the list of 150 is very high at this moment.


Furthermore, as Lehman Brothers has gone into bankruptcy, it will no longer give you the 5.1% as it promised and in this financial crisis, the variable returns from the basket of CDOs and credit-linked derivatives would be nearly zero as most of them are linked to SubPrime products.

Thus, with this basic understanding of the product Minibonds, I shall answer Peter's questions:

1) What was sold to the unsuspecting and gullible investors ? Is it a Credit Default Swap( CDS ). What is a CDS ?

Credit Default Swap, also commonly known as Credit Risk Swap, is a mechanism whereby two parties "exchange risk". In this case of Minibonds, it is totally an UNFAIR swapping. The "RISK" Minibonds Investors swapped with Lehman Brothers is the VARIABLE RETURNS from the basket of Collateral Assets they implicitly invested via Minibonds Ltd controlled by Lehman Brothers. However, the risk of the failing of the whole basket of Collateral Assets are not insured by Lehman Brothers. Thus, Lehman Brothers will not compensate investors if they lose money due to defaults of the CDOs and credit-linked assets held in the basket of collateral assets!

This is where the tricky part is. Lehman Brothers could use Minibonds Ltd to invest in many HIGH RISK financial derivatives to get very high variable returns and it will benefit from these returns while only giving back a fixed 5.1% to investors. But if these HIGH RISK derivatives failed, investors will have to bear the brunt.

On the other hand, Lehman Brothers has used the Six Reference banks as a risk bet to Minibonds investors. It seems to me that using such reference entities of "Low Risk" nature as Credit Default Risk exchange is MISLEADING as it creates an impression of "LOW RISKS" while in fact, the amount of RISK investors born is very much higher as they are responsible for the risk of the Collateral Assets!

2) What is the purpose of REFERENCE ENTITIES ( REs ) ? The REs are prominently displayed in the brochure and fooled us into thinking we are investing in their bonds.

As explained, the Reference Entities are just a reference of "Risk" that Lehman Brothers is swapping with you. Your money invested did not invest in these banks but rather in a list of 150 companies' credit-linked derivatives which may be of HIGH RISKS nature.

The main Risk that investors is taking lies in the basket of Collateral Assets.

3) The money collected from investors, what did they do with it. I saw the swapping chart in your blog in chinese. Can you kindly prepare one in english and email to me so that I can photocopy and distribute this sat. at speakers corner to help investors achieve some understanding.

The money collected from investors are invested in a basket of HIGH RISK derivatives issued by 150 companies. High risk derivatives may give high VARIABLE returns but the returns from these High Risk derivatives was swapped by the arrangement of CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP, to Lehman Brothers. That means that investors are bearing the HIGH RISKS of this basket of derivatives (not bonds, but CDOs and credit-linked derivatives) but Lehman Brothers has taken all the returns from these derivatives and in return, only promised to give you a FIXED return of 5.1%!

4) The REs have not defaulted,but the value of our investments have plumetted to almost zero. What is the rationale behind this incomprehensible senario.?

Although the REs have not defaulted but the basket of HIGH RISK derivatives that your money actually invested in as a basket of Collateral Assets has actually diminished due to the financial crisis that we are facing. Although you as investors have not enjoyed the high returns from these high risk derivatives (which you have swap and given to Lehman Brothers for 5.1% return) but you bear the risks of defaults or devaluation from these financial derivative instruments.

5) Did the distributor :-
a) misrepresented this product ( not aware of it's true nature and operating mechanism )
b) concealed the material fact ( they knew but did not tell us )

a) From the many descriptions given by investors with regards to the information they received from sales representatives, it is a CLEAR MIS-INFORMATION and MIS-REPRESENTATION of this product. The RISK you faced is not LOW as the failure of any one of the six reference entities. You, as an investor, also face risk of defaults or devaluation of the basket of HIGH RISK financial derivatives issued by the 150 companies and yet, you did not enjoy FULLY the potential high returns from these instruments but taking the risk of these instruments! Basically it means that, somebody used your money to invest in HIGH RISKS products and keep all the potential HIGH RETURNS from your investment but in return, they only give you back a FIXED 5.1% and you bear all the risks of defaults and devaluation of these products. I believe if this is represented properly to you, many investors would not be investing in this product. I mean, who wants to bear all the HIGH RISK while taking back only a FIXED 5.1%?

b) I am not in the position to say whether "they knew but did not tell you" or they conceal any material facts because I am not vested and would not know whether those front line sales representatives actually know what they are selling in the very first place. I believe not many people really understand this Lehman Brothers Minibonds when it was first sold. If those financial elites at MAS actually study the whole structure carefully, they would realize that this Minibonds is DETRIMENTAL to consumers' interests and it is a totally UNFAIR Credit Default Risk Swap as Lehman Brothers controlled the Swap Party Minibond Ltd.

I hope my explanation is clear enough for you to understand.

Goh Meng Seng

Reader: What is Minibonds?

I have received an email from reader to ask me about what is exactly Minibonds. I am in the process of doing a comprehensive write up on what exactly Minibonds is all about, for the benefits for both my English as well as Chinese readers.


Dear Mr. Goh Meng Seng

I had the pleasure of exchanging a few words with you last sat. at speakers corner,
and had met you previously in WP's hq. just before the last GE.

I had invested 80k of my retirement funds into this product and wish to learn from my mistakes. Up to now nobody could tell me the true intent and nature of this product called MINIBOND.
Most of us have been deceived by this word and thought we had invested in a basket of bonds.
I tried rereading the prospectus to get some answers but ended up confused and bewildered by the terminologies, technical jargon & legalese. ( I had retired from the construction sector )

These are some of questions, hope you can help :-
1) What was sold to the unsuspecting and gullible investors ? Is it a Credit Default Swap
( CDS ). What is a CDS ?
2) What is the purpose of REFERENCE ENTITIES ( REs ) ?
the REs are prominently displayed in the brochure and fooled us into thinking we
are investing in their bonds.
3) The money collected from investors, what did they do with it.
I saw the swapping chart in your blog in chinese. Can you kindly prepare one in english
and email to me so that I can photocopy and distribute this sat. at speakers corner
to help investors achieve some understanding.
4) The REs have not defaulted,but the value of our investments have plumetted to almost
zero. What is the rationale behind this incomprehensible senario.?
5) Did the distributor :-
a) misrepresented this product ( not aware of it's true nature and operating mechanism )
b) concealed the material fact ( they knew but did not tell us )

I have come across anecdotes where complainants were bullied and brow-beatened at the
interviews by reps of the banks and brokerages.
Without a proper knowledge and understanding ( in Hindsight ) of this product, this will always be the norm at such interviews.

Mr. Tan Kin Lian and your goodself have selflessly contributed your time and efforts to
help us, the ordinary citizens, and for that we are eternally grateful to you gentlemen.
I had initially wanted to send this email to Mr. Tan but do not wish to burden him
unnecessarily and also hope this is not the case with you.

Thank You

Peter

不关政府的事？ (二)

不关政府的事？

我这是回应蔡深江先生于十月二十六日在《想法》》版所写的“会头跑了”的文章。

蔡先生在他的文章里以“跟会”来形容这次迷你债券和结构性金融产品所产生的风波是非常不恰当的比喻。最重要的结论“不关政府的事”更是有混淆视听，转移视线的嫌疑。

我目前虽然只是在帮助陈钦亮先生替他把他的演讲稿翻译了演说给那一些受误导的小市民，引导他们循体制内寻求公道的解决方案，但是在我本人看来，追根究底这场风波的始作俑者就是金融管理局！蔡先生怎么能以“跟会”这非法集资放贷的地下会庄和堂堂正正见得光的银行金融体系做这种不恰当的比喻而得出“不关政府的事”的结论呢？

人们去“跟会”就预知它的非法和高风险性质，而且没有政府机制会来监管。所以如果人们为了那可观的会红去跟会，出了事，会头跑路了，因果自负，怨不了谁，更怨不了政府，因为政府已经把这会庄列成“非法”！但是，这次出事的是被政府监管机构所允许，标着“正当”的结构性金融产品啊！并不是人民去非法的金融公司购买非法的产品啊！

政府有责任是因为：

1） 政府属下的机构金融管理局监管疏忽，竟然应许这种高风险和结构复杂的金融产品让银行售买给那一些只寻求底风险定期存款回报率的客户。人们到储蓄银行存钱就是因为他们是保守，不愿承受高风险。这也就是说，金融管理局无视这明显的风险比对的差误而继续让银行为寻高利润而误销这一些产品。

2） 在这次风波发生前，我相信金管局已经接到许多关于银行职员用不良销售手法推销这一些结构性金融产品的投诉。对于这警钟的敲起，金管局当时似乎视而不见，只是口头上提醒银行而没有采取实质性的行动去真正了解下方实际情况从而制止不当误销行径继续发生。这样纵容银行不当的销售方法，代表政府的金管局真是难辞其咎！

3） 最重要的是，环顾世界上所有国家和地区，为什么唯独新加坡和香港会有普通市民被误销这类结构性金融产品呢？新加坡和香港政府为了争个“亚洲金融最开放的市场”这个虚名，枉顾消费者的利益而大打“解除监管”的大招牌，把一些连西方国家都不愿让储蓄银行销售的金融产品都摆在我们的银行里售卖。这不是一个自认负责任的政府所应该做的事。

我最看不过眼的是，政府在这事件中，摆着事不关己的态度。 就连贵报资深评论员也有意无意地为“不关政府的事”制造论据。虽然香港和新加坡政府一样都犯了同样的错误，但与香港政府对整个事件处理的积极性相比，新加坡政府就显得没有诚意，相形见绌了。香港政府除了积极为苦主收集投诉外，还主动安排把他们的投诉分批处理。除此之外，香港政府还誓言如果有必要的话，会通过资助他们的消费者协会为苦主打官司！相比之下，新加坡政府竟然通过金管局呼吁向金融机构投诉而接受金融机构的调查。可笑的是，金管局竟然相信这一些金融机构能“公正、合理”处理这一些个案！据我所接触的苦主的叙述，他们前往金融机构面谈时都遭到金融机构的代表以有如高压盘问犯人的手法对待，使他们倍感压力！在这样的情况底下，我们怎么期望苦主会得到应有的“公正、合理”的对待？

我吁请贵报应该作为人民的喉舌，应该以中肯的态度对待整件事件。新加坡报纸和香港报纸相比之下，这是逊色得很。在香港报社评论中，第一时间就为读者交待什么是雷曼迷你债券。报道也中肯的看待政府监管职责的疏忽、银行的行销手法、雷曼产品的毒害和投资者的过失。从来没有报纸会直接说政府没有责任！

我也吁请政府的金管局，应该更积极处理整件事件，不应叫苦主直接找金融机构投诉。因为这一些金融机构为了保护自己的利益，必定会用有利于他们自己的方法来处理事件。有苦主已经透露了他们受到高压对待，金管局不应一错再错，让苦主独自面对有膨大资源的金融机构以致他们在面谈的过程中做出对自己不利的言行。

吴明盛

星期天评头踩足—2008.10.26

主题:星期天评头踩足—2008.10.26
作者:韦春花 10:37am 26/10/2008

星期天评头踩足—2008.10.26





对于世间的万事万物，花儿我信服周易的原则：不易、简易、变易。说起来有些反智，但是我就是认为，那些高深的学问和见首不见尾的概念，很多时候是拿来唬人或者骗自己，如果回到初衷，最终还是要屈服于常识。

蔡深江的比喻就很妙，理查德·福尔德就像会头，而这个会头是跑了的。说什么结构性、衍生、对冲，到底是拿了人家的钱去赌，赌输了就跑路，就这么简单！没有信用和道德。连没有读书、受华文教育（什么时候这两样对等了？）都懂，问题是很多道貌岸然和扭曲的法律程序在保护着坏人，甚至还要抢着去救他；这跟扶着大债户过马路一样，深怕他给汽车给撞死了。

救世或救市需要大智慧，就是能够看破纷扰的时局，知道最基本的东西，去掉那些繁文缛节，直指问题核心（陈钦亮就有那么一点味道）。老实说看到金管局王瑞杰的专访，我知道这位先生在位不久了。当然不是现在，或者是三个月后、或者半年，他会因为一些奇怪的理由或者健康因素挂冠而去。为什么呢？因为他的讲话根本没有更高的东西，那支笛不断老调重吹，像坏了的唱盘，更在意的是为自己辩护。以这种提线傀儡的程度怎么肩负带领众人“出埃及”的重责呢？

