Afternote: Ok, Lucky Tan feels that the Conspiracy Theory is really unbelievable as Science Fiction. I would say that what is written by the Conspiracy Theorist is really exaggerating but the mechanism that he has mentioned still merit some thought. So beware when you read on the Conspiracy Theory, it should not be taken literally but the purpose here is to understand some of the mechanism that brings this world into this financial crisis.
This issue is linked to the so call Credit Default Swap (or Credit Risk Swap) which both Lehman Brothers Minibonds, DBS High Notes and many other structured credit-linked financial products.
To fully understand the whole issue, we will have to look at how the whole banking and financial system works. Economic times has sketched the structure of sub-prime induced mortgage credit-linked derivative products.
The two articles below, one by Economic Times, the other by a Malaysian Conspiracy Theorist Matthias Chang
Crisis: Don't blame it on subprime loans
30 Oct, 2008, 1345 hrs IST,T T Ram Mohan, ET Bureau
Single page view Text:
There is a pat explanation that’s been put forward to explain the subprime crisis. The US Fed and other central banks flooded the world with liquidity and created an era of low interest rates. Greedy bankers sought to take advantage of low interest rates by selling housing loans to greedy consumers who could not afford these (subprime loans). Once interest rates started rising, defaults on these loans were bound to go up, housing prices fated to fall and institutions exposed to these loans bound to fail.
In other words, an asset bubble, financial inclusion and human greed combined to create the havoc visited on the financial system today. This is only a half-truth at best. You can have a housing bubble, a boom in subprime loans and lots of greed but it does not follow that there should be a financial crisis.
Banks’ losses on subprime loans cannot explain the crisis we have today. The US subprime market is estimated to be $1.3 trillion — or around 10% of all mortgage loans. How much have banks lost on subprime loans? According to the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report, October 2008 (GFSR), just $50 billion!
It’s true that defaults on subprime loans have a snowballing effect as a fall in housing prices begins to impact on the economy at large. But even if we take this effect into account, the losses are not crippling. Losses on all loans, including commercial real estate, consumer loans, corporate loans, etc, have so far amounted to $425 billion with losses being shared by banks and other financial institutions. This is an order of losses that the financial system can withstand.
However, the financial system has suffered additional losses of $945 billion on investment in securities. Of these, losses on subprime related securities amount to $500 billion. These securities are not entirely subprime-related. Subprime loans are often one underlying component in a package.
It is losses on subprime-related securities that have complicated matters. An important reason why losses on these have been so large is that the accounting treatment of securities is different from that of loans. Traded securities have to be valued at market prices. If market prices fall below the face value of securities, banks must promptly recognise the associated losses. Loans are not required to be ‘marked to market’. Banks make provisions against loans as per regulatory norms.
Financial institutions invested in securities that were highly rated, meaning the risk of default on the underlying loans was believed to be low. When the default rate on subprime loans turned out to be higher than expected, the institutions panicked and wanted to get rid of subprime related securities. In the market, when everybody wants to exit, prices tend to overshoot their correct levels.
The market prices of many securities portfolios today are believed to be lower than warranted by the default rates on the underlying loans. For many illiquid securities, market prices are not available. They have to be valued using methods that tend to understate their values.
The GFSR shows what a world of difference there is between loan exposures and securities exposures. Losses on banks’ housing and real estate loan portfolios amount to only 3.6% of loans outstanding. For the reasons mentioned above, losses on subprime-related securities amount to a staggering 30% of the securities outstanding. Financial institutions are highly leveraged. For an institution that has capital equal to 10% of assets or less, the difference between a 3.4% loss on assets and a 30% loss is the difference between life and death.
So, explosive growth in subprime loans and the collapse of a housing bubble cannot explain the sheer magnitude of the crisis we are facing today. It was the “marketisation” of loans — the conversion of loans into tradeable securities — that created a crisis on such a scale.
True, such “marketisation” facilitated rapid growth in subprime loans. But rapid housing loan growth has happened elsewhere within the banking system without creating a financial crisis. Banking regulation has responded to the challenge through means such as increased risk weights on housing loans and limits on exposures.
When loans were “marketised”, they moved into a netherworld in which regulation was not equal to the task. This is a world that bristles with problems that have been written about so much — incorrect credit ratings, large exposures on the part of highly leveraged institutions dependent on wholesale funding, mark-to-market accounting, etc.
You can have low interest rates, an asset bubble, financial inclusion through subprime housing loans and greedy bankers and consumers. It does not follow that there must be a severe financial crisis. We have one today because traditional loans came to be substituted by financial instruments for which regulation was inadequate.
From Matthias Chang
By Matthias Chang
Let me explain why the situation is so dire and dangerous.
Since Wednesday, when the financial shits hit the ceiling fan, I was hoping that the so-called leading economics and financial commentators and opinion makers would explain the situation to the Malaysian public via the national dailies, the blogs and the TV network. I came across not one article or broadcast that explains the underlying reasons for the inevitable dire consequences.
Sure there were articles on the crisis, but they were merely describing the rescue of the largest insurance company in the USA (A.I.G.) if not the world and the amount involved. No explanation whatsoever, as to why only a few days earlier the Fed and the Treasury allowed the 4th largest bank, Lehman Bros to fold up but rushed in to rescue AIG with an unprecedented US$ 85 billion.
In my various articles published in my website and my final volume of the Future Fast-Forward Trilogy – The Shadow Money-Lenders and the Global Financial Tsunami – I explained in great detail the corruption within the global banking system and how these financial leeches through fraud and political protection created and amassed a global financial fortune in excess of US$500 Trillion. ( A book riddled with racist overtones)
Let me assure you that this is not a typo error. You got it right. It is not billions but a whopping US$500 trillion. I have been advised that as of the Q2 of 2008, the figure may have reached US$565 trillion.
This is a complex subject but I shall endeavour to make it as simple as I can.
Starting Point
The Ponzi Scheme
The crux of the fraudulent Ponzi scheme is the twin pillars of:
1) Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac – the two giant mortgage corporations of USA
2) The Derivative financial tool known as Credit Default Swap (CDS)
Once you have a grasp of these two concepts, you cannot but agree that we are facing total global banking collapse. Why? Because the entire global banking system has been built on these two financial pillars! But the system became irreparable in the last 7 years when CDS became the linchpin in the massive expansion of derivative trading and financial engineering.
The Mechanics
1. Banks became greedy and were unwilling to earn safe and steady profits from mortgages for housing and commercial properties which usually spread over a period of between 5 to 30 years.
2. Banks wanted massive profits in the shortest period of time and the ability to lend massive amounts and not be regulated as to how to do it.
3. The crooks devised a scheme. It was a simple idea.
4. Banks will provide mortgages to all and sundry.
5. I am going to use a simple example and using small numbers to illustrate for ease of calculation. Thus, assuming the Bank gave out US$1 million to finance mortgages, bearing interest at 10%.
6. The bank then sold the mortgages to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at a discount. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac being Government Sponsored Companies (GSCs) are able to get cheap financing to purchase these mortgages as they were assumed to be “guaranteed by the US Government”.
7. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac then package these mortgages into all sorts of structured financial products and these were sold to investors (private as well governments). Central Banks hold massive amounts of dollar reserves and they need to find a safe haven for them. Hence, and invariably, Central Banks invest their reserves in US Treasuries and financial “mortgage-backed” products issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as other US financial institutions.
8. With the payment of US$ 1 million by Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac, the bank by law, can lend ten times the amount after keeping 10% reserves i.e.US$100,000. Therefore, the bank can lend US$9 million by “creating money out of thin air” i.e. by crediting the borrowers in their loan accounts in amount of the loans extended. These US$9 million loans secured by mortgages are then sold to Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac again.
The cycle keeps repeating and the banks keep creating more and more loans.
It was so easy that the banks decided to create dubious loans called “Liars Loans” whereby the borrower need not state the actual income and or ability to repay.
9. As more and more of these loans were created, investors (government and private) demanded assurances that these loans were good for investments. The rating agencies (e.g. Moodys, Standard & Poor and Fitch etc.) who in collusion with banks, gave AAA ratings to what were essentially junks. This fraud led investors to believe that these financial products were good investments.
10. The rating agencies were only too aware that this scheme needed something more concrete to prolong the fraud and induce the investors to part with their monies.
11. The insurance companies like A.I.G. came into the picture. They were seduced by the idea that if they can insure against risks of accidents, storms etc., they could also insure risks against default by the mortgage holders. Thus was born the financial innovation – Credit Default Swap (CDS). Any financial product with a sound CDS would be rated AAA. It was as good as being guaranteed by Uncle Sam. *******s the world over, especially central banks, fell for it – hook, line and sinker. Bank Negara was no exception.
12. The scheme works out like this – AIG sells protection – i.e. in the event there is a default, AIG will pay out to the buyer who buys the protection (the CDS) in exchange for the payment of premiums covering the period of protection not unlike your usual insurance policy. It was easy money for everyone.
The banks get to sell their loans and have the liquidity to create more loans.
Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac and other financial institutions get the opportunity to repackage these loans / mortgages and sells them to investors with a tidy profit.
The investors are happy with their so-called guaranteed returns. The insurance companies, investment banks and other players get their premium income for selling protection. It was old fashion mafia loan sharking and protection business dressed up in modern financial jargon and everyone was too arrogant and greedy to see through the fraud.
13. When loans default and continue to be delinquent, the law (depending on each country) provides that if the loan is in default for 90 days or more, it should be declared a Non-Performing Loan (NPL) and banks must provide reserve to cover the loss.
14. What happened was banks were covering the defaults and kept them on the books for two years or more in the hope that no one would be wiser and interest income from new loans would cover the defaulted old loans – the classic ponzi modus operandi.
15. When the two years default reached critical proportions starting with the sub-prime loans, the fraud began to unravel. Investors began demanding their protection money for the losses arising from these defaults. It has been estimated that the market value of the CDS was in excess of US$60 trillion but the capital of the insurance companies like AIG are only in the billions. It is therefore a physical impossibility to make good the demand for payment for the defaults.
16. If AIG the No. 1 insurer in US and the world is in default, it means the rest are in deep shits. You can take it as a given that no one and no one has good coverage and protection anymore.
17. When there is no coverage and protection, how can there be AAA ratings for new issues of such financial products? Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac etc. cannot package these products for sale to investors and if they cannot sell, they will have no funds to buy more dubious mortgages from corrupt and fraudulent Wall Street banks. With no additional funds, these crooks in JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Lehman Bros., Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, UBS, Barclays, HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, etc. will have difficulty extending new loans.
The “Musical Money Chair” will have to come to a complete halt. The entire system gets into a gridlock.
Given the above explanation, can the US government and the Fed continue to bail out banks and other financial institutions? When US is in deficit in both the budget and current accounts, where else can they get the extra monies except by creating out of thin air (virtually by keying digits into computers) or print more dollars.
If you are a sovereign lender or a private hedge fund, knowing the situation, would you lend more monies to the US Treasury knowing that each dollar issued (whether digitally or in printed notes) are not worth the value stated therein.
These dollars ARE NO BETTER THAN TOILET PAPER.
The bulk of our reserves are in US dollars. Our trade – petroleum products, palm oil and other exports are mainly traded in dollars. When the dollar dives into the cesspool of waste, what then?
This is the impending mess that Malaysia will be facing as early as end of 2008.
Have you heard anyone other than this writer talking about it?
Friday, October 31, 2008
Flawed Financial Products-DBS High 5 Notes
The following article on Today has highlighted that DBS High 5 Notes is actually a FLAWED product with a risk factor of 8 or 9 out of 10. But yet, it was systematically sold to people who are only interested in fixed deposits with fixed interests.
Similarly, as explained in my last article "This is what Minibond is all about!" and a similar article in Chinese which illustrated that Lehman Minibonds is NOT Bonds at all.
In fact, it has ABSOLUTELY NOTHING to do with BONDS but just a HIGH RISK product which is TOTALLY FLAWED. Not only that it makes investors become INSURERS of Lehman Brothers but in actual fact, it practically makes investors to GIVE Lehman Brothers the right to use their hard earned money to GAMBLE in the financial derivatives market to earn HIGH RETURNS for Lehman Brothers without having it to bear any risk at all..i.e. Lehman Brothers will have a RISKLESS GAMBLE while all risks are born by investors!