李阿姐长篇大论：

* 从求见议员的选民的语汇中，可知他们自有一套思维方式。对于一些机构的概念，他们并不清楚。……还是因为人们多年来建立了对政府的信任，甚至养成依赖，有时可以不求甚解？又或者是人们自己拒绝去理解，只选择听自己想听的内容？……平日没有出乱子时，很多人都不会留意执行时所出的纰漏，我们也不会在意其中所谓 “弱势”的概念。但是这一次，因为牵涉到金钱的利益和售卖方式的正当与否，在处理问题时，当局就提出了“弱势”的归类。……现在，金融管理局已经有一套协助不同类型投资者的方案，有关机构需要时间去处理和解决。我所关心的是在这次事件以外的……相当一部分人即便懂得英语，甚至受不错的教育，对于我们生活中许多情况，政府的政策等等，也还是未必有清楚的概念。在我看来，更深层的，其实是其中知识结构的问题。而知识结构不只是有没有文凭和证书，是否有接受某种技能培训而已，是整个的知识面的宽窄，对课题认知的深浅。

中了人家设计的圈套，失去棺材本，是因为这些人平日“不求甚解、又或者是人们自己拒绝去理解，只选择听自己想听的内容”——要怪都要怪你懒惰、没脑、不用脑，自己要负起大部分的责任，李阿姐是这个意思吗？

其实这个“懂”与“不懂”之争，在于谁定义这两个词？在以总理、资政作后盾的金管局和以陈钦亮为代表的民间力量之间的角力，到底是谁教会谁真正的“懂”？金管局的不断U转（请参考 TOC选读：MAS——像只绝望的无头鸡），说明是他们在受教。之前，连最简单的人心向背都“不懂”。

高深的词汇只会把人弄糊涂，而不是要把人弄懂。就好像周兆呈的鸿文《‘新闻自由之最’的破产》，重点摘录是“新闻最自由的冰岛已经‘破产’，排名比较靠前的欧美都希望借助中国——新闻自由排名成绩不佳的国家——的经济力量来稳定全球金融秩序，这对曾经鼓与吹新闻自由与市场经济健康成正比的一些学者来说，真是情何以堪。”——非常截然、牙齿当金使的断言。

文中用了不少的大词汇：人均GDP、全球性的股市、债券、期货、信贷、房地产、信奉新闻自由与市场经济存有紧密因果关系、耶鲁大学管理学院金融学教授、亚洲金融危机、市场经济、法学教授、金融危机的肇因、新闻自由程度、经济自由化程度等，看得是眼花缭乱，就是希望为新加坡的排名落后找到一些搪塞之词，或者自我开解也说不定。

可是我用两个图表就可以推翻他的结论，请看左图跟右图，膺“新闻最自由”第一荣衔的国家共有7个，除非周兆呈能够预测他们在近期内都会破产，否则他的立论不能成立。对曾经鼓与吹新闻自由与市场经济健康成正比的一些学者来说，还是老神在在。

第140新加坡和第159中国之间还夹着18个国家，我希望周兆呈也能举证他们受金融风暴的影响很小（包括新加坡）。那么最后一名北朝鲜出来救全世界会不会更好呢？要不然他的结论也是下得太仓促了。

他以为他懂很多，很多时候碍于私心，只是见木不见林。♪

不关政府的事???

主题:典型的金融罪犯成了金融道德的典范！！！
作者:冬冬 2:15pm 26/10/2008

回来新加坡已有十一天，从开始兴致勃勃了解到几天后稍有了解后不想多言，这期间心理上是极大的不舒。今天看到蔡总编、周、李二位主任的大作，不禁摇头叹息。。。。

周主任利用冰岛经济破产来印证新加坡言论受压制的好处，冰岛经济可能破产是因为新闻自由之最之故吗？这根本是两码子事。冰岛是由于急于求富而在经济策略上孤注一掷而不幸遭逢金融怪兽的毒手，看看我们的星展吧，其实我们正在依循冰岛的脚步前行，只不过我们是刚起步涉入未深才不至遭大难。冰岛是大多数国民的资产都没入金融抄作。而我国这些年来却是却是官方一而再的鼓动全民拥股全民用赌。这是两者的最大差异之一，而周主任想利用的¨新闻自由¨是两国民众对金融风险认识的关键。

因为新闻自由度高，冰岛政府、财经界、知识份子和新闻从业员，都无利用职权来随意误导国民，冰岛大多数国民都了解金融衍生产品的高凤险。而新加坡呢？冰岛政府或准确的说是除香港和新加坡外的全球金融管理局都不敢批准把这些高凤险的迷你债卷卖给一般国民，而新加坡金管局呢？星展不只在港、新两地推售雷曼迷你债卷，更财迷心窍的推出了自己的金融衍生产品。周主任啊周主任。。你是否可以想像如果这次金融危机再拖拉个三两年才爆发，星展银行将会是怎一个¨危¨字了得？

我不知道李主任慧玲究竟对这次我国小民金融危机的肇因是懂还是不懂？还是她根本就不想懂、不愿懂或是自残脑袋根本不敢去懂？像她这样本来就该在事情爆发后，利用知识和职权去弄懂问题的所谓知识份子都只能是懵懂，竟还敢夸谈什么知识结构才是深层原由，奢谈什么知识经济。

蔡总编越来越有幽默感了，他把金融大恶形像化－－会头。他的标题是¨会头跑了¨！众所周之，¨会¨在我国是违规、非法的，给马打（警察）知道你是¨会头¨那是会被捉去坐牢的哦。。那么是谁批准那些个外国会头和本地会头（星展）在新加坡开¨会¨的？不就是新加坡金融管理局罗！！！蔡总编这¨会头跑了¨捅了金管局这个马蜂窝，当然担心乌纱帽不保，所以他又敢紧打圆场跟他妈说：那些¨本地会头¨自己决定要赔偿的，当然，政府在背后也很关心，看得很紧，
不过不关政府的事。

蔡总编真会开玩笑，你把你家大门的锁匙交给公寓的管理员，他开门让人进你家，结果那人偷了＄５０，０００，你发觉了，旁人说：那贼愿意赔你平均约＄５０，并提醒你，那是这个¨贼¨自己决定要赔偿的，当然，管理员在背后也很关心，看得很紧，不过不关管理员的事！是不是这意思啊蔡总编？？？

金融管理局是始作俑者，而星展是那些个贪得无厌的金融机构之一（是本地最绝对大的销售机构），但在蔡总编等人的笔下却成了最有人情味、最有道德、最有责任感的机构。在你们巧笔的描绘之下典型的金融罪犯成了金融道德的典范

那些个获全赔的¨弱势¨究竟占总购买额的多少？新加坡政府一定会快刀斩乱麻，以尽快在香港的赔偿明朗化之前为赔偿额定案。而香港则会大打太极让新加坡定出个超低的赔偿标准，香港人决不会因港府的恫吓而做缩头乌龟任由摆布，港府不能，新加坡政府一定能。当然港府也绝对不敢妄想如新加坡政府般反而从罪犯化身成了罗宾汉、救世主

A Mis-sold Government!

The following is another comment from the same anonymous reader. My response is this: Ever since I get involved in helping Mr. Tan Kin Lian in delivering his translated speech, some people approached me in private, even come to my shop and said, as a middle-upper class Singaporeans, they have finally awaken to the fact that this PAP government isn't as good as they claim to be. They could make grave mistakes. In this saga, apparently anyone with a critical mind, would come to the conclusion that MAS has mishandled the whole saga and that, MAS itself was the main culprit in allowing such complex financial product to be sold to people who are only interested in putting their money in safe bank fixed deposits.

And I am glad to hear from these people that they finally realized the importance of having alternative voice, checks and balances within the political platform, namely the parliament. I hope this will materialize in the next GE.

The following is the comment from anonymous:

I'm the same anonymous who wrote the above. I want to say somemore.

We as Singaporeans serve NS and do our reservist duties. But everyday many of us ask what we will be fighting for. Not towering million $ condominiums downtown or not the wealth of the companies that set up here and can close shop and leave when the bad time comes. We defend our pledge which holds the values that binds our society - democracy, justice, equality.

We have understood that we voted for a govt who will serve the people. But in times of crisis like this, we see the govt is not even sure which side to stand. It is like an NS man who is not sure whether to fight or not. There is no question in my mind that the leadership has to be on the side of the people from day 1. What we saw was dithering, denial and trying to spread the blame. It was shameful. Totally shameful. The MAS and govt seems to be hiding from the people on the 1st week of the saga. It was when Tan Kin Lian screamed "MAS Do the right thing" on his blog that people in the ivory tower realise they need to act.

10,000 ordinary Singaporeans losing their lifesavings wrought no sense of urgency from this govt. Their natural instinct was to adopt a minimalist approach if there was "little noise" from the ground.

I did not invest a single cent in structured product but I invested my entire life in this society called Singapore and accepted this form of elitist govt sold to me by the PAP. I've been mis-sold a govt. They are not worth the millions they are paid. There is no guarantee they are on the side of the people in times of crisis. There is no protection of the values in our pledge - Justice and equality. It seems their only interest in running this country to make money from ordinary people to grow the GLCs for the benefit of a handful of elites.

It is very clear to me that I've been mis-sold a whole govt called the PAP. It is a structured product - they have a power structure that downgrade the interests of the ordinary people. They structured our society so that there is a huge income gap between themselves and the ordinary folks. This structured product matures/expires in 3 years time, I'm not sure if I can get my 'principle' back. I'll make very sure the next time I stand in front of that ballot box I'll make the right decision. No amount of advertising and marketing will help them to mis-sell this structured product called PAP to me ever again.

MAS responsibility

The following is a comment left on my blog by anonymous reader:

A few points that I want to bring up:

1. Minibonds were not sold in many countries because there regulators deem it too complex e.g. Malaysia did not allow it.

2. MAS allowed the minibonds to come into Singapore but did not regulate the selling process. Oversight was missing and there were numerous complaints in the past but nothing concrete was done.

3. There is clear mis-selling on the part of the banks - minibonds were not bonds in the first place.

4. When the fiasco erupted MAS took a reactive approach.

It is the job of the govt to see that justice is done and the truth is found. The HK govt made ths same mistake as the Singapore govt in allowing these minibombs to be sold. But once it is clear the ordinary people will lose out, the HK govt stand firmly on the side of the people. We don't see this in Singapore. It is very disappointing for Singaporeans.

MiniBond Related Chinese Articles

I must apologize to my English readers about the many Chinese articles related to Minibond issues.

I have been working closely with Mr. Tan Kin Lian to help out Minibond investors to secure their rights and seek redress for the mis-selling of such complex financial instruments to layman retail investors. I guess I should not term them as investors as many of them are just simple folks who seek higher return for their fixed deposits with their banks.

I have agreed to become Mr. Tan Kin Lian's Chinese translator and delivering his speech in Mandarin on his behalf.

As I have given my blog's address to many of the Chinese educated people who have been affected by the structured financial products so that they could have a source of information in Chinese. This is why for this week my blog is mainly filled with Minibond-related Chinese articles.

I am going to write on the issue of Social Justice shortly, a reflection on the whole issue of Minibombs.

Goh Meng Seng

陈钦亮十月二十五日演讲译稿

芳林公园演说者角落 – 25 Oct 2008



1.马上投诉

第一步是向你所购买的金融公司陈上你的投诉信 必须诚实。在你的投诉信里，你必须很诚实的举出你是怎么样被引导和误导致使你决定购买这金融产品。很多人都被给予保证这产品是“安全”、“低风险”和是“定期存款”的一个很好的替代品。如果他们是这样跟你说的话，你可以如实的把它记录在你的投诉文件里。

你无需为你所签的任何行销代表给于你的文件所担心。如果他们没有把这一些文件的详细内容仔细的解释给你听的话，你也可以把这记录在你的投诉报告。

最为重要的是，你必须写清楚你是怎么被误导和行销代表是如何跟你讲解产品的内容。

我已经影印了一些表格好让你清楚的把有关资料写下以便帮助你更完整的提出具体投诉。如果你有什么不清楚的话，你可以向我们的义工求助。



Read this advice:
http://tankinlian.blogspot.com/2008/10/general-advice-to-investors-of.html

2.“非弱势”投资者

很多“非弱势”投资者对于他们的处境都很困惑。到目前为止，金管局和金融公司都没有具体的说明他们将如何对待这群投资者。

就让我们按部就班。你们应该见提出投诉并出席金融公司所安排的会面。你可以据实说出你所提出的投诉理由。

如果你不愿意自己前去，你可以带家人、朋友或其它受害投资者一同前往。





3.金融调解中心

如果你对金融公司所提出的赔偿方案不满意的话，你可以把这案件转向金融调解中心处理。你必须付费$53。50。

金融调解中心会成立审查小组来处理你的投诉。金融调解中心有权力作出对金融公司有约束性的裁决。但是这裁决对于你是没有约束性的。投资者有权力拒绝金融调解中心所作出的赔偿裁决而寻求法律途径。

到目前为止，金融调解中心的裁决权力范围的顶限是五万元。如果金融公司同意把赔偿裁决额提高超过五万元的话，它也就可以作出超过五万元的裁决。

4.与金融公司的公开论坛对话

我建议投资者应该团结起来，根据不同金融公司分组，一起向这些金融公司提出与投资者召开公开论坛来讨论以下的两点：

a) 投资者是怎么被行销代表所提供的资讯给误导

b) 金融公司应该要如何对这一些误导销售和错误意见赔偿损失。

5.第4份请愿书

我们可能有一万宗个案需要处理。到目前为止，只有少数的“弱势投资者”的个案已经圆满解决了。如果要以每个个案一个个的来处理的话可能就要花上很长的时间。而且很多受影响的人也还没有呈上他们的投诉。

我将组织另外一个请愿行动，向金融管理局局长提议寻求一个对这一些金融公司误导行销的情况提出一个全面集体的解决方案。全面集体的解决方案将有助于减少投资者在作出投诉时所面对的不安情绪和压力。这也有助于使整个事件明朗化，确保投资者会根据他们的所属的规范得到公平合理的赔偿。

6.法律诉讼

有一些投资者可能倾向于法律诉讼。我想提醒他们法律诉讼可能会很昂贵而具有败诉的风险。集体法律诉讼应该是最后的选择。

在投资者决定法律行动之前，他们应该考虑整个诉讼过程的费用和胜算有多少。他们也必须同意诉讼的途径和方法。他们也应该资询其它律师以便参考不同的费用估计。

陈钦亮
Tan Kin Lian
www.tankinlian.blogspot.com

金融补课

金融补课

■什么是结构产品（structured product）？

　　结构性产品是由金融机构把多种基础金融工具，比如证券、债券、汇率、商品等，或是信用工具等衍生产品（derivatives），组合成一种新的投资产品，经过精心设计包装后，分销给个别投资者。

结构性产品并不直接支付利息，回报受到与其挂钩的金融工具的价格所影响。
　　结构产品大致可分三种：本金保证（capital guaranteed）、资本回本（capital protected），另一种则完全没有保证。

　　★“本金保证”的结构产品风险低了许多，可被视为定期存款的另一种选择，但它回报率不定，而且投资期可长达数年。因此选择这种产品时，得考虑你的资金周转需求和投资时期有多长。

　　★“资本回本”型产品只担保投资者在投资期满时，至少取回本金。然而，根据条款，在期满之前，若产品出问题（比如发行银行倒闭、或挂钩的银行或投资出问题），投资者可能无法取回所有的本金，甚至血本无归。

　　雷曼兄弟迷你债券、星展高升短期债券5和美林Jubilee联赢票据3都属于资本回本的结构产品，投资的是信用工具。这些信用工具是把银行的贷款风险包装成结构产品，投资者继承这些风险，成了银行的“保险公司”。

■雷曼兄弟迷你债券(Lehman Minibonds)




　　尽管称为“迷你债券”，雷曼兄弟发行的这个产品其实即不是债券，也没有投资在债券上。

　　雷曼兄弟投资的是一篮子的信用（credit）工具，同时把产品与六家金融机构的信贷可靠程度挂钩。如果其中一家机构发生信贷事件（credit event），如破产、未能偿还债务、进行重组等，票据就会被终止，发行商将提早赎回票据并进行结算。

　　结算过程中，发行商会尝试售出所投资的信用工具，然后先偿还其他债主，投资者的索偿权排最后，赔偿将根据发生信贷事件的金融机构的市价来计算。然而，自美国次贷危机爆发后，几乎没有人愿意购买这类信用工具，所以投资者可能一分钱也取不回。

　　不过，“迷你债券”出问题并不是其中一家关联金融机构出问题，而是发行商倒闭。如果有人愿意接管这个票据，并承诺持守到产品到期日，投资者就有希望至少取回本金。目前还没有任何人愿意接管迷你债券。

■星展高升短期债券5（DBS High Notes 5）和美林Jubilee联赢票据3(Merrill Lynch Jubilee Series 3-LinkEarner Notes)
　　星展高升短期债券5和美林Jubilee联赢票据3的游戏规则，和雷曼兄弟迷你债券一样。

　　这两个产品也是投资在一篮子的信用工具上，很不幸的，这两个产品挂钩的其中一家金融机构，就是宣布破产的雷曼兄弟。而雷曼兄弟目前的市价几乎是零，投资者好比踏上地雷，被炸得体无完肤。

■星展高升短期债券2

（DBS High Notes 2）

　　星展高升短期债券2和上述产品有类似的游戏规则。所幸的是，雷曼兄弟不是8个挂钩银行的其中一家。然而，该票据有个隐藏的条例，如果所投资的一篮子信用工具当中有好几个出问题，那么产品也会被终止。

　　这一篮子信用工具，包括倒闭的雷曼兄弟、房地美(Freddie Mac)和房利美(Fannie Mae)的债券。由于这些债券的信贷评级被降级，算是发生信贷事件，它们就像小地雷一样，把投资者的手脚都炸掉了。

　　如果下来一切平安无事，那么投资者还有希望在投资到期时，取回本金。投资者可以选择不冒险，现在立即把票据卖了，但这些票据目前仅剩下10％左右的价值。

金融调解中心的程序

我已经向金融调解中心查询关于投诉和调解程序的过程，资讯如下：

1）如果你的索偿是在5万元以下的话，你可向你所属的金融公司投诉要求调解而同时联络金融调解中心给你寄上有关文件。比如说，你也许买入了10万元的迷你债券而你得知这些迷你债券的价值只剩下7万元，你的亏损将是3万元，你就可以直接到金融公司投诉然后通知金融调解中心，要求调解索偿。金融调解中心在这期间会向你索取地址资料以便把有关相关的文件寄给你。根据金融调解中心的意见是，你必须等待最多4星期。如果金融公司在这4星期没有回音的话，你可再找金融调解中心。但是如果你不属于弱势投资者的话，你可能拿到100%的赔偿的几率是很小的。

2）如果你的损失是超过5万元的话（例如，买了10万，剩值1万，净亏损9万），你有3个选择。你可以先到所属的金融公司投诉，如果他们同意把案件交给金融调解中心的话，金融调解中心就可能把索偿的赔偿额提高超过规定的5万元。这也就是说你可能通过金融调解中心拿到超过5万的赔偿。但是如果金融公司不肯把案件提交金融调解中心的话，你也可以直接和金融公司谈判。如果没法达成满意的协议的话，你还是可以通过金融调解中心投诉。但是如果是单方面通过金融调解中心投诉，你所能得到最高的赔偿还是5万元。如果你决定5万元不是你可以接受的赔偿的话，你就必须考虑采取集体诉讼行动索偿。

3）如果你是向同一间金融公司购买了多过一种金融结构产品的话，你可以要求金融公司和金融调解中心把这一些产品分开来处理。比如，你买了两个系列的迷你债券，总亏损是4万加3万，你可以要求分开处理，以便能把索偿顺利通过金融调解中心调解而不用得到金融公司的同意，或把赔偿总额限制在5万元，而是把它们当成两个各案来处理。

4）通过金融调解中心调解如果到了裁定阶段，你必须付裁决费用$53.50。金融调解中心的裁决对金融公司有约束力，但对于小投资者的你并没有约束力。这也就是说，如果你接受了金融调解中心的裁决，金融公司就必须依照裁决给于你那裁定的赔偿额。但你身位提诉者，你有权拒绝接受那裁定而转向集体法律诉讼程序。但是如果你接受了金融调解中心的裁决接受了拟定的赔偿，你就失去了针对同一投诉采取集体法律诉讼的权力。

以上是我所收集到的资料。我将在来临的星期六详细的讲解金融调解中心的整个过程。

吴明盛

雷曼迷债没有列出的真相-信报

雷曼迷债没有列出的真相

迷宗

笔者在各大小钱庄负责企业融资超过二十年，眼见各媒体对雷曼迷你债券都没有正确报道。笔者读毕其issue prospectus和programme prospectus，并尝试用知识拆解它的谜团（系列 36）。不过，笔者要提醒大家，雷曼迷债还有很多资料是没有在该两本说明书列出的。

前阵子，有银行前线销售员工打电话到电台，说雷曼是大金融机构，有良好评级，甚至优于很多本地银行，因此去年他们一直用雷曼这块招牌去招徕生意，只是没有人能料到他会倒下来。事实上，这批销售员并不了解此产品。这也难怪。结构性产品根本是企业融资或专业赌徒的专门工具，一般人根本难以理解，遑论参与。
回报小风险高

其实很多人到现在还不知道，雷曼根本不是借款人或担保人。在整系列的迷债中，雷曼都只是安排行，透过一间表面独立、没有任何关连的空壳公司 Pacific International Finance Limited（PIF），去买一些抵押债务证券（CDO）。不过，雷曼非但没有发任何担保给小投资者，更甚的是，雷曼机关算尽，把所有CDO的利益都拿走了，风险就全留给散户，而报酬就是那区区的5%年息！换言之，即使雷曼目前还健在，按现在的CDO市场，迷债仍然是亏本的。且看下面分解。

1．雷曼利用一招信贷违约掉期（CDS），以低廉息口（港元5%、美元5.5%），透过PIF借（实际上应是拿）小投资者的钱去投资一些CDO，然后抵押予散户。散户在到期还本日有没有钱收，就列明要看这批CDO的造化。

2．PIF代散户用CDS，以5%的代价，把CDO一切利息收益转让予雷曼。

3．不过，这CDS只是掉换利息不换本，即CDO的拥有权还在PIF，即散户的手中。就是说，CDO价格的下跌风险仍由小投资者一力承担，如在迷债到期时，这些CDO在PIF收回或卖得多少，散户就收多少；就算金额不及原来的本金，也不关雷曼的事。

4．一旦这些CDO期内有什么冬瓜豆腐，即如CDO发行机构破产或不能履行合同，小投资者便要承担损失。也就是这样，PIF把这些CDO卖得多少，散户就收多少；还有，散户也要付予雷曼提早中断CDS的termination fee（分手费，计算方法极为复杂，暂且按下不表）。

从上面看来，迷债徒有债券之名，表面上，散户好像是借了钱予PIF。实情是，散户透过PIF投资了一些CDO，但CDO的收益，PIF已帮散户在与雷曼签的CDS中，以五厘息让与雷曼。不过，这些CDO本金和违约风险，仍然是散户的！还有，迷债无论有什么问题，PIF都只赔散户那些CDO和其跟雷曼 CDS订下的权益。 PIF其他的资产，散户无权拿，也即是说，散户也没有权利把PIF清盘。笔者明白此举原意是保障其他投资者，用来作为不同系列的防火栏（ring- fencing），即系列36有事也不会影响其他系列1至35 。但此等细节事前肯定无人告知散户，现在便变成了PIF的金钟罩。但话得说回来，PIF根本是一间空壳公司，那里还有另外的资产还钱予散户？看过上面的条款，散户还怎么说此等迷债是普通的债？完全是委托投资。

那么，那些CDO又是什么？章程可没有详细透露，只知是火箭专家设计的产品，有3A评级。但产品章程这么空泛，连买什么都不知道，银行又何以推荐予公众呢？

吊诡之处就是，在CDS中，CDS订下的信贷违约参考机构，全是本地大蓝筹或知名大银行〔中电（002）、汇控（005）、星展、港铁（066）等〕。雷曼说，如任何一间参考机构发生了违约事件，不能偿还他们自己的借贷（不是散户的迷债，因他们跟散户和迷债完全没有关系）或破产，散户就再没有那五厘息了；散户也要把持有的CDO拿出来，与雷曼交换那个已出事机构的债务，即坏债（实情是那笔坏债到时再定！）。还有就是，如散户的CDO已跌价，就要在散户要收那些坏债的价值中，扣回有关差价。
转移散户视线

这似乎很公平、很吸引。中电、汇控、港铁都关门大吉的话，香港和我俱可休矣。这样的话，收五厘息可真是差不多。但且慢！散户可能忘记了（或不知道）自己是投资一些高风险的CDO，而非借钱予PIF或任何由雷曼担保的机构。散户面对的第一风险不是中电、汇控、地铁倒闭，而是CDO。雷曼成功转移了散户的视线，散户连买什么CDO都不知道，就“中招”了。

笔者上世纪九十年代便开始向本地和跨国企业或半官方法定机构销售结构性产品。大致上团队可分为两组人，一班是设计产品的火箭专家，全是银行祖家总行的老外；另一班就是本地的客户经理，主要是把产品微调再包装，以符合客户和本地法例要求。打个比方，火箭专家负责设计赌局（赌具和赌法），笔者等推销员就装修赌场，以符合法例要求和吸引客人，并向他们解释产品。

做文件时，客户和银行都要另聘律师，把整套文件从头看到尾，翻来覆去，历时两三个月也是等闲事！除非散户是业界中人或专门做金融合约的律师，否则根本不可能看得明这些文件。

现在，雷曼的火箭专家设计或看中了一些CDO，就利用CDS再加上本地推销员的财技，尽拿这些CDO的好处。不过，雷曼并不留下或承担风险（无担保、无举债），更不用为PIF的融资入账（在CDS订下的付款责任只按加权方程式入账），真是机关算尽，合法并合理（如小投资者一早认清并接受这种结构的话）。

条款公平与否？是商业决定，是当事人的判断。但有否误导？谁在误导？读者自己下结论吧。很多基本资料如投资者买什么CDO，又或CDS下面收什么坏债，都并没有说清楚，这是否公平呢？还有，结构性产品根本是给专业投资者的，而非普罗大众，他们哪有能力和时间看那些法律文件？他们也不可能找律师帮忙，因为收益只有5厘，抵销不了律师费。就算雷曼没有倒闭，这些迷债（CDO）根本是超高风险，买了输光的机会也是超高。

最后，迷债投资者投资前，其实应问一问下面几个问题，而答案全是负面。

1. 散户跟谁赌？

在迷债中，是空壳公司Pacific International Finance Limited，雷曼没有任何担保。

2. 赌什么？

在迷债中，是CDO和CDS两项投资。最惨是散户不知那些CDO是什么，CDS怎计算也不大清楚。

3. 最后回报？

只有5厘息，还要承担上面的不明风险。

上面的问题，其实毋须什么专业知识也懂得回答，不然，那些推销员就是无知和误导了！

2008年10月20日<信报>

Volunteers Needed

I have met up with some of the Minibond holders and those who are affected by the various structured financial products. Many of them are not able to read English nor understand English at all, least write English.