If they make it big gamble, they will only give 5.1% to investors and they keep the rest of the winning. If they lose, sorry, investors will be the ones who will lose the money!
Goh Meng Seng
Products were flawed
High-risk High Notes should not have been sold at all, they contend
By Francis Chan
ST PHOTOS: WANG HUI FEN
View more photos
SOME DBS High Notes 5 investors are broadening their complaints against the bank that sold them Lehman Brothers-linked investments that are now worthless.
They want to press the case that the structured product had 'flaws' and should never have been sold to them to start with.
This is different from complaints that have so far been lodged against the bank, which centre on allegations of 'mis-selling' of products that did not suit investors.
Two representatives from the 250-strong grouping - which has dubbed itself the 'DBS Hi Notes Investor Group' - spoke to The Straits Times in between two forums organised by DBS at Suntec City yesterday. They contend that High Notes 5 was a high-risk product not suitable for retail investors.
'There is a systemic failure in the product itself,' said one, who asked to be known as Mr Leong, 47. 'In fact, we got the bank to admit during the forum that the product is indeed not a low-risk product,' he added. Said the other representative, 38- year-old Kenneth Tay: 'We asked them to rate it on a scale of one to 10, with 10 being the highest, and they said High Notes 5 was between eight and nine.'
Mr Leong invested $100,000 in the doomed product and Mr Tay, $75,000. Their argument marks a shift away from the current focus on investor complaints about mis-selling of Lehman-linked products, especially to elderly or lowly-educated investors who could not understand their complexities.
DBS, like other financial institutions, has agreed to focus on helping 'vulnerable' investors such as the elderly and less educated and to probe mis-selling claims.
The bank is reviewing all sales transactions on a case-by-case basis regardless of whether a complaint has been made.
Mr Leong said the 250 investors agreed that High Notes 5 had three key flaws. 'The first is the product itself, the second is the sales process and third, the way the bank targeted customers,' he said.
On product flaws, Mr Leong said that with help from a 'finance expert' who had experience in manufacturing structured products, the group had learnt that as investors of High Notes 5, they had unfairly become 'insurers' to the credit default swaps (CDS) which backed the product.
On the sales process, Mr Leong said that it was agreed among the group that the DBS relationship managers who sold the product could not even explain the product features clearly.
'It is our view that they are inadequately trained, so how can inadequately trained people with faulty knowledge hope to advise people who know nothing?' he asked. Mr Leong said the third issue was the way in which the bank had approached customers to sell the product.
'Many [investors] share this story: They went to the bank to renew or open a fixed deposit and somehow ended up buying into High Notes 5,' he added. 'How can one associate a customer who is looking for a largely safe product like a fixed deposit ending up with such a high-risk product?'
Mr Leong and Mr Tay said they did not get satisfactory responses at the forums from DBS consumer banking head Rajan Raju. When asked to comment on the systemic flaws raised by investors, Mr Raju told reporters: 'All investments, as you know, are governed by the Financial Advisers Act in Singapore...and so far, all our products are benchmarked to the Financial Advisers Act.'
He added: 'What we are trying to say is that where there is a breakdown in our process, we will make sure that we take the responsibility and fix the problem.'
More than 360 investors of High Notes 5 attended the two sessions of the dialogue organised by DBS.
These came after 166 investors had visited DBS' Shenton Way headquarters on Oct 21 to call for an open forum. One investor, who declined to be named, said he had heard little new. 'But today they gave us this complaint form with 16 questions to complete, and promised us a fair review, so let's hope for the best - there's not much else I can do anyway.'
The 1,400 investors who bought High Notes 5 would have received letters from DBS by today informing them that their investments are worthless.
Similarly, as explained in my last article "This is what Minibond is all about!" and a similar article in Chinese which illustrated that Lehman Minibonds is NOT Bonds at all.
In fact, it has ABSOLUTELY NOTHING to do with BONDS but just a HIGH RISK product which is TOTALLY FLAWED. Not only that it makes investors become INSURERS of Lehman Brothers but in actual fact, it practically makes investors to GIVE Lehman Brothers the right to use their hard earned money to GAMBLE in the financial derivatives market to earn HIGH RETURNS for Lehman Brothers without having it to bear any risk at all..i.e. Lehman Brothers will have a RISKLESS GAMBLE while all risks are born by investors!
If they make it big gamble, they will only give 5.1% to investors and they keep the rest of the winning. If they lose, sorry, investors will be the ones who will lose the money!
Goh Meng Seng
Products were flawed
High-risk High Notes should not have been sold at all, they contend
By Francis Chan
ST PHOTOS: WANG HUI FEN
View more photos
SOME DBS High Notes 5 investors are broadening their complaints against the bank that sold them Lehman Brothers-linked investments that are now worthless.
They want to press the case that the structured product had 'flaws' and should never have been sold to them to start with.
This is different from complaints that have so far been lodged against the bank, which centre on allegations of 'mis-selling' of products that did not suit investors.
Two representatives from the 250-strong grouping - which has dubbed itself the 'DBS Hi Notes Investor Group' - spoke to The Straits Times in between two forums organised by DBS at Suntec City yesterday. They contend that High Notes 5 was a high-risk product not suitable for retail investors.
'There is a systemic failure in the product itself,' said one, who asked to be known as Mr Leong, 47. 'In fact, we got the bank to admit during the forum that the product is indeed not a low-risk product,' he added. Said the other representative, 38- year-old Kenneth Tay: 'We asked them to rate it on a scale of one to 10, with 10 being the highest, and they said High Notes 5 was between eight and nine.'
Mr Leong invested $100,000 in the doomed product and Mr Tay, $75,000. Their argument marks a shift away from the current focus on investor complaints about mis-selling of Lehman-linked products, especially to elderly or lowly-educated investors who could not understand their complexities.
DBS, like other financial institutions, has agreed to focus on helping 'vulnerable' investors such as the elderly and less educated and to probe mis-selling claims.
The bank is reviewing all sales transactions on a case-by-case basis regardless of whether a complaint has been made.
Mr Leong said the 250 investors agreed that High Notes 5 had three key flaws. 'The first is the product itself, the second is the sales process and third, the way the bank targeted customers,' he said.
On product flaws, Mr Leong said that with help from a 'finance expert' who had experience in manufacturing structured products, the group had learnt that as investors of High Notes 5, they had unfairly become 'insurers' to the credit default swaps (CDS) which backed the product.
On the sales process, Mr Leong said that it was agreed among the group that the DBS relationship managers who sold the product could not even explain the product features clearly.
'It is our view that they are inadequately trained, so how can inadequately trained people with faulty knowledge hope to advise people who know nothing?' he asked. Mr Leong said the third issue was the way in which the bank had approached customers to sell the product.
'Many [investors] share this story: They went to the bank to renew or open a fixed deposit and somehow ended up buying into High Notes 5,' he added. 'How can one associate a customer who is looking for a largely safe product like a fixed deposit ending up with such a high-risk product?'
Mr Leong and Mr Tay said they did not get satisfactory responses at the forums from DBS consumer banking head Rajan Raju. When asked to comment on the systemic flaws raised by investors, Mr Raju told reporters: 'All investments, as you know, are governed by the Financial Advisers Act in Singapore...and so far, all our products are benchmarked to the Financial Advisers Act.'
He added: 'What we are trying to say is that where there is a breakdown in our process, we will make sure that we take the responsibility and fix the problem.'
More than 360 investors of High Notes 5 attended the two sessions of the dialogue organised by DBS.
These came after 166 investors had visited DBS' Shenton Way headquarters on Oct 21 to call for an open forum. One investor, who declined to be named, said he had heard little new. 'But today they gave us this complaint form with 16 questions to complete, and promised us a fair review, so let's hope for the best - there's not much else I can do anyway.'
The 1,400 investors who bought High Notes 5 would have received letters from DBS by today informing them that their investments are worthless.
十一月一日芳林公园集会事项
这个星期六将会有另一个集会在芳林公园举行，时间从傍晚5时至7时
议程事项如下：
1。 请愿书最新消息报告
2。 帮助拟草投诉书
3。 与分销商的高级管理层对话
4。 集体诉讼事宜（最后抉择）
5。 投资者根据分销商聚集
6。 华语翻译
请各位踊跃参与，最好与你们的家人一同到场。只有维持团结和壮大的声势，我们才能继续施压为你们讨回公道。
议程事项如下：
1。 请愿书最新消息报告
2。 帮助拟草投诉书
3。 与分销商的高级管理层对话
4。 集体诉讼事宜（最后抉择）
5。 投资者根据分销商聚集
6。 华语翻译
请各位踊跃参与，最好与你们的家人一同到场。只有维持团结和壮大的声势，我们才能继续施压为你们讨回公道。
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
揭开雷曼迷你债券的真面目
这是之前在“金融补课”里所放置的香港经济日报有关迷你债券的解释图案。我把这图案重新整理成雷曼迷你债券的解释图：
从以上的图案来看，我们可以看得出这"迷你债券"其实与债券一点关系都没有！投资者所投资的钱并没有拿去投资任何债券而是拿去买了一堆高风险的信贷产品作为金融抵押产品。这一篮子的金融抵押品是由150间公司的金融信贷产品所组成的，这包括抵押债务权证（CDO)、信贷相连票据（CLN)和其他高风险高回报的信贷金融衍生产品。这产品的名字“迷你债券”其实本身就是具有严重误导成分。
这整个雷曼迷你债券的结构是这样的，整个结构里有五个部分：
1）第一个部分当然是雷曼兄弟投资银行，作为风险替交的对象。（我会解释什么是风险替交）
2）第二个部分是由雷曼兄弟投资银行所成立的空壳公司，迷你债券公司作为发行“雷曼迷你债券”的特别机构，从投资者那里集资的工具。
3）投资者
4）投资者所投资的钱由迷你债券公司投资在一篮子的高风险的信贷金融衍生产品。这篮子，包括抵押债务权证CDO)、信贷相连票据（CLN)和众多与次优房贷的金融衍生产品就成为了第四部分。这篮子是用来作为抵押金融资产的。
５）作为信贷参考的六家公司以作为风险替交的指标。这一些信贷参考的指标公司除了作为雷曼与投资者的“赌注”指标外，实质上跟投资者的投资是没有什么关系的。
让我们从一个比较容易理解的角度来看待这整个迷你债券的结构。雷曼兄弟投资银行可能没有买任何由这六家公司所发行的债券，但我们就当做他们是买了这六家公司的债券吧。他们需要为他们所买下的这六家公司债券买保险，但是这保险不是像任何保险公司买的，而是通过它所设立的“迷你债券公司”向你们投资者买这保险。实质上，迷你债券的投资者就集体成为了雷曼兄弟的保险公司！
但要成为雷曼兄弟的保险人，投资者就必须出一笔钱来作为抵押。这笔钱就交给了由雷曼兄弟控制的迷你债券公司投资在这一篮子的由150间公司所发行的高风险金融衍生产品。这一些高风险的金融衍生产品当然有可观的回报率，但是这一些回报率是不固定的。
迷你债券公司就用这由这篮子抵押产品的不固定，高风险的回报率来与雷曼兄弟做信贷毁约掉期，也就是我们所说的风险替交。迷你债券的投资者把这不固定的高风险回报率交给雷曼兄弟，而雷曼兄弟就保证给于这一些投资者固定的5。1%的回报率。但有个条件就是，迷你债券的投资者必须承担那六间公司里任何一间倒闭的风险。这也就是说，只要这六间公司里的任何一间如果倒闭的话，投资者就必须以他们投资的全部数额赔偿于雷曼兄弟!
但是，虽然投资者已经以他们的抵押金融衍生产品的回报率交给雷曼兄弟，但是雷曼兄弟并没有担保这一些产品的责任。这也就是说，投资者本身必须负起这一些高风险金融衍生产品贬值甚至因发行公司倒闭而毁损，一文不值的风险！
在这迷你债券的合约里，提出了两个能让投资者亏损，甚至血本无归的信贷事件：
1）只要那六间信贷参考公司中的任何一间倒闭，这就是一件信贷事件而投资者所投资在那一些高风险的金融衍生产品就会全部用来赔偿雷曼兄弟。
２）只要那一篮子里的１５０间公司有１１间以上倒闭的话，这也是一件信贷事件。这整个迷你债券就会解体，所有抵押产品就会被变卖，扣除亏损和费用后，就交还给投资者。
如果你有注意到的话，在整个结构里，雷曼兄弟并没有承担任何高风险，也没有出到任何巨大款项来投资。就算以上的任何信贷事件发生的话，雷曼兄弟都不会有亏损，反而会因第一信贷事件发生时，获得投资者的所有投资的抵押品！
虽然雷曼兄弟必须付出固定的５。１％的回报率给投资者，但是别忘了它无需承担那一篮子的高风险衍生产品贬值或倒闭的风险！而且迷你债券公司是由雷曼兄弟控制的，它可利用这公司去购买非常高风险的衍生产品以便让雷曼得到比５.１％还要高许多的回报率，反正如果这一些产品变得一文不值的话，那是投资者必须承担的损失，雷曼兄弟根本没有任何损失！
这样一来，雷曼兄弟既可以得到对那六间信贷参考指标公司的担保，又可以利用投资者的钱去做出高风险投资而无需承担任何风险！它只须要给投资者固定的５。１％的利率但无须为它间接借贷来做高风险投资的钱负任何责任！这真是对一个喜欢做高风险投资的投资银行的宝贝！
投资者为什么会为这看来完全不合理的结构产品投资呢？原因就是雷曼迷你债券的设计师很有技巧的抓住了亚洲投资者的心态。
１）他们故意用“债券”这个名词来为这高风险产品命名。这是因为他们知道在亚洲人的心理，债券，尤其是政府债券，是等于“底风险”的替代词。从一开始，他们就已经有误导的意图。
2）他们也知道亚洲人不喜欢冒险，所以以“固定回报率”作为鱼饵，使人们有个假象，固定回报率就等于“没有风险”！因为没有变动的回报率怎么会是高风险呢？
3）他们也知道亚洲人对风险的意识是以他们认识的大机构为标准。所以说用那六大企业作为信贷指标简直是障眼法！
4）最关键的是，当他们发行售卖这迷你债券时，他们并没有列出那150间公司与它们的信贷衍生产品！这部分是至关重要的，因为这是投资者所要面对的最主要的高风险！这就是应对了以那六间大企业作为风险的障眼法，而却故意遗漏了这最主要的高风险投资品！而这高风险的投资所得，全部会归纳于雷曼兄弟，但风险却是投资者承担！
我希望以上的分析能清楚地让大家知道为什么这雷曼迷你债券本身就隐藏着误导成分，甚至有欺瞒成分！这就是说为什么我们都认为在仔细揭破了以后，它是有剧毒的不平等条约。
而我本人坚持认为行动党所领导的政府在这事件上是彻底的失败的。金管局的监管纰漏简直是无可原谅的。这么一个剧毒的黑心金融结构产品他们竟然让它通关，甚至让它摆放在一个以保守、低风险环境的银行里售卖！这就是自认“世界级”的政府，拥有高薪精英当权的政府，竟然会犯下如此的大错误。就连自己的市政理事会都会懵懂的投资在这黑心迷你债券上，真是不可理喻！
更荒谬的是，有人竟然要为这政府的无能开脱责任，说这跟政府无关！如果有人送药品去政府申请批准而明明这药品是有害的而政府机构竟然批准售卖给民众，你说这到底跟政府有没有关系？
吴明盛
如果你们需要一些额外的补充资料，可以参考以下的文章：
1）http://evilsrevival.blogspot.com/2008/09/cdos.html
２）http://evilsrevival.blogspot.com/2008/09/cdos_28.html
3) http://beaver.dlc.ncnu.edu.tw/projects/emag/article/200805/%E6%B7%BA%E8%AB%87%E9%80%A3%E5%8B%95%E5%82%B5.pdf
Monday, October 27, 2008
什么是雷曼迷你债券?
在过去的两个星期,有许多苦主都问我同样的一个问题: 到底什么是雷曼迷你债券?
我会尝试以最简单的方法来解释,但是我必须先准备好一个图案以便更清楚和完整地解释整个雷曼迷你债券的来龙去脉.
有一位好友通知我说有几段影片也许能帮忙大家了解这雷曼迷你债券的概念,但是这一些短片是由香港民主党所录制的论坛摘要,是以广东话叙述的.影片的的网址是http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gs95uKVwqLA&feature=related
这网址内有许多其他关于雷曼迷你债券的影片供你参考，但绝大多数是以广东话叙述。
在此选了以下的几段：
吴明盛
我会尝试以最简单的方法来解释,但是我必须先准备好一个图案以便更清楚和完整地解释整个雷曼迷你债券的来龙去脉.
有一位好友通知我说有几段影片也许能帮忙大家了解这雷曼迷你债券的概念,但是这一些短片是由香港民主党所录制的论坛摘要,是以广东话叙述的.影片的的网址是http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gs95uKVwqLA&feature=related
这网址内有许多其他关于雷曼迷你债券的影片供你参考，但绝大多数是以广东话叙述。
在此选了以下的几段：
吴明盛
MAS responsibility in Minibonds-- Moral Hazards
The reason I feel that MAS has failed miserably in its role of a regulator is basically because it has failed to identify the MORAL HAZARDS involved in the structure of Lehman Brothers Minibonds.
First of all, the mention of the Six reference entities that consists of big names in the banking industry is TOTALLY MISLEADING, especially so when the risk that involves in the basket of Collateral Assets were not mentioned. In fact, as far as I know, at the time of sales, the list of 150 companies and their derivatives, were not even identified to the investors! How could anyone, be it MAS, banks or investors, really evaluate the TOTAL RISKS involved in this Minibonds if the bulk of risk that lies in this list of 150 companies was not even identified?
This is why I am very puzzled why this Minibonds has been approved by MAS to be sold to consumers VIA BANKS if the risk nature of it was not determined fully.
Secondly, there is an obvious MORAL HAZARDS that lies within this structure of Minibonds. The two SWAP PARTIES are actually the SAME! Minibonds Ltd is just an empty shell company created and owned by Lehman Brothers!
And due to the way that this Minibonds is structured, it would then mean that in the interests of Lehman Brothers, money invested by investors would be used to buy derivatives that would give the highest return while all these returns would be all given to Lehman Brothers. But in return Lehman Brothers would only give 5.1% to investors while investors would have to bear the risks of that Minibonds has taken, for the benefits of Lehman Brothers, in investing in all these high risk derivatives!
This is a CLEAR indication of MORAL HAZARDS. There is basically NO PROTECTION of investors' interests in preventing of taking too much risks for that amount of 5.1% return.
No investors would have known Minibonds Ltd is RELATED or even CONTROLLED by Lehman Brothers itself. And no investors would know EXACTLY HOW MUCH RISKS they are taking because the list of 150 companies and their derivatives was not even determined at the point of sales. This may explain why sales representatives would mislead investors into thinking that their money would be invested in the six reference banks or even Lehman Brothers itself! They may not even know the existence of the 150 companies' derivatives as in the Collateral Assets! How would a sales representative sell something that they don't even know what they are selling in the very first place?
The more I look at the whole structure, the more I feel that MAS has failed miserably as a regulator and YET, there are people who would claim this got nothing to do with the Government! How could PAP government that pride itself as World Class, filled with high paid elites, could ever allow such TOTALLY FLAWED and TOXIC financial products to be sold in Singapore is really something I could not understand.
Goh Meng Seng
First of all, the mention of the Six reference entities that consists of big names in the banking industry is TOTALLY MISLEADING, especially so when the risk that involves in the basket of Collateral Assets were not mentioned. In fact, as far as I know, at the time of sales, the list of 150 companies and their derivatives, were not even identified to the investors! How could anyone, be it MAS, banks or investors, really evaluate the TOTAL RISKS involved in this Minibonds if the bulk of risk that lies in this list of 150 companies was not even identified?
This is why I am very puzzled why this Minibonds has been approved by MAS to be sold to consumers VIA BANKS if the risk nature of it was not determined fully.
Secondly, there is an obvious MORAL HAZARDS that lies within this structure of Minibonds. The two SWAP PARTIES are actually the SAME! Minibonds Ltd is just an empty shell company created and owned by Lehman Brothers!
And due to the way that this Minibonds is structured, it would then mean that in the interests of Lehman Brothers, money invested by investors would be used to buy derivatives that would give the highest return while all these returns would be all given to Lehman Brothers. But in return Lehman Brothers would only give 5.1% to investors while investors would have to bear the risks of that Minibonds has taken, for the benefits of Lehman Brothers, in investing in all these high risk derivatives!
This is a CLEAR indication of MORAL HAZARDS. There is basically NO PROTECTION of investors' interests in preventing of taking too much risks for that amount of 5.1% return.
No investors would have known Minibonds Ltd is RELATED or even CONTROLLED by Lehman Brothers itself. And no investors would know EXACTLY HOW MUCH RISKS they are taking because the list of 150 companies and their derivatives was not even determined at the point of sales. This may explain why sales representatives would mislead investors into thinking that their money would be invested in the six reference banks or even Lehman Brothers itself! They may not even know the existence of the 150 companies' derivatives as in the Collateral Assets! How would a sales representative sell something that they don't even know what they are selling in the very first place?
The more I look at the whole structure, the more I feel that MAS has failed miserably as a regulator and YET, there are people who would claim this got nothing to do with the Government! How could PAP government that pride itself as World Class, filled with high paid elites, could ever allow such TOTALLY FLAWED and TOXIC financial products to be sold in Singapore is really something I could not understand.
Goh Meng Seng
This is what Minibonds is all about!
The name "Minibonds" itself is a misleading word for investors. Whatever money you have invested in this "Minibonds" are not invested in bonds of the six reference banks or bonds issued by Lehman Brothers.
This is how it works. Lehman Brothers may or may not buy any bonds from the six reference banks but it is just using these banks as "reference entities", some sort as a "bet" with Minibonds holders. There are basically 5 entities involved in the Minibonds arrangement.
1)First of all, its Lehman Brothers as the credit risk swap (I will explain what credit risk swap entails in this case later) partner.
２）Secondly, Lehman Brothers has created an empty shell company Minibond Ltd which will issue the Minibonds to investors.
３）Third, the investors.
４）Forth, the money taken from investors will be invested in a basket of AA financial products from 150 companies which includes CDOs which is basically collateral debts obligations, some of them are related to SubPrime debts.
5) The reference banks which has nothing to do with investors' investment other than being a betting reference: i.e. if any one of them failed, it would be a credit event that make investors lose money to Lehman Brothers.
For simplicity to understand the whole arrangement, just take it that Lehman Brothers has bought some bonds from these six reference entities (banks) and it needs somebody to insure its risk of exposure to these banks. It did not insure its risks from insurance companies like AIG but instead, via this Minibonds arrangement, bought insurance from investors like you.
Through the Credit Risk Swap, you as an investor has agreed to sell insurance to Lehman Brothers with regards to the reference entities. In order to become an insurance agents of Lehman Brothers, you will need to come up with money as collateral. This money is collected from you via the financial institutions that you bought the Minibonds and given to Minibond Ltd to invest in a basket of CDOs issued by 150 companies.
Whatever returns from these CDOs issued by these 150 companies (variable returns) are given to Lehman Brothers. In return, Lehman Brothers will give Minibonds Ltd a FIXED premium (most probably higher than 5.1%) and Minibonds Ltd will give investors 5.1% returns for their investment.
Now, the variable returns from the Collateral Assets may be higher or lower than 5.1% but investors will only get back 5.1%. It means that Lehman Brothers will take the risk of variable returns from these Collateral Assets in return for your risk taking on the reference entities. This complete the Credit Risks Swap, swapping your risks of variable returns for a fixed returns, while you in return, insured Lehman Brothers for their risk exposure to the Six reference entities.
The problem is that Minibonds Ltd, under the control of Lehman Brothers, may choose to invest in a higher risk instruments or CDOs because it would be very profitable if the returns from these investment is higher than 5.1% that Lehman Brothers promised you. Especially so, when they do not need to bear the risks of defaults these CDOs or any of the assets in the basket of Collateral Assets. The returns from these Collateral Assets, they take but you bear the risks of defaults from these assets.
Under the contract, once a CREDIT EVENT happens, the whole arrangement will be liquidated. The Credit Event involves:
1) If any one of the reference banks failed, it is considered as a Credit Event and the investors will have to pay Lehman Brothers for the insurance it bought via the Credit Risks Swap. Meaning, investors will lose all money invested.