Thus I am thinking ahead and feel that they may have problems writing a proper complain letters to the various financial institutions. I have discussed with Mr. Tan Kin Lian and we agreed that we could have volunteers to offer help to these people at our next meeting at Hong Lim Park this coming Saturday.

I am calling for interested readers here to volunteer your help. I am expecting about a couple of hundreds, if not more, to approach us for this little service. Thus, due to time constrain, we may need more than 20 volunteers to help out.

This is a strictly volunteering work and we will not allow soliciting of any business in whatsoever ways through this process.

For those who are interested, please email at chirongoh@gmail.com
Please include in your email:

Name, HP number and email address (please use a valid return email address)

Goh Meng Seng

迷你债券10月25日芳林公园集会事项

对于那一些需要帮忙写投诉信的迷你债券或结构金融产品的苦主，陈钦亮先生和我都在召集义务员，在10月25日到芳林公园的集会帮助你们起草投诉信件。到时候，你们可以把你所购买的金融结构产品的资料，包括合约、宣传册子、广告传单、每月的结账单等相关文件到方林公园去。我们会在傍晚5时左右开始帮忙你们草拟投诉信。

陈钦亮先生的演讲依旧是在6时正进行。

对于那一些苦主需要金融调节中心的地址，联络电话如下：

Registered Address
112 Robinson Road #13-03
HB Robinson
Singapore 068902

Tel: (65) 63278878
Fax: (65) 63278488
Email: info@fidrec.com.sg

Opening Hours:
Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays 9.00 a.m to 6.00 p.m

Tuesdays, Thursdays 9.00 a.m to 7.30 p.m
(prior appointment required after 6.00 p.m)

苦主最好是先打电话到金融调解局询问详情才前去。

吴明盛

TOC: MAS——像只绝望的无头鸡 (Translated)

A translated article from TOC

MAS——像只绝望的无头鸡
2008年10月18日 星期六

● 卢鸿佩 /副编辑
任何紧跟雷曼兄弟倒闭新闻的本地人一定看得不断搔头，他会对金管局（MAS）的作为或不作为感到无所适从。

从一开始，金管局就毫无主张——不懂得如何应付金融和信用危机、不懂得应对申告无门的愤怒苦主、不懂得在波诡云谲的时候挑起领袖的重担。

或许我在两个礼拜前，陪陈钦亮先生到珊顿大道金管局办公室代苦主们提交请愿书就该嗅出端倪。我在那里等候已经提前进去交请愿书的陈钦亮先生，以便和他会合。就在外面闲逛的当儿，我就被保安人员问了三次，还有一位小姐自称来自comms department，大概就是所谓的公关部门。她显然很担心我会拍下金管局大厦的照片，或者有关陈先生在里面交涉过程的任何照片。

她问了两次：我是不是来自媒体？而且不断提醒我不可拍照，因为那是“他们的大厦”。意识到她因我的存在而局促不安（加上那个保全不停地看着我），我问：是不是我该到别处去等？她说随我的便，所以我选择留下来。

我的感觉就是，这个大概就是金管局混乱和惊慌的征兆吧。接下来的一周，发生了很多事，引起更多人怀疑金管局到底有什么作为？

如陈幸运在他的博客 Minibonds : No leadership in times of trouble....! 所写：咱们政府好像跟香港政府亦步亦趋，有时落后一步，有时则两步。

当丑闻爆开的时候，金管局根本不理睬苦主的投诉，叫他们径自去和银行交涉。可是另一方面，香港政府则对银行售卖结构性金融商品给毫无防备心的公众采取严厉的措施。事实上，国务资政吴作栋，现任金管局主席，竟惹众怒说：“那是命，你要高回报，你就得冒高风险。要不然，就乖乖把钱放在公积金就好了。”我所遇到的人都对这些话觉得很感冒。

金管局接着告诉银行（那些被投资者投诉的银行）设立他们自己的“独立调查组”来接受苦主的投诉。当苦主们决定走上街头，金管局又U转，说要设立由他们指派的调查员。可是就如陈露西所观察的一样，金管局的这些瞎忙活，其实他们一个也没有接触过受影响的苦主。

当香港政府宣布保障所有存户的存款时，新加坡政府却对新加坡人说他们保证这里的金融和银行的结构健全，就如大家所理解的，政府不打算学香港政府那样保障所有银行存款。就在紧挨着的第二天，新加坡又来个U转，新加坡政府宣布保障所有银行存款，这是独立43年来从未做过的一件大事。这不免带来一些疑问：新加坡政府真的关心新加坡人，还是担心千百万元的存款被海外抽走？当市场激烈波动，存户当然要选择把钱放在有保障的国度，这样一个道理，用膝盖想都知道。所以真正的问题是，既然香港和一些其他国家都毅然采取这些措施，金管局之前在犹豫些什么呢？

这个风暴的最新发展，金管局显然又从香港那边“偷桥”。香港特区政府展开迷债调查的次日，金管局也跟进，在新闻发布会中，他们宣布也会这么做。

看来金管局所能做的就是等待香港同侪的下一步。香港政府给当地银行下了最后通牒，是否接受建议中的买回债券？也准备增加法律援助金，以备苦主们通过法律途径起诉银行业主。这在新加坡简直不可思议，在我的记忆中，这样的事在这里还没发生过。

鉴于新加坡政府缺乏领袖素质，接下来唯有指望苦主和公共知识分子如陈钦亮先生，去争取他们认为的公正与公平。

至于金管局，也只能祈望他们多些主动性。要不然，或许如陈幸运所说的，我们虽然付出世界最高薪给这些部长们，实际上新加坡人在“困难时期是群龙无首的”。

迄今，金管局与其权威地做个领头人，倒像只绝望的无头鸡到处乱窜。

我觉得1万名苦主不该就这样牺牲掉。

陈钦亮先生芳林公园演讲译稿Translated Script of Mr. Tan Kin Lian

The following is the translated speech I have presented on behalf of Mr. Tan Kin Lian in Hong Lim Park this evening:

以下是今天在芳林公园为陈钦亮先生翻译和演讲的内容：

6 p.m. Saturday 18 October 2008

昨天，十月17日，金管局开了一个关于销售结构金融产品的记者会。

金管局的新闻稿是这么说的：

7。 金管局呼吁那一些真正被误导销售结构金融产品的苦主去你所认购的金融公司去投诉。金管局要求这一些金融公司严格审慎的对每个投诉作出合理的处理。他们必须认真给予独立人士的意见一定分量的重视。

8。很明显的，在众多投资者当中，有一些是受高深教育者，更有一些是经验丰富的投资者。我们最关注的是那一些弱势投资者。我们正专注于那一些金融公司错误销售给弱势投资者的个案和那一些把产品销售给那些明显不符合投资者寻求的个案。我们已经要求有关金融公司给予这一些个案优先处理。他们不应该采取过于法律定义的态度来处理这一些错误销售的案子。

9。至于那一些有足够迹象显示这一些金融产品是被误销或者产品明显不符合投资者的背景概况的案例，这些金融公司应该负起应有的责任。有几间金融公司已经向金管局表明他们会对此类案件负起全部责任。我们很高兴收到这一些承诺并且希望其它有参与销售这类结构产品的金融公司都能效仿而作出这样的承诺。

马上去投诉

每一位这里的苦主首要优先处理的事情是到你的金融公司去呈上正式的投诉书，清清楚楚的列明你是在什么样的情况下被误导买下这一些结构产品的。金管局已经要求这一些金融公司尽快处理这一些案件而避免用太过严谨的法律准则来处理。他们也说你们无需交上宣示申明。

诚实作出供证是非常重要的。你必须把你怎么被误导买进这一些金融产品一五一十的列明。很多投资者告诉我他们被广告、销售册子、保证和销售代表的解释(包括口头和电邮)给误导的。

很多投资者被告知或被错误引导，致使他们相信

a) 这一些资金是投资在那一些涉及信贷机构的债券

b) 所有的相关信贷机构必须倒闭后，他们才会损失所有的本金

c)如果他们把投资持有至期满，他们的本金将受到保护

我希望以下的指导方针能帮助你们准备一个完整的投诉报告给有关的金融公司。你一定要以你最大的能力据实无欺的写这份报告。

你的投诉报告应具备以下的重点：

1。名字，居民证号码，地址，电话

2。你怎么接触到这一些投资

3。你是向那一间金融公司购买，那间分行，投资数额，日期

4。你在购买过程

5。你购买时有没有人与你同伴？如果有，是谁？

6。行销员跟你说了些什么关于产品的资料

7。行销员有没有明确的告诉你这产品是有担保？

8。他们有没有给你签任何关于投资产品的表格？你是否完全明白这表格里头的所有条款？你是在决定投资前或后收到这表格？你有仔细阅读这表格码？

9。你是否依赖行销员的解释和意见来决定投资？那一些意见或讲解对你是至关重要的？

10。任何其它具有误导性的销售情况你都可以写下来

我会要求个别根据不同金融公司分组的联络员帮助其它投资者，尤其是那些受教育不多的成员，准备他们的投诉报告。

弱势投资者

金管局已要求金融公司优先处理弱势投资者的投诉。弱势投资者是指年长者，受低教育者和第一次作投资的人。这些金融公司已经承诺对这些弱势投资者所投诉的误导销售案件负起全部的责任。这责任包括全数或局部赔偿他们的投资损失。这是令人鼓舞的第一步。

我希望那些不属于“弱势投资者”的苦主要坚强和耐心一点。如果你是同样的被误导投资这一些结构性金融产品的话，而且是很有很明显的迹象显示是如此的话，你也有很高的机会索偿。但是你必须要有心里准备和合理的期望，你也许必须接受比“弱势投资者”更低的部分赔偿。

就让我们按部就班，此时你应该尽快提出投诉。

金管局正式介入调查

金管局也提到他们已经针对某些有关违法、金融公司缺乏内部监管和恶劣行销手法的投诉正式展开调查。调查结束后，他们会公布调查结果。

如果发现有违法、缺乏内部监管或恶劣行销手法的话，投资者就有更高的机会对有关金融公司索取更高的赔偿。让我们拭目以待吧。
替代管理公司

金管局说雷曼迷你债券的信托法人真正仔细考量所有可行的方案而会以保障投资者的利益为上。如果出现新的掉期对手，投资者就有机会为这一选项投票表决。为了帮助投资者作出明智的决定，金管局已经委任了独立的专业投资顾问为投资者提供质询。这结果将在下个星期公布。

如果能找到一个替代管理公司，投资者也许能减少损失因为目前的投资资产就可以保存到一个更好的时机来兑现。我接触了一间有意接管的香港公司。他们现在正与信托法人和金管局接洽。

我也希望其它公司，尤其是新加坡的金融公司能对此作出竞标。

对媒体的呼吁

我也想在此呼吁媒体朋友们传达这项讯息给那一些买了结构性金融产品的投资者，尽快去作出他们的投诉。

请告诉他们如果他们是被误导购买这些产品的话，他们就应该马上去相关机构投诉。


陈钦亮
kinlian@gmail.com

www.tankinlian.blogspot.com
翻译： 吴明盛

National Parks Website Down

After note: I finally managed to get into National Park website to register myself to speak at the very last minute before I set off to Hong Lim this evening. I shall be putting up Chinese translated of Mr. Tan Kin Lian's speech on my blog later.