2) If more than 11 companies of the 150 companies listed in the Collateral Assets failed, or a certain percentage of the CDOs or credit-linked derivatives held as Collateral Assets go into default, the whole Minibonds will be liquidated and any loss from these defaults will be born by investors (not Lehman Brothers).
Afternote: Someone asks me about where does the prospectus point out about Credit Event no. 2. This is the tricky part, when you were sold the product, they did not point out directly the more important risk involved in the collateral assets and in the base prospectus , it was not listed as "Credit Event" or "Risk" but instead it was listed under the section on Mandatory Redemption. I have seen the pricing statement and such important HIGH RISK was not prominently mentioned also. Someone pointed out that under the various series'prospectus, it was mentioned as follows:
- for minibond series 3 if 10 credit events happen to the 150 companies, investor would experience some loss of principal. If there are 12 such credit events investor will loss all principal.
(Prospectus pg 20)
- for minibond series 5, if 11 credit events happen to the 150 companies, investors would experience some loss of principal. If there are 13 such credit events investor will loss all principal.
(Prospectus pg 21)
- for minibond series 7 (they don't even state the numbers now). Investor will experience some loss of principal if a "specified amount" of loss from the unknown number of companies.
(Prospectus pg 22)
Most important of all, the prospectus did not list out the 150 companies
But the definition of Credit Event does not includes the failing of Lehman Brothers as the Credit Risks Swap partner. Thus, at this moment, investors do no face immediate liquidation of the Minibonds and suffer immediate losses.
However, investors RISK losing a lot of money due to the fact that the value of the basket of CDOs and other credit-linked derivatives held as Collateral Assets has devalued tremendously due to the present financial crisis. The likelihood of a credit event triggered by the failing of a substantial number of companies within the list of 150 is very high at this moment.
Furthermore, as Lehman Brothers has gone into bankruptcy, it will no longer give you the 5.1% as it promised and in this financial crisis, the variable returns from the basket of CDOs and credit-linked derivatives would be nearly zero as most of them are linked to SubPrime products.
Thus, with this basic understanding of the product Minibonds, I shall answer Peter's questions:
1) What was sold to the unsuspecting and gullible investors ? Is it a Credit Default Swap( CDS ). What is a CDS ?
Credit Default Swap, also commonly known as Credit Risk Swap, is a mechanism whereby two parties "exchange risk". In this case of Minibonds, it is totally an UNFAIR swapping. The "RISK" Minibonds Investors swapped with Lehman Brothers is the VARIABLE RETURNS from the basket of Collateral Assets they implicitly invested via Minibonds Ltd controlled by Lehman Brothers. However, the risk of the failing of the whole basket of Collateral Assets are not insured by Lehman Brothers. Thus, Lehman Brothers will not compensate investors if they lose money due to defaults of the CDOs and credit-linked assets held in the basket of collateral assets!
This is where the tricky part is. Lehman Brothers could use Minibonds Ltd to invest in many HIGH RISK financial derivatives to get very high variable returns and it will benefit from these returns while only giving back a fixed 5.1% to investors. But if these HIGH RISK derivatives failed, investors will have to bear the brunt.
On the other hand, Lehman Brothers has used the Six Reference banks as a risk bet to Minibonds investors. It seems to me that using such reference entities of "Low Risk" nature as Credit Default Risk exchange is MISLEADING as it creates an impression of "LOW RISKS" while in fact, the amount of RISK investors born is very much higher as they are responsible for the risk of the Collateral Assets!
2) What is the purpose of REFERENCE ENTITIES ( REs ) ? The REs are prominently displayed in the brochure and fooled us into thinking we are investing in their bonds.
As explained, the Reference Entities are just a reference of "Risk" that Lehman Brothers is swapping with you. Your money invested did not invest in these banks but rather in a list of 150 companies' credit-linked derivatives which may be of HIGH RISKS nature.
The main Risk that investors is taking lies in the basket of Collateral Assets.
3) The money collected from investors, what did they do with it. I saw the swapping chart in your blog in chinese. Can you kindly prepare one in english and email to me so that I can photocopy and distribute this sat. at speakers corner to help investors achieve some understanding.
The money collected from investors are invested in a basket of HIGH RISK derivatives issued by 150 companies. High risk derivatives may give high VARIABLE returns but the returns from these High Risk derivatives was swapped by the arrangement of CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP, to Lehman Brothers. That means that investors are bearing the HIGH RISKS of this basket of derivatives (not bonds, but CDOs and credit-linked derivatives) but Lehman Brothers has taken all the returns from these derivatives and in return, only promised to give you a FIXED return of 5.1%!
4) The REs have not defaulted,but the value of our investments have plumetted to almost zero. What is the rationale behind this incomprehensible senario.?
Although the REs have not defaulted but the basket of HIGH RISK derivatives that your money actually invested in as a basket of Collateral Assets has actually diminished due to the financial crisis that we are facing. Although you as investors have not enjoyed the high returns from these high risk derivatives (which you have swap and given to Lehman Brothers for 5.1% return) but you bear the risks of defaults or devaluation from these financial derivative instruments.
5) Did the distributor :-
a) misrepresented this product ( not aware of it's true nature and operating mechanism )
b) concealed the material fact ( they knew but did not tell us )
a) From the many descriptions given by investors with regards to the information they received from sales representatives, it is a CLEAR MIS-INFORMATION and MIS-REPRESENTATION of this product. The RISK you faced is not LOW as the failure of any one of the six reference entities. You, as an investor, also face risk of defaults or devaluation of the basket of HIGH RISK financial derivatives issued by the 150 companies and yet, you did not enjoy FULLY the potential high returns from these instruments but taking the risk of these instruments! Basically it means that, somebody used your money to invest in HIGH RISKS products and keep all the potential HIGH RETURNS from your investment but in return, they only give you back a FIXED 5.1% and you bear all the risks of defaults and devaluation of these products. I believe if this is represented properly to you, many investors would not be investing in this product. I mean, who wants to bear all the HIGH RISK while taking back only a FIXED 5.1%?
b) I am not in the position to say whether "they knew but did not tell you" or they conceal any material facts because I am not vested and would not know whether those front line sales representatives actually know what they are selling in the very first place. I believe not many people really understand this Lehman Brothers Minibonds when it was first sold. If those financial elites at MAS actually study the whole structure carefully, they would realize that this Minibonds is DETRIMENTAL to consumers' interests and it is a totally UNFAIR Credit Default Risk Swap as Lehman Brothers controlled the Swap Party Minibond Ltd.
I hope my explanation is clear enough for you to understand.
Goh Meng Seng
Reader: What is Minibonds?
I have received an email from reader to ask me about what is exactly Minibonds. I am in the process of doing a comprehensive write up on what exactly Minibonds is all about, for the benefits for both my English as well as Chinese readers.
Dear Mr. Goh Meng Seng
I had the pleasure of exchanging a few words with you last sat. at speakers corner,
and had met you previously in WP's hq. just before the last GE.
I had invested 80k of my retirement funds into this product and wish to learn from my mistakes. Up to now nobody could tell me the true intent and nature of this product called MINIBOND.
Most of us have been deceived by this word and thought we had invested in a basket of bonds.
I tried rereading the prospectus to get some answers but ended up confused and bewildered by the terminologies, technical jargon & legalese. ( I had retired from the construction sector )
These are some of questions, hope you can help :-
1) What was sold to the unsuspecting and gullible investors ? Is it a Credit Default Swap
( CDS ). What is a CDS ?
2) What is the purpose of REFERENCE ENTITIES ( REs ) ?
the REs are prominently displayed in the brochure and fooled us into thinking we
are investing in their bonds.
3) The money collected from investors, what did they do with it.
I saw the swapping chart in your blog in chinese. Can you kindly prepare one in english
and email to me so that I can photocopy and distribute this sat. at speakers corner
to help investors achieve some understanding.
4) The REs have not defaulted,but the value of our investments have plumetted to almost
zero. What is the rationale behind this incomprehensible senario.?
5) Did the distributor :-
a) misrepresented this product ( not aware of it's true nature and operating mechanism )
b) concealed the material fact ( they knew but did not tell us )
I have come across anecdotes where complainants were bullied and brow-beatened at the
interviews by reps of the banks and brokerages.
Without a proper knowledge and understanding ( in Hindsight ) of this product, this will always be the norm at such interviews.
Mr. Tan Kin Lian and your goodself have selflessly contributed your time and efforts to
help us, the ordinary citizens, and for that we are eternally grateful to you gentlemen.
I had initially wanted to send this email to Mr. Tan but do not wish to burden him
unnecessarily and also hope this is not the case with you.
Thank You
Peter
Dear Mr. Goh Meng Seng
I had the pleasure of exchanging a few words with you last sat. at speakers corner,
and had met you previously in WP's hq. just before the last GE.
I had invested 80k of my retirement funds into this product and wish to learn from my mistakes. Up to now nobody could tell me the true intent and nature of this product called MINIBOND.
Most of us have been deceived by this word and thought we had invested in a basket of bonds.
I tried rereading the prospectus to get some answers but ended up confused and bewildered by the terminologies, technical jargon & legalese. ( I had retired from the construction sector )
These are some of questions, hope you can help :-
1) What was sold to the unsuspecting and gullible investors ? Is it a Credit Default Swap
( CDS ). What is a CDS ?
2) What is the purpose of REFERENCE ENTITIES ( REs ) ?
the REs are prominently displayed in the brochure and fooled us into thinking we
are investing in their bonds.
3) The money collected from investors, what did they do with it.
I saw the swapping chart in your blog in chinese. Can you kindly prepare one in english
and email to me so that I can photocopy and distribute this sat. at speakers corner
to help investors achieve some understanding.
4) The REs have not defaulted,but the value of our investments have plumetted to almost
zero. What is the rationale behind this incomprehensible senario.?
5) Did the distributor :-
a) misrepresented this product ( not aware of it's true nature and operating mechanism )
b) concealed the material fact ( they knew but did not tell us )
I have come across anecdotes where complainants were bullied and brow-beatened at the
interviews by reps of the banks and brokerages.
Without a proper knowledge and understanding ( in Hindsight ) of this product, this will always be the norm at such interviews.
Mr. Tan Kin Lian and your goodself have selflessly contributed your time and efforts to
help us, the ordinary citizens, and for that we are eternally grateful to you gentlemen.
I had initially wanted to send this email to Mr. Tan but do not wish to burden him
unnecessarily and also hope this is not the case with you.