I want to register to speak at Hong Lim Park today but it seems that the National Parks Website is down for the whole afternoon. I just cannot believe that with a World Class government, such things could actually happen and detrimental to our freedom of speeches at this little small park!

I will still go ahead to speak, basically to help Mr. Tan Kin Lian to translate his English speech into Mandarin, in order to help those who could not understand English well to get the necessary information for their next moves.

Mr. Tan Kin Lian has been doing a great job in helping Minibonds and Structured Deposits holders in this difficult times and I admire his courage and righteous spirit in helping out these Minibond holders. He has given me a call this morning to request for my help to address many of the Chinese educated elderly uncles and aunties. I have agreed to help him at short notice but unfortunately, the National Park website to register myself to speak at Hong Lim has been down for the whole afternoon!

I may risk charges for making an "illegal speech" at Hong Lim Park, all thanks to National Parks' faulty website, but I guess I am prepared to go to jail (nope, I am not going to pay the fines) for a righteous cause like this one.

Goh Meng Seng

A Nation in Gamble

The recent happenings have kept me thinking, are we a Nation in Gamble?

First, we have a million dollar man flip flop. One day claims that our financial system is very stable, we don't need 100% guarantee for bank deposits, but within 48 hours, a total U-turn and announce that MAS will provide 100% guarantee for all bank deposits after all. But wait, please notice the difference here. MAS is providing such guarantee not because it thinks that it has the obligations to local Singaporeans, but rather, it is because it is afraid that the exodus of foreign money will destabilize the whole financial system! Well, we have to settle for the fact that the PAP government will always take filthy rich foreigners' interests at first priority rather than local Singaporeans' interests. We will always be the last priority.

Some friends were making noise about this silly statements by MAS that it would not provide 100% guarantee to depositors because it believes that our financial system is very safe. Then it begs the question, if the system is so safe, it would be definitely "riskless" for MAS to give additional assurance to Singaporeans by providing that 100% guarantee, right?

And now, does it mean that since MAS finally did a total U-turn, would it imply that our financial system has suddenly become unstable? No, says MAS, its because we want to keep foreign money on our shores! Does it then mean that if all these foreign money vacate from Singapore, our financial system will become unstable?

This kind of attitude really reminds me of people gambling at the Black Jack table. They just could not think properly whether to take the card or not when they have 16 points at hand. I would expect that our people should get better judgment and performance from the million dollar ministers at such sensitive time. We are sitting right in the middle of the Crisis of Confidence (which I will write on it for my next post) and yet, they are giving out contradicting signals that may well shaken our confidence further.

This is especially true when we assess how MAS performs in this Minibonds issue. It would just push off responsibility and not act on it. It would be understandable for its "weak leadership" in such disputes because Singapore is dominated by Government Linked Companies. MAS, as a government agency, would not want to jeopardize its own money making machinery, would it? This is exactly the same problem I have mentioned in my previous post on Public Transport: how could we ever expect the government to regulate the companies that it owns? This is against human nature and totally absurd. Thus I could only advise Minibonds and other structured deposits holders to come together, stand in unity and go for class action lawsuit. They should not hold on the classic view that this PAP government will solve all these problems for them, especially so when it involves monies and interests of a stingy government. I know many of these people have not intended to gamble with their money when they first bought these Minibonds, but yet, I guess they are taking a big gamble if they think they could depend on MAS to help them out. Please remember, this government is more worried of foreigner's money than yours. It will only take less than 48hrs for them to make 180 degrees policy U turn when it involves foreign interests, but definitely not yours.

The fact that MAS actually allows Minibonds to be sold in Singapore, itself is a sign that we are fast becoming a Nation in Gamble. Minibonds is effectively a bet put on the reputation of some other bigger names. Minibonds holders effectively become the insurers of other bigger giant banks and financial institutions. It is absurd if you see it in its naked perspective but yet, these absurd instruments with many hidden risks are packaged as "medium-low risk investment" for our consumers. Even CPF allows such structured derivatives to be "invested" as "medium-low risk" instruments! And the fact that even some GLCs created their own version of structured products which is basically nothing but a financial bet, "invested" in CDS CDO with whatever names that are so complex to layman. Do all these relevant authorities, establishment and companies know exactly what they are doing? Are they pushing the whole Nation into Gambling?

Singaporeans are traditionally more conservative and risk adverse in their investment choice. How could they package such risky instruments (technically speaking, not even assets to speak of, but financial bets) to sell them to our citizens is something I could not really fully understand.

Well, talking about Gambling, no bigger and prominent Gambling is more obvious than our two Casino resorts, building in process. It seems that all hopes are pinned on these two gigantic projects that the whole Nation has taken up as their engine towards "Golden Period". But the recent news report worries me. Some foreign workers were protesting outside MOM against their employers who intend to cut their pay or even force them to be sent back to their country of origins. These foreign workers work for one of the big construction company which I believe is one of the main contractors of the Casino resort at Marina. And it was reported that when the matter has been settled, the workers return to their construction site, doing nothing more than AREA CLEANING! I mean, 100 people doing AREA CLEANING?

It worries me. I was thinking to myself, WHAT IF, a BIG BIG IF, any of these two Casino resorts failed to take off even before they are built, what will happen to us? Our schools and polytechnics has trained so many students ready to be employed for these casino resorts. Our banks have given out so much loans to finance these casino resorts construction (not only the owners, but constructors, subcontrustors...etc). What IF anyone of them or even Both of them fail? Are we staking our whole economy on these Casino resorts?

Well, maybe some may say I am really paranoid, how could these BIG casino companies go bust? This is especially so when our PAP government has claimed to conduct all due diligence in screening these casino companies.

It seems a little bit unbelievable but nowadays, when even the big 4 investment banks in USA could go bust, what else isn't possible? Anyway, with this little question in mind, I did a research. I have found that LV SANDS, the owner of Singapore Marina's Casino Resort, has filed for Chapter 11 (bankruptcy protection) in USA before! It was 1998 when Sands filed for bankruptcy, right after the 1997 financial crisis, though we all believe that USA is not affected by this financial crisis at all. Then there is another recent article I have found on the net. Its entitled "Is LV Sands headed for Bankruptcy?"

In this article, it claims that LV Sands' share price has dropped from a high of $148 to $14.05! It has lost a lawsuit without allocating the amount of money to pay for the damages. Its earnings has plunged dramatically, with Return on Equity (ROE) dropping from 67% to a mere 5.38%. All these are worrying signs, not only for LV Sands, but the whole Singapore!

I could hardly imagine what would happen to Singapore IF, a BIG IF, Sands goes under. The PAP government has put Singapore into a BIG GAMBLE that we may be ill afford to play.

On the other hand, we have the most direct impact on our pockets from absurd electricity tariff pricing. We were told that for this quarter, we will be paying our electricity bill based on future price of US$155 per barrel of oil when the oil price right now is US$71 per barrel! How absurd this could be? Well, should we feel "lucky" because there is someone who makes claim that the price of oil could well reach US$200 this year end? So is this future price of US$155 based the "discount" from US$200 per barrel? Is this another GAMBLE that went wrong and innocent Singaporeans have to paid for such losses?

These are the events that have more direct impact on our lives to be mentioned here. There are more gambles going on, taking up by GIC and Temasek Holdings all around the world. Our SWF has thrown billions of dollars into failing companies and later getting their shares diluted by injection of rescue funds by the various government agencies. My gut feeling is that our GIC and Temasek have taken up these gambles too early with too much money thrown in. We are a small country in the world with limited resources. We must be extremely prudent in investing whatever we have. Plunging ourselves at the start of this financial turmoil will definitely cost us dearly and force us to take up unnecessary risks. Could we really afford to take up all these gambles?

With the total melt down of the current financial markets, I really doubt that those investments done by GIC and Temasek would come up good. We thought we could save UBS but eventually Swiss Government has to step in to take over the bank. We thought we could save US banks, but it seems that the more merger and take overs occur, our shares in them would be totally diluted. How much more Gamble should we take as a Nation before we could shout STOP? I suspect one day, we would wake up as a Nation, just like all Minibonds holders, having a shock that we have actually lost so much in all these Gambles when in the first place, we are just a Nation of conservative and risk adverse citizens. That would be a day of reckoning, shock and devastation.

Goh Meng Seng

迷债事件 “七宗罪”

This is an article from Ming Pao, Hong Kong stating the root of the problem: Lapses in in the regulatory role of HK Monetary Authority.

迷债事件 “七宗罪”
2008年10月13日

【明报专讯】上周本栏假设零售银行有员工可能会因为投资银行回馈的利益而对散户作出不恰当的衍生产品销售，是希望推动衍生产品销售制度的改进。为此现尝试较尖锐地为机制及迷债事件作出以下的七无概括，供有关人士参考。

无审批——监管机构表示并无为任何衍生产品把关的职责，亦无审批公开发售使用的销售单章。

无申报——投资者无从知晓零售银行对其销售衍生产品会收取多少投资银行的回馈，包括已出事的迷债。

无监管——销售一般是以面谈形式进行，但无任何的录音或会议纪录要求，事问如何监管前线人员有否作不恰当的陈述，有争执时又如何有证据。

无责任——一银行高层上周据报道表示，即使迷债事件有不恰当的前线销售，责任在于前线，会对违规销售人员作内部处分；银行高层的责任由于“产品经过发行商的内部严格审批及监管机构认可，在这个层面上已经做得足够”。

无赔偿——监管机构表示无权力要求银行向被误导的迷债投资者作赔偿，而银行高层表示“会否赔偿投资者则视乎证据而定”。城安恐怕举证的困难令一般投资者即使被误导也难以获得赔偿。

无公开——城安有一亲友不幸持有迷债，但多次查询托管人及零售银行后仍未有相关资料，惟上周初据报银行已在计算迷债的回购价。

无改变——在本年头传媒亦广泛报道有病重的八旬老妇遭私人银行销售Accumulator，但事件并未为制度带来任何改变。

城安担心的是，监管机构过分执覑市场的无为而治，而在既得利益集团的游说下忽略对小投资者的保障。在遇上如狼似虎的营销人员时，香港的小投资者就仿似是群小羊牯。

城安曾于一饭局中遇上雷曼的营销人员。当时侍应送上一碟略嫌未煮透的肉食，该人员就将其打回头，然后大有反应的向我们说“唔熟点食呀！ ”城安当时自然礼貌陪笑，但心里就觉得此人相当厉害，说不定睡梦中也会在讨价还价云云。

城安

联合报选读：李家同—那些金钱游戏者我们应该鄙视！

联合报选读：李家同—那些金钱游戏者我们应该鄙视！


李家同：那些金钱游戏者我们应该鄙视！

在全世界为这次的金融风暴伤脑筋的时候，我们终于听到了一些将风暴连结到道德的言论。

首先，教宗提醒世人不要盲目地追求财富。身为教宗，他的这种谈话乃是意料中的。比较特别的是英国布朗首相的谈话，他说世人应该建立一种基于道德感的金融制度，在做冒险性投资时，一定要负责任。

银行倒闭 雷曼老董无伤

在美国国会的听证会上，一位议员指出雷曼兄弟的董事长从公元二千年到现在，一共拿到了将近五亿美金的钱，银行最后倒闭，他的财产丝毫无损，而股东所持有的股票却化为乌有。他说这种做法是利润私有化、损失公有化，极不道德。

更深沉的问题乃是在于这一代年轻人的价值观。在我的时代，美国的菁英分子也喜欢冒险，但他们多半在科技上努力工作，设法造出最好的电脑、最快的战斗机、送人入太空、建造网际网路等等。当时，菁英分子都想成为科学家或是工程师。他们都是辛勤工作者，他们所追求的是科技上的卓越。美国之所以强盛，就是因为有这些人在埋头苦干，使美国在科技上遥遥领先。

菁英分子 华尔街纸醉金迷

曾几何时，在科技上追求卓越，已不是美国菁英分子的兴趣，他们人人想去华尔街。在华尔街，当然不是做一个存款银行的行员，而是要做一个操盘手，大做垃圾债券、连动性债券、衍生性金融产品、债务抵押债券、信用违约交换等等。这些五花八门的花招，外人很少搞得懂，他们却美其名为“产品”。只是，这些产品和引擎、积体电路和特用化学品不可同日而语。

美国社会 拜金主义正横流

为何现在的菁英分子如此喜欢玩金钱游戏，而不肯辛勤地从事科技研究？谁也不能精确地回答这个问题。我想最重要的是美国社会最近拜金主义的流行。

在过去，甘迺迪总统曾试图注射一些理想主义进入了美国的社会，使美国人多多少少注意到公益。遗憾的是，现在，这种理想主义已经没有任何社会的意见领袖倡导，难怪很多年轻的菁英分子变成了庸俗不堪的惟利是图者。

辛勤工作者 我们才该崇拜

最重要的问题；我们该崇拜谁？我们应该尊敬那些在田野里和工地里流汗工作的农人和工人，在学校里认真教书的老师，建立工厂和各种企业的企业家，在各企业里小心翼翼工作的工人、工程师和管理人员，在研究室内绞尽脑汁的研发人员，在政府服务的公务员，在金融机构真正替企业和人民服务的人员，带给我们快乐的演艺人员、音乐家和运动员。凡是努力工作者，都应是我们尊敬的对象，因为是他们使我们能过好日子，是他们替我们建造了一个很不错的国家。

我们应该鄙视那些用我们的钱豪赌的金钱游戏者，他们最多能替我们打造虚幻而短暂的繁荣，但他们却会在一夜之间使无数辛劳的人民受到严重的打击。

（本文作者为暨南、清华、静宜大学荣誉教授）

佘长年—我们需要一个民主的政体

The following is not my article but re-posted article.