Thank You
Peter
Sunday, October 26, 2008
不关政府的事？ (二)
不关政府的事？
我这是回应蔡深江先生于十月二十六日在《想法》》版所写的“会头跑了”的文章。
蔡先生在他的文章里以“跟会”来形容这次迷你债券和结构性金融产品所产生的风波是非常不恰当的比喻。最重要的结论“不关政府的事”更是有混淆视听，转移视线的嫌疑。
我目前虽然只是在帮助陈钦亮先生替他把他的演讲稿翻译了演说给那一些受误导的小市民，引导他们循体制内寻求公道的解决方案，但是在我本人看来，追根究底这场风波的始作俑者就是金融管理局！蔡先生怎么能以“跟会”这非法集资放贷的地下会庄和堂堂正正见得光的银行金融体系做这种不恰当的比喻而得出“不关政府的事”的结论呢？
人们去“跟会”就预知它的非法和高风险性质，而且没有政府机制会来监管。所以如果人们为了那可观的会红去跟会，出了事，会头跑路了，因果自负，怨不了谁，更怨不了政府，因为政府已经把这会庄列成“非法”！但是，这次出事的是被政府监管机构所允许，标着“正当”的结构性金融产品啊！并不是人民去非法的金融公司购买非法的产品啊！
政府有责任是因为：
1） 政府属下的机构金融管理局监管疏忽，竟然应许这种高风险和结构复杂的金融产品让银行售买给那一些只寻求底风险定期存款回报率的客户。人们到储蓄银行存钱就是因为他们是保守，不愿承受高风险。这也就是说，金融管理局无视这明显的风险比对的差误而继续让银行为寻高利润而误销这一些产品。
2） 在这次风波发生前，我相信金管局已经接到许多关于银行职员用不良销售手法推销这一些结构性金融产品的投诉。对于这警钟的敲起，金管局当时似乎视而不见，只是口头上提醒银行而没有采取实质性的行动去真正了解下方实际情况从而制止不当误销行径继续发生。这样纵容银行不当的销售方法，代表政府的金管局真是难辞其咎！
3） 最重要的是，环顾世界上所有国家和地区，为什么唯独新加坡和香港会有普通市民被误销这类结构性金融产品呢？新加坡和香港政府为了争个“亚洲金融最开放的市场”这个虚名，枉顾消费者的利益而大打“解除监管”的大招牌，把一些连西方国家都不愿让储蓄银行销售的金融产品都摆在我们的银行里售卖。这不是一个自认负责任的政府所应该做的事。
我最看不过眼的是，政府在这事件中，摆着事不关己的态度。 就连贵报资深评论员也有意无意地为“不关政府的事”制造论据。虽然香港和新加坡政府一样都犯了同样的错误，但与香港政府对整个事件处理的积极性相比，新加坡政府就显得没有诚意，相形见绌了。香港政府除了积极为苦主收集投诉外，还主动安排把他们的投诉分批处理。除此之外，香港政府还誓言如果有必要的话，会通过资助他们的消费者协会为苦主打官司！相比之下，新加坡政府竟然通过金管局呼吁向金融机构投诉而接受金融机构的调查。可笑的是，金管局竟然相信这一些金融机构能“公正、合理”处理这一些个案！据我所接触的苦主的叙述，他们前往金融机构面谈时都遭到金融机构的代表以有如高压盘问犯人的手法对待，使他们倍感压力！在这样的情况底下，我们怎么期望苦主会得到应有的“公正、合理”的对待？
我吁请贵报应该作为人民的喉舌，应该以中肯的态度对待整件事件。新加坡报纸和香港报纸相比之下，这是逊色得很。在香港报社评论中，第一时间就为读者交待什么是雷曼迷你债券。报道也中肯的看待政府监管职责的疏忽、银行的行销手法、雷曼产品的毒害和投资者的过失。从来没有报纸会直接说政府没有责任！
我也吁请政府的金管局，应该更积极处理整件事件，不应叫苦主直接找金融机构投诉。因为这一些金融机构为了保护自己的利益，必定会用有利于他们自己的方法来处理事件。有苦主已经透露了他们受到高压对待，金管局不应一错再错，让苦主独自面对有膨大资源的金融机构以致他们在面谈的过程中做出对自己不利的言行。
吴明盛
我这是回应蔡深江先生于十月二十六日在《想法》》版所写的“会头跑了”的文章。
蔡先生在他的文章里以“跟会”来形容这次迷你债券和结构性金融产品所产生的风波是非常不恰当的比喻。最重要的结论“不关政府的事”更是有混淆视听，转移视线的嫌疑。
我目前虽然只是在帮助陈钦亮先生替他把他的演讲稿翻译了演说给那一些受误导的小市民，引导他们循体制内寻求公道的解决方案，但是在我本人看来，追根究底这场风波的始作俑者就是金融管理局！蔡先生怎么能以“跟会”这非法集资放贷的地下会庄和堂堂正正见得光的银行金融体系做这种不恰当的比喻而得出“不关政府的事”的结论呢？
人们去“跟会”就预知它的非法和高风险性质，而且没有政府机制会来监管。所以如果人们为了那可观的会红去跟会，出了事，会头跑路了，因果自负，怨不了谁，更怨不了政府，因为政府已经把这会庄列成“非法”！但是，这次出事的是被政府监管机构所允许，标着“正当”的结构性金融产品啊！并不是人民去非法的金融公司购买非法的产品啊！
政府有责任是因为：
1） 政府属下的机构金融管理局监管疏忽，竟然应许这种高风险和结构复杂的金融产品让银行售买给那一些只寻求底风险定期存款回报率的客户。人们到储蓄银行存钱就是因为他们是保守，不愿承受高风险。这也就是说，金融管理局无视这明显的风险比对的差误而继续让银行为寻高利润而误销这一些产品。
2） 在这次风波发生前，我相信金管局已经接到许多关于银行职员用不良销售手法推销这一些结构性金融产品的投诉。对于这警钟的敲起，金管局当时似乎视而不见，只是口头上提醒银行而没有采取实质性的行动去真正了解下方实际情况从而制止不当误销行径继续发生。这样纵容银行不当的销售方法，代表政府的金管局真是难辞其咎！
3） 最重要的是，环顾世界上所有国家和地区，为什么唯独新加坡和香港会有普通市民被误销这类结构性金融产品呢？新加坡和香港政府为了争个“亚洲金融最开放的市场”这个虚名，枉顾消费者的利益而大打“解除监管”的大招牌，把一些连西方国家都不愿让储蓄银行销售的金融产品都摆在我们的银行里售卖。这不是一个自认负责任的政府所应该做的事。
我最看不过眼的是，政府在这事件中，摆着事不关己的态度。 就连贵报资深评论员也有意无意地为“不关政府的事”制造论据。虽然香港和新加坡政府一样都犯了同样的错误，但与香港政府对整个事件处理的积极性相比，新加坡政府就显得没有诚意，相形见绌了。香港政府除了积极为苦主收集投诉外，还主动安排把他们的投诉分批处理。除此之外，香港政府还誓言如果有必要的话，会通过资助他们的消费者协会为苦主打官司！相比之下，新加坡政府竟然通过金管局呼吁向金融机构投诉而接受金融机构的调查。可笑的是，金管局竟然相信这一些金融机构能“公正、合理”处理这一些个案！据我所接触的苦主的叙述，他们前往金融机构面谈时都遭到金融机构的代表以有如高压盘问犯人的手法对待，使他们倍感压力！在这样的情况底下，我们怎么期望苦主会得到应有的“公正、合理”的对待？
我吁请贵报应该作为人民的喉舌，应该以中肯的态度对待整件事件。新加坡报纸和香港报纸相比之下，这是逊色得很。在香港报社评论中，第一时间就为读者交待什么是雷曼迷你债券。报道也中肯的看待政府监管职责的疏忽、银行的行销手法、雷曼产品的毒害和投资者的过失。从来没有报纸会直接说政府没有责任！
我也吁请政府的金管局，应该更积极处理整件事件，不应叫苦主直接找金融机构投诉。因为这一些金融机构为了保护自己的利益，必定会用有利于他们自己的方法来处理事件。有苦主已经透露了他们受到高压对待，金管局不应一错再错，让苦主独自面对有膨大资源的金融机构以致他们在面谈的过程中做出对自己不利的言行。
吴明盛
星期天评头踩足—2008.10.26
主题:星期天评头踩足—2008.10.26
作者:韦春花 10:37am 26/10/2008
星期天评头踩足—2008.10.26
对于世间的万事万物，花儿我信服周易的原则：不易、简易、变易。说起来有些反智，但是我就是认为，那些高深的学问和见首不见尾的概念，很多时候是拿来唬人或者骗自己，如果回到初衷，最终还是要屈服于常识。
蔡深江的比喻就很妙，理查德·福尔德就像会头，而这个会头是跑了的。说什么结构性、衍生、对冲，到底是拿了人家的钱去赌，赌输了就跑路，就这么简单！没有信用和道德。连没有读书、受华文教育（什么时候这两样对等了？）都懂，问题是很多道貌岸然和扭曲的法律程序在保护着坏人，甚至还要抢着去救他；这跟扶着大债户过马路一样，深怕他给汽车给撞死了。
救世或救市需要大智慧，就是能够看破纷扰的时局，知道最基本的东西，去掉那些繁文缛节，直指问题核心（陈钦亮就有那么一点味道）。老实说看到金管局王瑞杰的专访，我知道这位先生在位不久了。当然不是现在，或者是三个月后、或者半年，他会因为一些奇怪的理由或者健康因素挂冠而去。为什么呢？因为他的讲话根本没有更高的东西，那支笛不断老调重吹，像坏了的唱盘，更在意的是为自己辩护。以这种提线傀儡的程度怎么肩负带领众人“出埃及”的重责呢？
李阿姐长篇大论：
* 从求见议员的选民的语汇中，可知他们自有一套思维方式。对于一些机构的概念，他们并不清楚。……还是因为人们多年来建立了对政府的信任，甚至养成依赖，有时可以不求甚解？又或者是人们自己拒绝去理解，只选择听自己想听的内容？……平日没有出乱子时，很多人都不会留意执行时所出的纰漏，我们也不会在意其中所谓 “弱势”的概念。但是这一次，因为牵涉到金钱的利益和售卖方式的正当与否，在处理问题时，当局就提出了“弱势”的归类。……现在，金融管理局已经有一套协助不同类型投资者的方案，有关机构需要时间去处理和解决。我所关心的是在这次事件以外的……相当一部分人即便懂得英语，甚至受不错的教育，对于我们生活中许多情况，政府的政策等等，也还是未必有清楚的概念。在我看来，更深层的，其实是其中知识结构的问题。而知识结构不只是有没有文凭和证书，是否有接受某种技能培训而已，是整个的知识面的宽窄，对课题认知的深浅。
中了人家设计的圈套，失去棺材本，是因为这些人平日“不求甚解、又或者是人们自己拒绝去理解，只选择听自己想听的内容”——要怪都要怪你懒惰、没脑、不用脑，自己要负起大部分的责任，李阿姐是这个意思吗？
其实这个“懂”与“不懂”之争，在于谁定义这两个词？在以总理、资政作后盾的金管局和以陈钦亮为代表的民间力量之间的角力，到底是谁教会谁真正的“懂”？金管局的不断U转（请参考 TOC选读：MAS——像只绝望的无头鸡），说明是他们在受教。之前，连最简单的人心向背都“不懂”。
高深的词汇只会把人弄糊涂，而不是要把人弄懂。就好像周兆呈的鸿文《‘新闻自由之最’的破产》，重点摘录是“新闻最自由的冰岛已经‘破产’，排名比较靠前的欧美都希望借助中国——新闻自由排名成绩不佳的国家——的经济力量来稳定全球金融秩序，这对曾经鼓与吹新闻自由与市场经济健康成正比的一些学者来说，真是情何以堪。”——非常截然、牙齿当金使的断言。
文中用了不少的大词汇：人均GDP、全球性的股市、债券、期货、信贷、房地产、信奉新闻自由与市场经济存有紧密因果关系、耶鲁大学管理学院金融学教授、亚洲金融危机、市场经济、法学教授、金融危机的肇因、新闻自由程度、经济自由化程度等，看得是眼花缭乱，就是希望为新加坡的排名落后找到一些搪塞之词，或者自我开解也说不定。
可是我用两个图表就可以推翻他的结论，请看左图跟右图，膺“新闻最自由”第一荣衔的国家共有7个，除非周兆呈能够预测他们在近期内都会破产，否则他的立论不能成立。对曾经鼓与吹新闻自由与市场经济健康成正比的一些学者来说，还是老神在在。
第140新加坡和第159中国之间还夹着18个国家，我希望周兆呈也能举证他们受金融风暴的影响很小（包括新加坡）。那么最后一名北朝鲜出来救全世界会不会更好呢？要不然他的结论也是下得太仓促了。
他以为他懂很多，很多时候碍于私心，只是见木不见林。♪
作者:韦春花 10:37am 26/10/2008
星期天评头踩足—2008.10.26
对于世间的万事万物，花儿我信服周易的原则：不易、简易、变易。说起来有些反智，但是我就是认为，那些高深的学问和见首不见尾的概念，很多时候是拿来唬人或者骗自己，如果回到初衷，最终还是要屈服于常识。
蔡深江的比喻就很妙，理查德·福尔德就像会头，而这个会头是跑了的。说什么结构性、衍生、对冲，到底是拿了人家的钱去赌，赌输了就跑路，就这么简单！没有信用和道德。连没有读书、受华文教育（什么时候这两样对等了？）都懂，问题是很多道貌岸然和扭曲的法律程序在保护着坏人，甚至还要抢着去救他；这跟扶着大债户过马路一样，深怕他给汽车给撞死了。
救世或救市需要大智慧，就是能够看破纷扰的时局，知道最基本的东西，去掉那些繁文缛节，直指问题核心（陈钦亮就有那么一点味道）。老实说看到金管局王瑞杰的专访，我知道这位先生在位不久了。当然不是现在，或者是三个月后、或者半年，他会因为一些奇怪的理由或者健康因素挂冠而去。为什么呢？因为他的讲话根本没有更高的东西，那支笛不断老调重吹，像坏了的唱盘，更在意的是为自己辩护。以这种提线傀儡的程度怎么肩负带领众人“出埃及”的重责呢？
李阿姐长篇大论：
* 从求见议员的选民的语汇中，可知他们自有一套思维方式。对于一些机构的概念，他们并不清楚。……还是因为人们多年来建立了对政府的信任，甚至养成依赖，有时可以不求甚解？又或者是人们自己拒绝去理解，只选择听自己想听的内容？……平日没有出乱子时，很多人都不会留意执行时所出的纰漏，我们也不会在意其中所谓 “弱势”的概念。但是这一次，因为牵涉到金钱的利益和售卖方式的正当与否，在处理问题时，当局就提出了“弱势”的归类。……现在，金融管理局已经有一套协助不同类型投资者的方案，有关机构需要时间去处理和解决。我所关心的是在这次事件以外的……相当一部分人即便懂得英语，甚至受不错的教育，对于我们生活中许多情况，政府的政策等等，也还是未必有清楚的概念。在我看来，更深层的，其实是其中知识结构的问题。而知识结构不只是有没有文凭和证书，是否有接受某种技能培训而已，是整个的知识面的宽窄，对课题认知的深浅。
中了人家设计的圈套，失去棺材本，是因为这些人平日“不求甚解、又或者是人们自己拒绝去理解，只选择听自己想听的内容”——要怪都要怪你懒惰、没脑、不用脑，自己要负起大部分的责任，李阿姐是这个意思吗？
其实这个“懂”与“不懂”之争，在于谁定义这两个词？在以总理、资政作后盾的金管局和以陈钦亮为代表的民间力量之间的角力，到底是谁教会谁真正的“懂”？金管局的不断U转（请参考 TOC选读：MAS——像只绝望的无头鸡），说明是他们在受教。之前，连最简单的人心向背都“不懂”。
高深的词汇只会把人弄糊涂，而不是要把人弄懂。就好像周兆呈的鸿文《‘新闻自由之最’的破产》，重点摘录是“新闻最自由的冰岛已经‘破产’，排名比较靠前的欧美都希望借助中国——新闻自由排名成绩不佳的国家——的经济力量来稳定全球金融秩序，这对曾经鼓与吹新闻自由与市场经济健康成正比的一些学者来说，真是情何以堪。”——非常截然、牙齿当金使的断言。
文中用了不少的大词汇：人均GDP、全球性的股市、债券、期货、信贷、房地产、信奉新闻自由与市场经济存有紧密因果关系、耶鲁大学管理学院金融学教授、亚洲金融危机、市场经济、法学教授、金融危机的肇因、新闻自由程度、经济自由化程度等，看得是眼花缭乱，就是希望为新加坡的排名落后找到一些搪塞之词，或者自我开解也说不定。
可是我用两个图表就可以推翻他的结论，请看左图跟右图，膺“新闻最自由”第一荣衔的国家共有7个，除非周兆呈能够预测他们在近期内都会破产，否则他的立论不能成立。对曾经鼓与吹新闻自由与市场经济健康成正比的一些学者来说，还是老神在在。
第140新加坡和第159中国之间还夹着18个国家，我希望周兆呈也能举证他们受金融风暴的影响很小（包括新加坡）。那么最后一名北朝鲜出来救全世界会不会更好呢？要不然他的结论也是下得太仓促了。
他以为他懂很多，很多时候碍于私心，只是见木不见林。♪
不关政府的事???