● 佘长年

看到美国众议院推翻7000亿美元援救配套时，我不禁想到，这件事要是发生在新加坡，那么国会到底会怎么做呢？

当然，这只是用了我几秒钟的时间，我就十分确定行动党一定会像美国共和党那么大手笔。

他们一定赶去拯救大企业——特别是那些政联公司（GLCs）——据说是为了“避免经济整个崩溃”。

美国民主党则要求一个比较公平的配套，而不只是救出那些信用破产的华尔街大鳄。

他们要求为那些因次贷风暴而失去家园的人赎回房子，还要那些享受可耻高薪和花红的企业总裁大幅度减薪。

美国共和党传统上都是比较保守和亲商的（这和行动党差不多），而民主党则崇尚自由和亲民。

虽然这两个政党经常斗得头破血流，但是他们最后还是会打落牙齿和血吞达成某种妥协，是负责任两党制的好榜样。

大多数美国人还是很气愤政府动用纳税人的钱来拯救那些邪恶公司，而惨被波及的老百姓则被撂在一旁，根本没人理睬。

民主党人扳回了这种局面。

要是这样的拯救配套在新加坡的国会里提出，我敢打包票一定是会从84席里获得82席的赞成票，也省去了啰唆的辩论，或者从所谓的“成熟的两党制”获得不同观点的补益。

这里没有“民主党”来辩论任何过失或不足。这么一来，新加坡全民（一个都不能少）就得买单。

也不可能有什么其他的选择来平衡老百姓的利益和所谓大财团、整体经济的利益。

这个灾难正逐步走向新加坡，而新加坡人都会受苦。

一个长期的衰退即将来临，而新加坡人也随着面对低工资、失业和生意失败的噩运。他们其实需要一个强大和有才干的反对党来反映他们的心声和照顾他们的利益。

陷入困境的美国已经示范两党制如何会有效地保护新加坡人民，不仅仅是大生意而已，而是源源不断地产生应对危机的解决办法。

实际上新加坡人还比美国人更需要保护，因为这里的政策更倾向于保护企业利益多过关心人民的福利。

许多提供公共服务的大企业，如公共交通、能源（记得最近的21%调涨）、租赁等等，都是政府控制的，再不然就是政府拥有的。

在这个困难时期，这些公司都急着涨价来维持利润。所以政治上更需要一个适任的反对党来提供一种制衡。

要是这个艰难时期是被一个权威政府主导，排除（或者“整”）反对党进行有效的监督，那么大家就只好自求多福了。

这时候需要一个“美国民主党”式的反对党来和行动党协作，制定出一个包容和尽可能照顾大多数人的方案。

一个成熟的两党制虽然不容易，但是新加坡人还是有能力和准备好扮演这样的角色。

很显然，这和李光耀资政反对多党制民主的看法是抵触的。

他已经不止一次暗示过，要是新加坡不是一人一票制，他能够做也许更多。

许多年来，李资政认为他的行动党不强调意识形态，只是务实和为新加坡谋福利。

这虽然在过去是对的，但是今天却不同了。

近年来，他们把新加坡当成一个大企业来管理，为了累积利润和储备金而不余遗力。这个城市国家完全可以叫做新加坡大企业。

到了现阶段，它不能再依赖一党独大。

一个美国式的民主政体或许可以把它的注意力摆正，并产生一个包容性的社会。

至少它可以满足大多数人的利益，而不再是一家大公司而已

MiniBond- Allocation of Responsibility

I have gathered a couple of news articles from Hong Kong which give better perspective of the whole issue.

What is MiniBond in the very first place? The picture above is a simple illustration I gather from Hong Kong Economics Daily newspaper. Yes, it is written in Traditional Chinese and I hope you could read it well.

Anyway, in short, the whole Minibond instrument comprises two parts:

1) The AA or AAA bonds as the basis of the structure (Right side of the diagram)
2) The Credit Risks Swap which involves a Vehicle (in this case, Lehman Brother's collective of financial bonds and instruments).

The first part (right part of the diagram) of the instrument is easy to understand. The money paid by the investors are used to buy AA or better rated bonds. The coupon rate or interest payment by the bonds are given to the investors on an annual basis.

However, to increase the returns of this instrument, the bonds are used as the basis to provide "insurance" for the other vehicle, like a collection of bonds or derivatives or financial entities. In this case, Lehman Brothers' collection of financial instruments. It means that Lehman Brothers will give the bond holders a certain percentage of premium to exchange for protection of its own credit risks. This is what Credit Risks Swap all about.

Literally, it means that Lehman Brothers, as an financial institution, needs to insure its own credit risk of honoring all the bonds or financial derivatives it sold in the market. Instead of buying financial insurance from a insurance company (or reassurance companies), it chose to pay a risk premium to Minibonds holders in return for an insurance against any of its losses in the event of credit events that it suffers.

Why would Lehman Brothers pay a risk premium to Minibonds holders for such Credit Risks Swap rather than buying insurance from a insurance company? Most probably it is much cheaper to do a Credit Risks Swap than paying hefty insurance premiums for its own credit risks.

The amount of "additional returns" that a Minibond provides for its investors depends on who or what the Credit Risks Swap is done with. If the Credit Risks Swap involves a collection of Junk Bonds, then naturally, due to the higher risks of Junk Bonds, the return would be higher. In this case, prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, it was considered as a relatively "low risk" financial entity by virtue of the facts that it was the 4th largest Investment Bank in USA. Thus the overall return of Lehman Brothers Minibonds is relatively low.

Well, if everything goes well and there is no credit issues or events for Lehman Brothers' collection of financial instruments, the investors could get all the interests paid plus the AA bonds they paid for when the Minibonds matured. But if there is anything happen to Lehman Brothers, then they could have to compensate Lehman Brothers for its loss due to these credit events like bankruptcy or inability to fulfill its financial liabilities. i.e. The Minibonds holders are required under the agreement, to act as an insurer of Lehman Brothers. It means that the AA bonds that are bought under the Minibond agreement would be cashed out and used as a compensation to Lehman Brothers to fulfill the obligation of the Credit Risks Swap.

This is the interesting part, small investors acting as insurer of a big investment bank!

The various articles have suggested that the regulators have not taken a pro-active stand in regulating the sales of these financial instruments. In the mini-bond issue, the returns are "improved" by virtue of the credit risks swap taken up by the financial instruments. In this case, Lehman Brothers bond is the vehicle that the bonds has taken up the risks swap. Yes, nobody would consider Lehman Brothers as a "high risk" financial entity but that is also why the returns is just 5.1%. If the vehicle involves consist of junk bonds, then one would expect a higher return.

The crux of the matter is whether investors are being misled in the whole dealings. But I guess the contract or agreement they have signed would have a clause that says the investors are briefed and understood the product, including all the risks involved. This is where the banks or financial institutions have covered their backsides. But the contract would most probably be very vague on what kind of risks they have explained to the investors. This is where improvement on regulation could be made. SPECIFIC risks and possibilities must be stated CLEARLY in BOLD, not in fine prints.

Even if the regulators come up with the requirement of putting different categories on the different financial instruments being sold, it is difficult to classify Mini-Bonds which involves two parts of financial structures: Bonds + Credit Risks Swap. Unless the regulations include the declaration of all possibilities of defaults and risks involves, I would say that no matter how good the products are marketed and sold, there will always be investors who will claim ignorance. Where does it end?

While I empathize with many aunty and uncle investors, but the point is, if they are not sure about what they are buying, they should not buy it in the very first place. If all investment decision in any instruments is solely based on the returns alone, then I would say that our investors, including aunties and uncles, will not evolve smarter at all. That is why I feel that we need to strengthen investors education. The plight of these aunty uncle investors is really sympathetic but they could not avoid their part of responsibility. If they chose to invest blindly, then they will have to bear the consequences. Very sad but this is basically how capitalist system works. Unless they could prove that they are being misled with clear evidence of mis-selling or misrepresentation by the institutions.

From the legislative perspective, there are rules could be set to avoid such chaos and disputes. For example, if the financial institutions that sold the financial products did not list out in BOLD of the various risks and possibilities within the marketing tools, contracts and agreements, then if one of the unlisted possibilities occurred and losses are incurred, then the investors should have the right to claim compensations from the financial institutions that sold them the products. For example, in this case, if the contract did not list the possibility of Lehman Brothers being bankrupted and the implications behind it, then the consumers have the right to claim compensations from the financial Institutions for their losses.

This will shift the burden of legal responsibilities of clear representation of risks to the financial institutions. If their presentation of risks is not all inclusive, then they will have to bear the risks of taking losses.

But I bet even with that legislation, there will always be investors that would claim ignorance. I mean, how would one measure the risk of Lehman Brothers being bankrupted at that point of time when it was the 4th largest investment bank in USA? It has no end. One has to learn that near zero possibility is NOT IMPOSSIBLE. However small the risk and possibility it is, there is still risks involved.

In the case of Hong Kong handling the issue of this MiniBond saga, the main argument is that those front line sales personnels are hardly trained and knowledgeable about this product that they were selling. I mean, this is a VERY COMPLEX derivative product that involves very abstract concept of credit risks swap. I would say that if the investors want to fight their case, they would have to provide all the marketing brochures and such, to show that the financial institutions did not explain or show clearly what a credit risks swap is all about. Then they could argue that the contract they have signed with that clause of claiming the investors have understood the product and all the risks involved, are totally invalid because due to this missing part of explaining credit risks swap.

This is the only plausible legal point that grievance investors could bring up against the financial institutions.

In my view, the regulatory body, MAS must bear part of the responsibility too. If any financially trained individuals would have difficulty in understand what a Minibond is all about at first sight, I wonder why MAS would allow it to be sold by banks to layman in the very first place. There is a clear lack of regulatory requirement or directions or guidelines to make stringent demands on the marketing effort of such complex financial instruments.

Furthermore, I think for banks that use their front line tellers to push sales of Minibonds is very irresponsible. I really doubt the front line tellers really know what Credit Risks Swap is all about and least, have the ability to explain clearly the risks involved in Credit Risks Swap to the customers, especially to the less educated aunties and uncles. This is both the lapse of MAS regulatory role as well as the banks' irresponsible moves as well.

Most customers would trust the banks as a more credible financial entity than an insurance agent or so call "financial consultant". This is the psychological effect of any normal persons. If one could entrust his money in this bank, naturally there is a level of trust on the credibility of the banks. Thus, most of the time, consumers would buy such "high return" financial instruments by virtue of basic trust on the banks' credibility, even though the banks' front line sales personnels may not be able to explain in full what the products entailed.

MAS should stop this practice by the banks, by means of regulation. Banks cannot sell complex structured financial instruments via its front line tellers. In fact, in USA, there is a strict distinction between Commercial Banks vs Investment Banks. Commercial Banks could only earn their keeps by taking in deposits and loaning them out. They are strictly regulated and disallowed to get involved in dealings with financial instruments with high leverage. Invest Banks are those who created all these mess with their financial innovations on derivatives.

I would suggest MAS to put a stop to such practice by banks in dealing with high leverage financial instruments by putting up categorization of each and every financial instruments approved for sales in Singapore. For example, if the financial instruments have a category of C, it means that it is a high risk, high return and high leverage financial instruments. Commercial Banks should be banned from selling or dealing with such financial instruments. Category A would be Government or Commercial bonds with AA or AAA ratings. This would be allowed for commercial banks... so on and so forth.

In my view, although the investors should bear bigger responsibility in taking up investment decisions, but MAS and the banks selling these Minibonds or High Notes could be totally excused from their part of responsibilities. MAS has failed miserably as a regulator in providing a clear guidelines in the sales of such financial instruments to the public.

If the PAP government could order cigarette packaging to bear big warning of lung cancer as well as tax-paid labels, I wonder why MAS has not taken similar steps in requesting financial institutions to put up BOLD and clear representation of ALL risks and possibilities involved in investing in any financial instruments. Furthermore, MAS should have prevented banks from selling complex structured, high leverage or risky instruments to layman. This should only be done by professional financial consultants instead.