主题:典型的金融罪犯成了金融道德的典范！！！
作者:冬冬 2:15pm 26/10/2008
回来新加坡已有十一天，从开始兴致勃勃了解到几天后稍有了解后不想多言，这期间心理上是极大的不舒。今天看到蔡总编、周、李二位主任的大作，不禁摇头叹息。。。。
周主任利用冰岛经济破产来印证新加坡言论受压制的好处，冰岛经济可能破产是因为新闻自由之最之故吗？这根本是两码子事。冰岛是由于急于求富而在经济策略上孤注一掷而不幸遭逢金融怪兽的毒手，看看我们的星展吧，其实我们正在依循冰岛的脚步前行，只不过我们是刚起步涉入未深才不至遭大难。冰岛是大多数国民的资产都没入金融抄作。而我国这些年来却是却是官方一而再的鼓动全民拥股全民用赌。这是两者的最大差异之一，而周主任想利用的¨新闻自由¨是两国民众对金融风险认识的关键。
因为新闻自由度高，冰岛政府、财经界、知识份子和新闻从业员，都无利用职权来随意误导国民，冰岛大多数国民都了解金融衍生产品的高凤险。而新加坡呢？冰岛政府或准确的说是除香港和新加坡外的全球金融管理局都不敢批准把这些高凤险的迷你债卷卖给一般国民，而新加坡金管局呢？星展不只在港、新两地推售雷曼迷你债卷，更财迷心窍的推出了自己的金融衍生产品。周主任啊周主任。。你是否可以想像如果这次金融危机再拖拉个三两年才爆发，星展银行将会是怎一个¨危¨字了得？
我不知道李主任慧玲究竟对这次我国小民金融危机的肇因是懂还是不懂？还是她根本就不想懂、不愿懂或是自残脑袋根本不敢去懂？像她这样本来就该在事情爆发后，利用知识和职权去弄懂问题的所谓知识份子都只能是懵懂，竟还敢夸谈什么知识结构才是深层原由，奢谈什么知识经济。
蔡总编越来越有幽默感了，他把金融大恶形像化－－会头。他的标题是¨会头跑了¨！众所周之，¨会¨在我国是违规、非法的，给马打（警察）知道你是¨会头¨那是会被捉去坐牢的哦。。那么是谁批准那些个外国会头和本地会头（星展）在新加坡开¨会¨的？不就是新加坡金融管理局罗！！！蔡总编这¨会头跑了¨捅了金管局这个马蜂窝，当然担心乌纱帽不保，所以他又敢紧打圆场跟他妈说：那些¨本地会头¨自己决定要赔偿的，当然，政府在背后也很关心，看得很紧，
不过不关政府的事。
蔡总编真会开玩笑，你把你家大门的锁匙交给公寓的管理员，他开门让人进你家，结果那人偷了＄５０，０００，你发觉了，旁人说：那贼愿意赔你平均约＄５０，并提醒你，那是这个¨贼¨自己决定要赔偿的，当然，管理员在背后也很关心，看得很紧，不过不关管理员的事！是不是这意思啊蔡总编？？？
金融管理局是始作俑者，而星展是那些个贪得无厌的金融机构之一（是本地最绝对大的销售机构），但在蔡总编等人的笔下却成了最有人情味、最有道德、最有责任感的机构。在你们巧笔的描绘之下典型的金融罪犯成了金融道德的典范
那些个获全赔的¨弱势¨究竟占总购买额的多少？新加坡政府一定会快刀斩乱麻，以尽快在香港的赔偿明朗化之前为赔偿额定案。而香港则会大打太极让新加坡定出个超低的赔偿标准，香港人决不会因港府的恫吓而做缩头乌龟任由摆布，港府不能，新加坡政府一定能。当然港府也绝对不敢妄想如新加坡政府般反而从罪犯化身成了罗宾汉、救世主
作者:冬冬 2:15pm 26/10/2008
回来新加坡已有十一天，从开始兴致勃勃了解到几天后稍有了解后不想多言，这期间心理上是极大的不舒。今天看到蔡总编、周、李二位主任的大作，不禁摇头叹息。。。。
周主任利用冰岛经济破产来印证新加坡言论受压制的好处，冰岛经济可能破产是因为新闻自由之最之故吗？这根本是两码子事。冰岛是由于急于求富而在经济策略上孤注一掷而不幸遭逢金融怪兽的毒手，看看我们的星展吧，其实我们正在依循冰岛的脚步前行，只不过我们是刚起步涉入未深才不至遭大难。冰岛是大多数国民的资产都没入金融抄作。而我国这些年来却是却是官方一而再的鼓动全民拥股全民用赌。这是两者的最大差异之一，而周主任想利用的¨新闻自由¨是两国民众对金融风险认识的关键。
因为新闻自由度高，冰岛政府、财经界、知识份子和新闻从业员，都无利用职权来随意误导国民，冰岛大多数国民都了解金融衍生产品的高凤险。而新加坡呢？冰岛政府或准确的说是除香港和新加坡外的全球金融管理局都不敢批准把这些高凤险的迷你债卷卖给一般国民，而新加坡金管局呢？星展不只在港、新两地推售雷曼迷你债卷，更财迷心窍的推出了自己的金融衍生产品。周主任啊周主任。。你是否可以想像如果这次金融危机再拖拉个三两年才爆发，星展银行将会是怎一个¨危¨字了得？
我不知道李主任慧玲究竟对这次我国小民金融危机的肇因是懂还是不懂？还是她根本就不想懂、不愿懂或是自残脑袋根本不敢去懂？像她这样本来就该在事情爆发后，利用知识和职权去弄懂问题的所谓知识份子都只能是懵懂，竟还敢夸谈什么知识结构才是深层原由，奢谈什么知识经济。
蔡总编越来越有幽默感了，他把金融大恶形像化－－会头。他的标题是¨会头跑了¨！众所周之，¨会¨在我国是违规、非法的，给马打（警察）知道你是¨会头¨那是会被捉去坐牢的哦。。那么是谁批准那些个外国会头和本地会头（星展）在新加坡开¨会¨的？不就是新加坡金融管理局罗！！！蔡总编这¨会头跑了¨捅了金管局这个马蜂窝，当然担心乌纱帽不保，所以他又敢紧打圆场跟他妈说：那些¨本地会头¨自己决定要赔偿的，当然，政府在背后也很关心，看得很紧，
不过不关政府的事。
蔡总编真会开玩笑，你把你家大门的锁匙交给公寓的管理员，他开门让人进你家，结果那人偷了＄５０，０００，你发觉了，旁人说：那贼愿意赔你平均约＄５０，并提醒你，那是这个¨贼¨自己决定要赔偿的，当然，管理员在背后也很关心，看得很紧，不过不关管理员的事！是不是这意思啊蔡总编？？？
金融管理局是始作俑者，而星展是那些个贪得无厌的金融机构之一（是本地最绝对大的销售机构），但在蔡总编等人的笔下却成了最有人情味、最有道德、最有责任感的机构。在你们巧笔的描绘之下典型的金融罪犯成了金融道德的典范
那些个获全赔的¨弱势¨究竟占总购买额的多少？新加坡政府一定会快刀斩乱麻，以尽快在香港的赔偿明朗化之前为赔偿额定案。而香港则会大打太极让新加坡定出个超低的赔偿标准，香港人决不会因港府的恫吓而做缩头乌龟任由摆布，港府不能，新加坡政府一定能。当然港府也绝对不敢妄想如新加坡政府般反而从罪犯化身成了罗宾汉、救世主
A Mis-sold Government!
The following is another comment from the same anonymous reader. My response is this: Ever since I get involved in helping Mr. Tan Kin Lian in delivering his translated speech, some people approached me in private, even come to my shop and said, as a middle-upper class Singaporeans, they have finally awaken to the fact that this PAP government isn't as good as they claim to be. They could make grave mistakes. In this saga, apparently anyone with a critical mind, would come to the conclusion that MAS has mishandled the whole saga and that, MAS itself was the main culprit in allowing such complex financial product to be sold to people who are only interested in putting their money in safe bank fixed deposits.
And I am glad to hear from these people that they finally realized the importance of having alternative voice, checks and balances within the political platform, namely the parliament. I hope this will materialize in the next GE.
The following is the comment from anonymous:
I'm the same anonymous who wrote the above. I want to say somemore.
We as Singaporeans serve NS and do our reservist duties. But everyday many of us ask what we will be fighting for. Not towering million $ condominiums downtown or not the wealth of the companies that set up here and can close shop and leave when the bad time comes. We defend our pledge which holds the values that binds our society - democracy, justice, equality.