And last but not least, I think the banks that sold these Minibonds would have to bear a level of responsibility in pushing the sales of such complex instruments when even their front line sales personnels may have limited knowledge about it. In fact, I would think that their credibility in the eyes of the public would be badly tarnished if nothing is done to compensate for their inconsiderate sales of such instruments to less educated aunties and uncles.

As for the investors, I could only say that if you want to prove their case against mis-selling, you would have to gather all marketing tools and materials to show that those sales personnels did not explain clearly what Credit Risks Swap is all about. Its not going to be an easy task to fight such cases against strong, big and mighty but I guess if all of you could unite and come together to go for class actions against irresponsibility sales of such instruments, you may have the chance to prove your case that even if you have signed that contractual agreement that says you have understood all about the product, but in fact, you have not been told about what the heck is Credit Risks Swap.

But ultimately, every potential investors in any financial instruments, even for investment related life insurance, we should be responsible enough to find out more about all these products before we commit our hard earned money into them.

Good Luck to you guys.

Goh Meng Seng

The Systematic Problems of Public Transport

A few weeks ago, I have given my first public speech at Hong Lim Park with regards to our "World Class" Transport System which is organized by TOC (The Online Citizens).

The following are the few points I raise and I have added a few thoughts thereafter. My whole speech central around the following 4 points.

1) Business Model
2) Economic Model
3) Efficiency
4) City-town planning

Business Model

1) Transport companies should not focus on getting profit from fares alone. In fact, if any transport companies thinks that it could make huge profits by charging higher fare, then the CEO should be sacked. If you have noticed, transport companies in HK, especially MTR, even the mini-bus, earns quite a bit from advertising. The business model should be similar to free software or services provided by Internet companies.



The main focus of public transport companies should be focusing to increase their customers' ridership. This is basically because advertising dollars depends on the number of commuters using their public transport services. With the prospect of increase in commuters, companies will be more willing to advertise their products with these public transport companies. This is the main reason why even Internet companies could make huge profits even without charging the massive usage of their services and software by the users. Examples are Yahoo, Google, MSN....etc. The list goes on.




Thus the priority of public transport companies should be looking into ways to increase ridership, not because they could collect more fares in return, but rather, they could increase their attractiveness as an advertising medium. This could be achieved by two main ways.



First, REDUCE fares, instead increasing fares. In my view, in Singapore's context of high cost of maintaining private cars (more ERPs, one of the highest petrol prices in the world..etc.), reducing fares may well increase ridership.

Secondly, increase efficiency and effectiveness of their public transport services. These could be achieved by increasing frequency of their services, instead of reducing their frequency in the bid to "cut cost", in the name of optimization.

I will deal with these focuses, but now, there is another macro problem we must look at before we go into efficiency and effectiveness.

Economic Model

2) To have sufficient advertisers in any economic model, competition is the paramount necessary condition. For example, you will not hear SingTel advertising back in 1980s basically because it was the only monopoly in the Telecommunications market. When more companies were allowed to compete in the market, advertising for Telecommunication services would increase substantially. In Singapore’s context, the problem with our economic model is that we have too many monopolies and oligopolies (few dominant companies dominating the whole industry) within the system.i.e. basically, GLCs dominates the whole economy.

Thus, unlike Hong Kong, there isn’t a huge group of SMEs with their own brands to put up advertising resulting in limited advertising dollars for the whole market. For example, for the Mooncake festival, Hong Kong would have quite a massive number of advertisement from the local various SMEs on MTR (train system) but in Singapore, we could hardly see any, or rather, I don’t see any.

This is a long lasting structural problem with our economy in which Government Linked Companies or companies with symbiotic relations with the ruling party are allowed to dominate and even crowd out competitors.

In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong government does not get involves in running companies or businesses within the economy as it would always be perceived as potential conflict of interests between a regulator vs those being regulated.

These Government Linked Companies are creating more structural problems than we could imagine. This leads to the following potential problems of Efficiency.

Efficiency

3) The government is the largest shareholder of local transport companies. There is basically a conflict of interests here, between the companies that they are supposed to regulate and the fact that they are the regulator themselves.

The PTC is set up to monitor fare hikes but the members of PTC includes members from the transport companies. The proper set up should include consumer representatives, opposition party members (or MPs) and business consultants. The transport companies could only be submitting their request and making their presentation on why they need a fare hike without any voting power within the PTC itself.

The PTC should be setting the service standards like timing or frequency for the transport companies during peak and off peak hours. In a small country like Singapore, it is really hard to imagine that we need to wait for more than 30 mins for a bus during off peak hours when someone just mention that we only need 20 mins to travel from any point to another point in Singapore. That is a bit ridiculous.

There is a lack of critical fundamental investment in the whole public transport system. We do not need fanciful stuff like satellite tracking system when the frequency of our bus system is comparable to third world country. While cities like Hong Kong have invested in more practical aspects of technological applications like location announcement system within the buses as well as the trains, more advanced rail track signaling system for the train that increase frequency, Singapore has not improved at all even though we pride ourselves as a technological advanced country.



Just to illustrate this point about more practical information system for the public transport. If you take a train, most likely it would be too noisy to hear the public announcement of the arrival at the various stops. In Hong Kong, you will have a visual LED system which will indicate which stop the train will be arriving and which door you should alight at. On top of that, it will show you at that stop, which train station you could alight and change to other train service lines. It is hard for you to get lost in the train system. Similarly, for the buses, right before the next stop, there will be visual LED screen indicating the stop location.

Furthermore, I do no think our train system is designed to cope with 4.5 million population, least 6.5 million. We have only 6 cabins in the train while Hong Kong MTR has 8 cabins. And the frequency of our train service is lower than Hong Kong, be it peak or off-peak hours.




On top of that, in order to cope with the huge massive number of commuters, Hong Kong train stations usually have more than one exit from the station building. This is to disperse human traffic flows. They have far more escalators in some of the busiest stations than ours. Sometimes, they would have two to three gate entrances and exits.




The most interesting part of the train system is that Hong Kongers are very practical and conscious about efficiency. Even small things like the Octopus Card (equivalent to our EZ-link card) top up machines, they do not need you to press buttons here and there before you could apply the right procedures like using Nets or paying cash. They would immediately wait for you either to swap your bank cards or insert your cash into the machine. Very straight forward. After you have finished with it, just press a button to retrieve your card. On the other hand, they will have a dedicate machine for you to check your balance card values as well as the charges you paid for the last 3 trips. Machines solely for that purpose so that you don't crowd out the other machines for such simple tasks.

All these designs have allowed the train system to cope with huge human traffic flows and increase in its overall efficiency for the consumers.


City-Town Planning

4) The city -planning model of Singapore affects the efficiency and effective use of public transport. You don’t find many high rise flats in town centres in Singapore which are also transportation nodal points. Instead, they like to plan so much that they have spread out the HDB flats but the Town Centre, ironically, nearest to transport services, were lack of residential flats. You can observe in HK that at every each main MTR stations, there will be many flats built above or just next to the stations, along with shopping malls and such. That is why it is very convenient for commuters and in return, it helps to secure high ridership. But here, we are made to stay far away from the transportation points, forced to take those inefficient feeder buses or worse, the light rail. Besides all these, MTR in HK have income from some of the building and managing estates right near their various stations.

The most typical failures of our town planning are demonstrated by the Punggol-Sengkang estates as well as the Ang Mo Kio Hub situated right next to the AMK MTR station.

In spite of launching the Punggol 21 vision one decade ago, land right next to Punggol MRT station has been left vacant until recently. Almost all the prime lands next to MRT stations are being monopolize or dominated by other GLCs. The SMRT, though a GLC itself, should have the first priority to develop the land near its stations basically because if it integrates the land use with its strategic needs to increase the efficiency of the public transport model, it could well be positioned to do so. In effect, it could cross subsidize the public transport commuters by having more income sources to cover the operation costs of the public transport system.

This is the kind of model that we should seriously consider to implement. There would be a need to reinvent and revamp the whole strategic thinking for the public transport system. Instead of focusing on increasing fares, cost cutting by reducing frequency and such, they should be focusing on how to increase utilization of the system and increasing revenues by virtue of the massive crowds they command. They are in the business of Mass public transport but they should be earning more from the MASS part instead of the fares collected from the TRANSPORT part.

We have a self proclaimed a highly paid First World Government who keeps boasting about building a World Class Public Transport System. However, for those of us who are well traveled to gain enough foreign exposures, I would say that our present Public Transport System is far from being World Class. Maybe not Third world standards, but it is definitely not World Class. There are much rooms for improvement, from city planning to realignment to the new business model.

In time to come, we will be facing a critical strain, overcrowding and crunch on our present public transport system if the relevant authorities do not act pro-actively to face the increase of population size due to huge influx of foreign workers. There is an urgent need to rebuild or re-evaluate the present structural deficiency to increase efficiency and capacity.

I do not think the fare increase in the coming month of October is justifiable if we do not see any moves or efforts by the public transport companies to come up with a solid blueprint on how they are going to improve their overall service efficiency.

Well, this is just life in Singapore as the masses will just suffer in silence.

Goh Meng Seng

Thank you for your support!

I have a GREAT evening at Speakers'Corner today. All thanks the responsive crowd of over hundred audience from all walks of life. I have never expected such a crowd during off-election period and I think its a good start. At the very least, it means that down there, there are still people who care enough, with all passion, about this tiny little island to take all their effort to spend their precious Saturday evening down at Hong Lim to listen to us.

This GREAT EVENING would not have been possible without the responsive participation of these people. Of course, I would also like to thank TOC Chief editor, Andrew Loh, for inviting me to speak at this event. He has spent a couple of hundreds dollars on a portable amplifier with wireless microphone. I think that little gadget is really great for such an event!

Anyway, I am still waiting for any updates of video on Youtube before I write on what I have spoken at Hong Lim. Until then, stay tuned. :)

Goh Meng Seng

My Maiden Speech at Hong Lim Park

It has never crossed my mind that I will ever speak at Hong Lim Park at all. Ever since its inception as "Speakers' Corner", I have never thought of going there to become a speaker myself.

I would actually prefer to "ambush" radio stations which have call-in programs once in a while. In fact, I have just done that a few days ago, calling in to 95.8 to talk about "protest culture". Why? Well, it really takes less effort and time to do so but the returns in terms of number of people I could outreach to, are pretty more in comparisons.

Making a speech face to face to your audience requires a very different set of skills. When the eyes meet, the challenge is to transcend your message deep down into your audiences' hearts. The atmosphere created, will be a direct product of your effective or ineffective interactions with your immediate audience. Calling into radio station will lack that direct emotional interactions with your audience.

The impact of a public speech can be a double edged sword. If the speaker is not skillful enough, the message may just be lost in the midst of boredom. It would be most advantageous to skillful and well prepared speakers to get their message across with long lasting impression.

However, you must first pass the first criteria, AUDIENCE. No matter how skillful you are as a public speaker, if you do not have any audience standing right in front of you, all effort will be wasted. This is the main reason why speaking in Hong Lim Park is not going to be attractive at all.

But my friend, Andrew Loh from The Online Citizen (TOC) has a different view. There could be a purpose in speaking up in Hong Lim Park if we organize it properly. As Singapore Netizens are very comfortable with typing away behind their keywords most of the time, it would be a good exercise for a change to get all bloggers and netizens down to Hong Lim Park and gather in real persons to listen to speeches. Besides, there is this one important topic that will affect many Singaporeans in time to come: Increase in Public Transport Fares.

Andrew personally invited me to speak at this TOC organized event. It will not be "just another event" by a civil group but may just be a real test of bringing in online "soft power influence" of virtual bloggers, forummers and netizens into the real life public sphere. It just reminds me of how I have stepped out of the comfort of virtual anonymity in 2001 to join WP and subsequently become more active in real life politics, ending up as an opposition candidate in GE 2006. It is indeed steep learning curve and character molding period for me personally.

Thus, when Andrew sent his invitation and stated that there would be three other (now four, including James Gomez) speakers speaking at the same event, same place, same time frame on the same topic, I really gave it a serious thought. This may be a ground breaking bridging exercise to bring online citizenry into real life participation in social-political concerns. We may just make it a new trendy culture for online citizens to practice their oracle skills once or twice a year at Hong Lim Park!

Thus my maiden speech at Hong Lim Park is set to go, with multiple purposes in mind. To encourage active REAL LIFE CITIZENRY, transferring active online citizenry to real life actions. To speak up on this dear topic that would most probably affect 60% or 70% of Singaporeans at large. Of course, for my own personal grooming, its about time to give some practice to my rusty public speaking skills. :)

See you there, folks. 13 September Saturday, 5pm to 7pm.

Goh Meng Seng

废除不平等和无法执行的条例

This is my letter to ZaoBao Forum.


废除不平等和无法执行的条例

我读宏茂桥-杨厝港市镇理事会于2008年8月19日《联合早报交流站》对于宏茂桥“红格”收费的回复，我总觉得宏茂桥-杨厝港市镇理事会并没有勇气去尝试为这明显不合理的收费与其它有关条例给于一合理的解释。

第一，用“大多数的市镇会也这样做”来为自己的无理收费辩护是非常可笑的。这有如一个无理取闹、不负责任的司机为自己鲁莽驾驶，在转弯时不出示讯号灯时所用的辩词一样，很多人都如此，所以他也可理直气壮的这样驾驶！

第二，这收费的不合理之处是显而易见的。店主为了配合建屋局的“翻新”，须为建设这户外走廊付出一定限额的钱。在寻求店主赞成付这笔钱时，市镇会都会巧言令色的对店主说，建成后店主便可利用此空间来摆放货物，但并没有申明这是必须受费的！如果当初市镇会讲明是须收费的话，我想许多店主也许会多加三思到底要不要付这笔钱，而且还要忍受生意受影响的痛苦。再说，为何只跟在市中心有红格子的店主收钱而不跟邻里的店主收钱呢？

第三，这好比叫人自己付钱建个小亭，然后市镇会便在小亭内用红漆画个格子，就对付钱建亭子的人说，“好了，你们要用这亭子就得付钱！”这合理吗？也许市镇会的确对许多店主的不满根本不了解，但以我在宏茂桥中心经商十多年的接触，这的确是许多店主敢怒不敢言的心里状态。我相信这问题不只限于宏茂桥-杨厝港市镇理事会，而其它依样画葫芦的市镇理事会也一样对这种不合理的条例所引起的不满视若无睹。

第四，我们姑且不对这十五元一方尺“店外”的收费的合理性做出任何质疑，市镇会不只是以似是而非的理由收取不合理的收费，它又对店主定下无理的规定。店外摆放的货物必须跟店内一样。言下之意，就是店主不能把店外分租给其它人或行业。这规定简直是只许州官放火，不许百姓点灯吗！市镇理事会可以把店外租给出钱建设的店主，但店主就不可以把他们出钱建设的店外走廊分租给别人！

其实这种种不合理的条例，只有向来逆来顺受的新加坡人才会默默的忍受。但我希望身为一个自称世界第一级的政府和官爷们，不要以为我们都是是非不分。我相信许多市镇理事会里的基层员工都意识到这一切的无理条例都不应该有的，甚至到执行这一些条例时，他们都是开只眼闭只眼的。譬如，如果真的要严厉实行店主不能在店外摆放与店内不一样的货品的话，我保守的估计是，单单在宏茂桥中心，八成的店主必定会收到罚单！上千人的生计将受影响。店主必定会提高店内主要租户的租金而到最后，商家们一定会把这租金转嫁给普罗大众！据我所知，在宏茂桥中心许多租户是以分租店外的红格子才能承担高租金而继续营业的。还好有市镇理事会基层职员的通融，才“拯救”了许许多多人的生计和生意！也避免了物价再一次的上升。也许坐在冷气办公室里的高官们都以为他们所设订的条例是多么好，但我想要不是这一些基层员工的通情达理，我想民怨必定四起！

这令我想起也是宏茂桥集选区议员李显龙总理刚在国庆群众大会宣布“为了与时并进”而“放宽”网际网络的政治条例的约束。与其说是“放宽”倒不如说是废除那一些无理、无法有效执行的条例！这才是明智之举。同样的，如果市镇理事会能真正的为广大的商家着想，在这高通货膨胀的环境里，除了只会呼吁商家不要起价、工人不要“过高”的加薪要求外，何不顺民意，废除这一些不合理、事实上不易执行的诸多条例？

吴明盛

NSP - INTERESTING BUT WITHOUT SUFFICIENT IMPACT

NSP Press Release:

INTERESTING BUT WITHOUT SUFFICIENT IMPACT


The Prime Minister’s National Day speech was generally interesting in terms of linguistic versatility and showmanship. It however lacked sufficient impact as many of its measures were deemed to be short, despite the lengthy 3.5 hours delivery.
POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Few people are surprised at the Government’s lackluster efforts to “liberalize” the political landscape, considering its paranoiac obsession towards power consolidation over the years. The nominal gestures in softening media controls and confining outdoor demonstrations to the Speakers’ Corner, are rather insignificant responses to international pressure for Singapore to reveal its true posture in the arena of democracy. Those superficial measures are grossly insufficient in meeting the needs of an expanding, politically conscious and active citizenry.

The Government could be more proactive by expanding the platform for greater public participation in politics and parliamentary elections. A genuine attempt to liberalize should include the easing of cumbersome election procedures, reverting mega-sized GRCs to their original size of three, introducing proportional representation, and refraining from any eleventh-hour “stick & carrot” inducements. Here lies the toughest challenge for the PAP … to be truthful to itself.
PARENTHOOD PERKS

PM Lee exhorts the people to look beyond complaints and see the bigger picture. But the bigger picture also comprises of high inflation and job insecurity made worse by intense competition from locally based foreigners. The average, middle-class family would take a rational, double look and flinch away from the risk of a 21-year responsibility of raising a child in the light of such uncertainties. The change in lifestyle of the now generation, coupled with social pressure and the usual marital stress, would render the latest tranche of goodies with only limited appeal. Thus, the Government should have tackled the “bigger picture” first.
LIVING STANDARDS

Instead of wringing blames on “external factors” the Government is expected to well manage the steep rise in inflationary rates -– a job for which it has, for long, been very well paid. Instead of pointing at “uncontrollable factors”, it could reduce and not increase the GST rates, ERP rates & gantries, and public transport fares. In fact, the inflation rate started to climb along with the increment of the GST rate from 5% to 7%. The PAP Government had, in many ways, helped to initiate the inflationary price hikes; it therefore cannot be free from blame!
SOCIAL GRACE

The decades-old Courtesy Campaign has never been successful. So has the annual ritual by the Government to inspire grace as a way of life. Its consistent emphasis on materialism, elitism and officiousness effectively cancels any budding effort toward graciousness. The Executive and the Judiciary – in effect, the entire Establishment -– are always so full of pride and prejudice. Compassion seems to be a galactic term. The recent STTA power-hungry fiasco easily brings one to mind the ease of corruptability of naked power. Ego and materialism have now dug deep as a full-bred culture. Perhaps, the PAP Government could conduct a little introspection on itself first, before its next pronouncement on the need for social grace.

Nevertheless, we do sincerely applaud the Prime Minister for his continuing efforts to bring about improvements. We also hope that all these improvements would ultimately be for the betterment of our little red dot of an island. Majulah Singapura !!





Ken Sun

Secretary-General
NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PARTY

A "Tribute" to Ah Hua

This is from a Chinese forum, not written by me.

眼高手低也称才，
若不集选难上台；
初掌乒总担大任，
鲁莽轻率一起来。
三把火、谁能挨，老旧茅坑今日拆；
可怜银牌刚到手，过桥抽板老臣哀。

Another one:

名扬天下有奇招，茅坑臭屎出英豪；
哗众取宠等闲事，捅破蜂窝也糟糕。
重组织、再应聘，越描越黑何唠叨；
冷言冷语尖似箭，难堪气焰遇寒潮。

忆父亲

父亲，

天堂的日子还好过吗？我想您应该过得很不错，因为您这一年来都没有对我们要求过什么。

我们都还过得去，只不过母亲偶尔也会思念您而不禁独自流泪。但是您也不用挂心，我们都把母亲照顾得很好。

想起去年的今天，我们八个兄弟姐妹面对您突然的逝世时的错愕，我也不尽悲从心涌。虽然您没有留下任何遗言，但我打从心里知道，您最牵挂的是母亲，一个与您同甘共苦六十载的老伴。虽然姐姐和哥哥们起初都有点担心母亲留守在您临别的病床会受不了您的最后挥别，我还是忍着悲痛坚持母亲一定要留下看您最后一面。我不想你们彼此在阴阳相隔的那一刹那，留下任何终身的遗憾。母亲也必须彻底的亲眼目睹您的离去，才能在往后接受这个事实，放下您的离去。

在您的丧礼，我代表全家上下为您念吊文，我相信您也一定听到了。我之所以这样肯定您一定去了天堂，理由的确很简单：在您的一生中，以您最平凡的方法，刻苦耐劳，任劳任怨的工作，省吃俭用的生活，养育了我们八个兄弟姐妹。虽然没有所谓的丰功伟绩，但也没偷没抢没诈。一生人中就算是别人欺瞒了您，您也能放得下。就算是别人犯了错误，用车撞到您的车时，您也能以微笑的原谅对之。您给于我们八兄弟姐妹的养育之恩,已经足够让您到天堂了。其实要到天堂并不是一件那么难的事，您说是吗？

您走了以后，店里还不时有老顾客问起您。他们怀念的是您那和蔼可亲的笑容，当他们知道您的离去时，都觉得非常惋惜。我这时才从他们身上了解，原来您人缘是多么的好! 豁然回首,您已经在我背后默默地支持我创业十多年了，也默默的支持我参与对抗霸权政府好几年。

其实不说您也许不知，您一直以来，都是我政治教育的引导者！虽然您从不愿提起以前参与统一阵线的政治活动的详情，但您在我很小的时候便引导我每日读报纸，关心时事，不时为各种政策给于评论。这一切都深深地影响了我对社会、政治、教育问题、经济和铁腕政权的关注。我的成长，有您的脚印。我的政治认知，有您的思维。您对社会正义、道义的坚持，对政治迫害的愤慨，对华校、华文教育和南洋大学的遭遇的惋惜，对民主政治的执著等等，都深深影响了我，塑造了我的政治道德价值观。我无能在您有生之年，给您看到任何政治奋斗的成果，是我这一生的遗憾。

父亲，回想起来，您对我一生的影响，是非常大的。您的正直是我的榜样。您对贫弱的慷慨慈悲，也是我的榜样。您经常的打抱不平，也是我的榜样。您的诚实与诚恳更是我敬佩学习的榜样。您那嫉恶如仇的勇气，也是我学习的榜样。我相信您在这短短几十年里，默默看着我从事社会公益到政治斗争，从中也看到您自己的缩影吧！

虽然我很想在这一世了生死，不想再轮回无数，但我还是在想万一我不能断缺轮回，下一世有缘的话，我们一定会再见面的。

父亲，今天是您逝世一周年的忌日。我没为您在报上刊登任何启示，因我想这应该是我们对您私底下对您思念的时候。对一个影响我一生一世的父亲，我的确是无法以佛之教诲，放下思念和悲伤。

子 明盛

Impersonation - Highest form of Flattery?

Lately I have found out some interesting happenings going on in the internet. I have been impersonated in the new sammyboy forum and facebook!

I have written in to Sam Leong (host of the Sammyboy forum) to "reclaim" back my moniker there but for the Facebook, it seems that I could not get this impersonator removed. Although I have my own account in Facebook but I am afraid that many people will be confused by who is who in that networking portal. The impersonator has used my public photo put up on NSP website and my real name in facebook. However, apparently, it did not attract any friends because all my friends know my REAL facebook account.

I am a bit upset until a friend told me, "Impersonation is the highest form of flattery"! Sometimes I really wonder, do I really deserve such flattery from my political opponents and detractors? I am really amused after hearing that from my friend.

I guess I would have to live with it for the time being as this is just typical Singapore. Sad to say, we are still politically immature as a Nation. Our PAP government could just self pro-claim "World Class" but the very fact is that we have a F9 for political development.

Well, readers could just check my earlier postings which were bombarded with all sorts of spam insults by my political opponents, detractors and agents. It is not after I declare that I will just leave them as it is for the WHOLE WORLD to read and understand how politics actually work in this politically backward country, the spamming just stopped. Coincidence?

Now the agents have changed tactic. They have started smear campaign on the net by setting up blogs to throw insults on their political opponents. Then, they try to impersonate their opponents! But they do not understand that if they keep doing such things, they are actually telling the world that these people (well, I am really flattered to be included!) are "dangerous" or "threatening" enough to them, their position, so much so that they will use all dirty means to try and destroy them! That's a bit too much credits put on my shoulders, I guess.

Frankly speaking, I am just a nobody. Its just that I happen to run as a candidate in the most hotly contested wards in Aljunied GRC along with my ex-comrades Sylvia Lim back in 2006, that's about it. Well, maybe this blog of mine has raised some very critical questions on PAP's governance from time to time, but if all these are just rubbish to be brushed aside, so let it be! I do not think what I have raised here is critical enough to topple the PAP government. Its just simply a VOICE that I have amplified from the people that I see, meet and listen to.

But I would say all these CHILDISH acts by my opponents are just a reflection of the political reality in Singapore: backward and undeveloped. Its just shame that modern, high tech society with world class infrastructures are inhabited by such political goons. Sometimes, I don't really know whether to laugh or cry about these goons.

Goh Meng Seng