We have understood that we voted for a govt who will serve the people. But in times of crisis like this, we see the govt is not even sure which side to stand. It is like an NS man who is not sure whether to fight or not. There is no question in my mind that the leadership has to be on the side of the people from day 1. What we saw was dithering, denial and trying to spread the blame. It was shameful. Totally shameful. The MAS and govt seems to be hiding from the people on the 1st week of the saga. It was when Tan Kin Lian screamed "MAS Do the right thing" on his blog that people in the ivory tower realise they need to act.
10,000 ordinary Singaporeans losing their lifesavings wrought no sense of urgency from this govt. Their natural instinct was to adopt a minimalist approach if there was "little noise" from the ground.
I did not invest a single cent in structured product but I invested my entire life in this society called Singapore and accepted this form of elitist govt sold to me by the PAP. I've been mis-sold a govt. They are not worth the millions they are paid. There is no guarantee they are on the side of the people in times of crisis. There is no protection of the values in our pledge - Justice and equality. It seems their only interest in running this country to make money from ordinary people to grow the GLCs for the benefit of a handful of elites.
It is very clear to me that I've been mis-sold a whole govt called the PAP. It is a structured product - they have a power structure that downgrade the interests of the ordinary people. They structured our society so that there is a huge income gap between themselves and the ordinary folks. This structured product matures/expires in 3 years time, I'm not sure if I can get my 'principle' back. I'll make very sure the next time I stand in front of that ballot box I'll make the right decision. No amount of advertising and marketing will help them to mis-sell this structured product called PAP to me ever again.
And I am glad to hear from these people that they finally realized the importance of having alternative voice, checks and balances within the political platform, namely the parliament. I hope this will materialize in the next GE.
The following is the comment from anonymous:
I'm the same anonymous who wrote the above. I want to say somemore.
We as Singaporeans serve NS and do our reservist duties. But everyday many of us ask what we will be fighting for. Not towering million $ condominiums downtown or not the wealth of the companies that set up here and can close shop and leave when the bad time comes. We defend our pledge which holds the values that binds our society - democracy, justice, equality.
We have understood that we voted for a govt who will serve the people. But in times of crisis like this, we see the govt is not even sure which side to stand. It is like an NS man who is not sure whether to fight or not. There is no question in my mind that the leadership has to be on the side of the people from day 1. What we saw was dithering, denial and trying to spread the blame. It was shameful. Totally shameful. The MAS and govt seems to be hiding from the people on the 1st week of the saga. It was when Tan Kin Lian screamed "MAS Do the right thing" on his blog that people in the ivory tower realise they need to act.
10,000 ordinary Singaporeans losing their lifesavings wrought no sense of urgency from this govt. Their natural instinct was to adopt a minimalist approach if there was "little noise" from the ground.
I did not invest a single cent in structured product but I invested my entire life in this society called Singapore and accepted this form of elitist govt sold to me by the PAP. I've been mis-sold a govt. They are not worth the millions they are paid. There is no guarantee they are on the side of the people in times of crisis. There is no protection of the values in our pledge - Justice and equality. It seems their only interest in running this country to make money from ordinary people to grow the GLCs for the benefit of a handful of elites.
It is very clear to me that I've been mis-sold a whole govt called the PAP. It is a structured product - they have a power structure that downgrade the interests of the ordinary people. They structured our society so that there is a huge income gap between themselves and the ordinary folks. This structured product matures/expires in 3 years time, I'm not sure if I can get my 'principle' back. I'll make very sure the next time I stand in front of that ballot box I'll make the right decision. No amount of advertising and marketing will help them to mis-sell this structured product called PAP to me ever again.
MAS responsibility
The following is a comment left on my blog by anonymous reader:
A few points that I want to bring up:
1. Minibonds were not sold in many countries because there regulators deem it too complex e.g. Malaysia did not allow it.
2. MAS allowed the minibonds to come into Singapore but did not regulate the selling process. Oversight was missing and there were numerous complaints in the past but nothing concrete was done.
3. There is clear mis-selling on the part of the banks - minibonds were not bonds in the first place.
4. When the fiasco erupted MAS took a reactive approach.
It is the job of the govt to see that justice is done and the truth is found. The HK govt made ths same mistake as the Singapore govt in allowing these minibombs to be sold. But once it is clear the ordinary people will lose out, the HK govt stand firmly on the side of the people. We don't see this in Singapore. It is very disappointing for Singaporeans.
A few points that I want to bring up:
1. Minibonds were not sold in many countries because there regulators deem it too complex e.g. Malaysia did not allow it.
2. MAS allowed the minibonds to come into Singapore but did not regulate the selling process. Oversight was missing and there were numerous complaints in the past but nothing concrete was done.
3. There is clear mis-selling on the part of the banks - minibonds were not bonds in the first place.
4. When the fiasco erupted MAS took a reactive approach.
It is the job of the govt to see that justice is done and the truth is found. The HK govt made ths same mistake as the Singapore govt in allowing these minibombs to be sold. But once it is clear the ordinary people will lose out, the HK govt stand firmly on the side of the people. We don't see this in Singapore. It is very disappointing for Singaporeans.
Saturday, October 25, 2008
MiniBond Related Chinese Articles
I must apologize to my English readers about the many Chinese articles related to Minibond issues.
I have been working closely with Mr. Tan Kin Lian to help out Minibond investors to secure their rights and seek redress for the mis-selling of such complex financial instruments to layman retail investors. I guess I should not term them as investors as many of them are just simple folks who seek higher return for their fixed deposits with their banks.
I have agreed to become Mr. Tan Kin Lian's Chinese translator and delivering his speech in Mandarin on his behalf.
As I have given my blog's address to many of the Chinese educated people who have been affected by the structured financial products so that they could have a source of information in Chinese. This is why for this week my blog is mainly filled with Minibond-related Chinese articles.
I am going to write on the issue of Social Justice shortly, a reflection on the whole issue of Minibombs.
Goh Meng Seng
陈钦亮十月二十五日演讲译稿
芳林公园演说者角落 – 25 Oct 2008
1.马上投诉
第一步是向你所购买的金融公司陈上你的投诉信 必须诚实。在你的投诉信里，你必须很诚实的举出你是怎么样被引导和误导致使你决定购买这金融产品。很多人都被给予保证这产品是“安全”、“低风险”和是“定期存款”的一个很好的替代品。如果他们是这样跟你说的话，你可以如实的把它记录在你的投诉文件里。
你无需为你所签的任何行销代表给于你的文件所担心。如果他们没有把这一些文件的详细内容仔细的解释给你听的话，你也可以把这记录在你的投诉报告。
最为重要的是，你必须写清楚你是怎么被误导和行销代表是如何跟你讲解产品的内容。
我已经影印了一些表格好让你清楚的把有关资料写下以便帮助你更完整的提出具体投诉。如果你有什么不清楚的话，你可以向我们的义工求助。
Read this advice:
http://tankinlian.blogspot.com/2008/10/general-advice-to-investors-of.html
2.“非弱势”投资者
很多“非弱势”投资者对于他们的处境都很困惑。到目前为止，金管局和金融公司都没有具体的说明他们将如何对待这群投资者。
就让我们按部就班。你们应该见提出投诉并出席金融公司所安排的会面。你可以据实说出你所提出的投诉理由。
如果你不愿意自己前去，你可以带家人、朋友或其它受害投资者一同前往。
3.金融调解中心
如果你对金融公司所提出的赔偿方案不满意的话，你可以把这案件转向金融调解中心处理。你必须付费$53。50。
金融调解中心会成立审查小组来处理你的投诉。金融调解中心有权力作出对金融公司有约束性的裁决。但是这裁决对于你是没有约束性的。投资者有权力拒绝金融调解中心所作出的赔偿裁决而寻求法律途径。
到目前为止，金融调解中心的裁决权力范围的顶限是五万元。如果金融公司同意把赔偿裁决额提高超过五万元的话，它也就可以作出超过五万元的裁决。
4.与金融公司的公开论坛对话
我建议投资者应该团结起来，根据不同金融公司分组，一起向这些金融公司提出与投资者召开公开论坛来讨论以下的两点：
a) 投资者是怎么被行销代表所提供的资讯给误导
b) 金融公司应该要如何对这一些误导销售和错误意见赔偿损失。
5.第4份请愿书
我们可能有一万宗个案需要处理。到目前为止，只有少数的“弱势投资者”的个案已经圆满解决了。如果要以每个个案一个个的来处理的话可能就要花上很长的时间。而且很多受影响的人也还没有呈上他们的投诉。
我将组织另外一个请愿行动，向金融管理局局长提议寻求一个对这一些金融公司误导行销的情况提出一个全面集体的解决方案。全面集体的解决方案将有助于减少投资者在作出投诉时所面对的不安情绪和压力。这也有助于使整个事件明朗化，确保投资者会根据他们的所属的规范得到公平合理的赔偿。
6.法律诉讼
有一些投资者可能倾向于法律诉讼。我想提醒他们法律诉讼可能会很昂贵而具有败诉的风险。集体法律诉讼应该是最后的选择。
在投资者决定法律行动之前，他们应该考虑整个诉讼过程的费用和胜算有多少。他们也必须同意诉讼的途径和方法。他们也应该资询其它律师以便参考不同的费用估计。
陈钦亮
Tan Kin Lian
www.tankinlian.blogspot.com
1.马上投诉
第一步是向你所购买的金融公司陈上你的投诉信 必须诚实。在你的投诉信里，你必须很诚实的举出你是怎么样被引导和误导致使你决定购买这金融产品。很多人都被给予保证这产品是“安全”、“低风险”和是“定期存款”的一个很好的替代品。如果他们是这样跟你说的话，你可以如实的把它记录在你的投诉文件里。
你无需为你所签的任何行销代表给于你的文件所担心。如果他们没有把这一些文件的详细内容仔细的解释给你听的话，你也可以把这记录在你的投诉报告。
最为重要的是，你必须写清楚你是怎么被误导和行销代表是如何跟你讲解产品的内容。
我已经影印了一些表格好让你清楚的把有关资料写下以便帮助你更完整的提出具体投诉。如果你有什么不清楚的话，你可以向我们的义工求助。
Read this advice:
http://tankinlian.blogspot.com/2008/10/general-advice-to-investors-of.html
2.“非弱势”投资者
很多“非弱势”投资者对于他们的处境都很困惑。到目前为止，金管局和金融公司都没有具体的说明他们将如何对待这群投资者。
就让我们按部就班。你们应该见提出投诉并出席金融公司所安排的会面。你可以据实说出你所提出的投诉理由。
如果你不愿意自己前去，你可以带家人、朋友或其它受害投资者一同前往。
3.金融调解中心
如果你对金融公司所提出的赔偿方案不满意的话，你可以把这案件转向金融调解中心处理。你必须付费$53。50。
金融调解中心会成立审查小组来处理你的投诉。金融调解中心有权力作出对金融公司有约束性的裁决。但是这裁决对于你是没有约束性的。投资者有权力拒绝金融调解中心所作出的赔偿裁决而寻求法律途径。
到目前为止，金融调解中心的裁决权力范围的顶限是五万元。如果金融公司同意把赔偿裁决额提高超过五万元的话，它也就可以作出超过五万元的裁决。
4.与金融公司的公开论坛对话
我建议投资者应该团结起来，根据不同金融公司分组，一起向这些金融公司提出与投资者召开公开论坛来讨论以下的两点：
a) 投资者是怎么被行销代表所提供的资讯给误导
b) 金融公司应该要如何对这一些误导销售和错误意见赔偿损失。
5.第4份请愿书
我们可能有一万宗个案需要处理。到目前为止，只有少数的“弱势投资者”的个案已经圆满解决了。如果要以每个个案一个个的来处理的话可能就要花上很长的时间。而且很多受影响的人也还没有呈上他们的投诉。
我将组织另外一个请愿行动，向金融管理局局长提议寻求一个对这一些金融公司误导行销的情况提出一个全面集体的解决方案。全面集体的解决方案将有助于减少投资者在作出投诉时所面对的不安情绪和压力。这也有助于使整个事件明朗化，确保投资者会根据他们的所属的规范得到公平合理的赔偿。
6.法律诉讼
有一些投资者可能倾向于法律诉讼。我想提醒他们法律诉讼可能会很昂贵而具有败诉的风险。集体法律诉讼应该是最后的选择。
在投资者决定法律行动之前，他们应该考虑整个诉讼过程的费用和胜算有多少。他们也必须同意诉讼的途径和方法。他们也应该资询其它律师以便参考不同的费用估计。
陈钦亮
Tan Kin Lian
www.tankinlian.blogspot.com
金融补课
金融补课
■什么是结构产品（structured product）？
结构性产品是由金融机构把多种基础金融工具，比如证券、债券、汇率、商品等，或是信用工具等衍生产品（derivatives），组合成一种新的投资产品，经过精心设计包装后，分销给个别投资者。
结构性产品并不直接支付利息，回报受到与其挂钩的金融工具的价格所影响。
结构产品大致可分三种：本金保证（capital guaranteed）、资本回本（capital protected），另一种则完全没有保证。
★“本金保证”的结构产品风险低了许多，可被视为定期存款的另一种选择，但它回报率不定，而且投资期可长达数年。因此选择这种产品时，得考虑你的资金周转需求和投资时期有多长。
★“资本回本”型产品只担保投资者在投资期满时，至少取回本金。然而，根据条款，在期满之前，若产品出问题（比如发行银行倒闭、或挂钩的银行或投资出问题），投资者可能无法取回所有的本金，甚至血本无归。
雷曼兄弟迷你债券、星展高升短期债券5和美林Jubilee联赢票据3都属于资本回本的结构产品，投资的是信用工具。这些信用工具是把银行的贷款风险包装成结构产品，投资者继承这些风险，成了银行的“保险公司”。
■雷曼兄弟迷你债券(Lehman Minibonds)
尽管称为“迷你债券”，雷曼兄弟发行的这个产品其实即不是债券，也没有投资在债券上。
雷曼兄弟投资的是一篮子的信用（credit）工具，同时把产品与六家金融机构的信贷可靠程度挂钩。如果其中一家机构发生信贷事件（credit event），如破产、未能偿还债务、进行重组等，票据就会被终止，发行商将提早赎回票据并进行结算。
结算过程中，发行商会尝试售出所投资的信用工具，然后先偿还其他债主，投资者的索偿权排最后，赔偿将根据发生信贷事件的金融机构的市价来计算。然而，自美国次贷危机爆发后，几乎没有人愿意购买这类信用工具，所以投资者可能一分钱也取不回。
不过，“迷你债券”出问题并不是其中一家关联金融机构出问题，而是发行商倒闭。如果有人愿意接管这个票据，并承诺持守到产品到期日，投资者就有希望至少取回本金。目前还没有任何人愿意接管迷你债券。
■星展高升短期债券5（DBS High Notes 5）和美林Jubilee联赢票据3(Merrill Lynch Jubilee Series 3-LinkEarner Notes)
星展高升短期债券5和美林Jubilee联赢票据3的游戏规则，和雷曼兄弟迷你债券一样。
这两个产品也是投资在一篮子的信用工具上，很不幸的，这两个产品挂钩的其中一家金融机构，就是宣布破产的雷曼兄弟。而雷曼兄弟目前的市价几乎是零，投资者好比踏上地雷，被炸得体无完肤。
■星展高升短期债券2
（DBS High Notes 2）
星展高升短期债券2和上述产品有类似的游戏规则。所幸的是，雷曼兄弟不是8个挂钩银行的其中一家。然而，该票据有个隐藏的条例，如果所投资的一篮子信用工具当中有好几个出问题，那么产品也会被终止。
这一篮子信用工具，包括倒闭的雷曼兄弟、房地美(Freddie Mac)和房利美(Fannie Mae)的债券。由于这些债券的信贷评级被降级，算是发生信贷事件，它们就像小地雷一样，把投资者的手脚都炸掉了。
如果下来一切平安无事，那么投资者还有希望在投资到期时，取回本金。投资者可以选择不冒险，现在立即把票据卖了，但这些票据目前仅剩下10％左右的价值。
■什么是结构产品（structured product）？
结构性产品是由金融机构把多种基础金融工具，比如证券、债券、汇率、商品等，或是信用工具等衍生产品（derivatives），组合成一种新的投资产品，经过精心设计包装后，分销给个别投资者。
结构性产品并不直接支付利息，回报受到与其挂钩的金融工具的价格所影响。
结构产品大致可分三种：本金保证（capital guaranteed）、资本回本（capital protected），另一种则完全没有保证。
★“本金保证”的结构产品风险低了许多，可被视为定期存款的另一种选择，但它回报率不定，而且投资期可长达数年。因此选择这种产品时，得考虑你的资金周转需求和投资时期有多长。
★“资本回本”型产品只担保投资者在投资期满时，至少取回本金。然而，根据条款，在期满之前，若产品出问题（比如发行银行倒闭、或挂钩的银行或投资出问题），投资者可能无法取回所有的本金，甚至血本无归。
雷曼兄弟迷你债券、星展高升短期债券5和美林Jubilee联赢票据3都属于资本回本的结构产品，投资的是信用工具。这些信用工具是把银行的贷款风险包装成结构产品，投资者继承这些风险，成了银行的“保险公司”。
■雷曼兄弟迷你债券(Lehman Minibonds)
尽管称为“迷你债券”，雷曼兄弟发行的这个产品其实即不是债券，也没有投资在债券上。
雷曼兄弟投资的是一篮子的信用（credit）工具，同时把产品与六家金融机构的信贷可靠程度挂钩。如果其中一家机构发生信贷事件（credit event），如破产、未能偿还债务、进行重组等，票据就会被终止，发行商将提早赎回票据并进行结算。
结算过程中，发行商会尝试售出所投资的信用工具，然后先偿还其他债主，投资者的索偿权排最后，赔偿将根据发生信贷事件的金融机构的市价来计算。然而，自美国次贷危机爆发后，几乎没有人愿意购买这类信用工具，所以投资者可能一分钱也取不回。
不过，“迷你债券”出问题并不是其中一家关联金融机构出问题，而是发行商倒闭。如果有人愿意接管这个票据，并承诺持守到产品到期日，投资者就有希望至少取回本金。目前还没有任何人愿意接管迷你债券。
■星展高升短期债券5（DBS High Notes 5）和美林Jubilee联赢票据3(Merrill Lynch Jubilee Series 3-LinkEarner Notes)
星展高升短期债券5和美林Jubilee联赢票据3的游戏规则，和雷曼兄弟迷你债券一样。
这两个产品也是投资在一篮子的信用工具上，很不幸的，这两个产品挂钩的其中一家金融机构，就是宣布破产的雷曼兄弟。而雷曼兄弟目前的市价几乎是零，投资者好比踏上地雷，被炸得体无完肤。
■星展高升短期债券2
（DBS High Notes 2）
星展高升短期债券2和上述产品有类似的游戏规则。所幸的是，雷曼兄弟不是8个挂钩银行的其中一家。然而，该票据有个隐藏的条例，如果所投资的一篮子信用工具当中有好几个出问题，那么产品也会被终止。
这一篮子信用工具，包括倒闭的雷曼兄弟、房地美(Freddie Mac)和房利美(Fannie Mae)的债券。由于这些债券的信贷评级被降级，算是发生信贷事件，它们就像小地雷一样，把投资者的手脚都炸掉了。
如果下来一切平安无事，那么投资者还有希望在投资到期时，取回本金。投资者可以选择不冒险，现在立即把票据卖了，但这些票据目前仅剩下10％左右的价值。
Thursday, October 23, 2008
金融调解中心的程序
我已经向金融调解中心查询关于投诉和调解程序的过程，资讯如下：
1）如果你的索偿是在5万元以下的话，你可向你所属的金融公司投诉要求调解而同时联络金融调解中心给你寄上有关文件。比如说，你也许买入了10万元的迷你债券而你得知这些迷你债券的价值只剩下7万元，你的亏损将是3万元，你就可以直接到金融公司投诉然后通知金融调解中心，要求调解索偿。金融调解中心在这期间会向你索取地址资料以便把有关相关的文件寄给你。根据金融调解中心的意见是，你必须等待最多4星期。如果金融公司在这4星期没有回音的话，你可再找金融调解中心。但是如果你不属于弱势投资者的话，你可能拿到100%的赔偿的几率是很小的。
2）如果你的损失是超过5万元的话（例如，买了10万，剩值1万，净亏损9万），你有3个选择。你可以先到所属的金融公司投诉，如果他们同意把案件交给金融调解中心的话，金融调解中心就可能把索偿的赔偿额提高超过规定的5万元。这也就是说你可能通过金融调解中心拿到超过5万的赔偿。但是如果金融公司不肯把案件提交金融调解中心的话，你也可以直接和金融公司谈判。如果没法达成满意的协议的话，你还是可以通过金融调解中心投诉。但是如果是单方面通过金融调解中心投诉，你所能得到最高的赔偿还是5万元。如果你决定5万元不是你可以接受的赔偿的话，你就必须考虑采取集体诉讼行动索偿。
3）如果你是向同一间金融公司购买了多过一种金融结构产品的话，你可以要求金融公司和金融调解中心把这一些产品分开来处理。比如，你买了两个系列的迷你债券，总亏损是4万加3万，你可以要求分开处理，以便能把索偿顺利通过金融调解中心调解而不用得到金融公司的同意，或把赔偿总额限制在5万元，而是把它们当成两个各案来处理。
4）通过金融调解中心调解如果到了裁定阶段，你必须付裁决费用$53.50。金融调解中心的裁决对金融公司有约束力，但对于小投资者的你并没有约束力。这也就是说，如果你接受了金融调解中心的裁决，金融公司就必须依照裁决给于你那裁定的赔偿额。但你身位提诉者，你有权拒绝接受那裁定而转向集体法律诉讼程序。但是如果你接受了金融调解中心的裁决接受了拟定的赔偿，你就失去了针对同一投诉采取集体法律诉讼的权力。
以上是我所收集到的资料。我将在来临的星期六详细的讲解金融调解中心的整个过程。
吴明盛
1）如果你的索偿是在5万元以下的话，你可向你所属的金融公司投诉要求调解而同时联络金融调解中心给你寄上有关文件。比如说，你也许买入了10万元的迷你债券而你得知这些迷你债券的价值只剩下7万元，你的亏损将是3万元，你就可以直接到金融公司投诉然后通知金融调解中心，要求调解索偿。金融调解中心在这期间会向你索取地址资料以便把有关相关的文件寄给你。根据金融调解中心的意见是，你必须等待最多4星期。如果金融公司在这4星期没有回音的话，你可再找金融调解中心。但是如果你不属于弱势投资者的话，你可能拿到100%的赔偿的几率是很小的。
2）如果你的损失是超过5万元的话（例如，买了10万，剩值1万，净亏损9万），你有3个选择。你可以先到所属的金融公司投诉，如果他们同意把案件交给金融调解中心的话，金融调解中心就可能把索偿的赔偿额提高超过规定的5万元。这也就是说你可能通过金融调解中心拿到超过5万的赔偿。但是如果金融公司不肯把案件提交金融调解中心的话，你也可以直接和金融公司谈判。如果没法达成满意的协议的话，你还是可以通过金融调解中心投诉。但是如果是单方面通过金融调解中心投诉，你所能得到最高的赔偿还是5万元。如果你决定5万元不是你可以接受的赔偿的话，你就必须考虑采取集体诉讼行动索偿。
3）如果你是向同一间金融公司购买了多过一种金融结构产品的话，你可以要求金融公司和金融调解中心把这一些产品分开来处理。比如，你买了两个系列的迷你债券，总亏损是4万加3万，你可以要求分开处理，以便能把索偿顺利通过金融调解中心调解而不用得到金融公司的同意，或把赔偿总额限制在5万元，而是把它们当成两个各案来处理。
4）通过金融调解中心调解如果到了裁定阶段，你必须付裁决费用$53.50。金融调解中心的裁决对金融公司有约束力，但对于小投资者的你并没有约束力。这也就是说，如果你接受了金融调解中心的裁决，金融公司就必须依照裁决给于你那裁定的赔偿额。但你身位提诉者，你有权拒绝接受那裁定而转向集体法律诉讼程序。但是如果你接受了金融调解中心的裁决接受了拟定的赔偿，你就失去了针对同一投诉采取集体法律诉讼的权力。
以上是我所收集到的资料。我将在来临的星期六详细的讲解金融调解中心的整个过程。
吴明盛
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
雷曼迷债没有列出的真相-信报
雷曼迷债没有列出的真相
迷宗
笔者在各大小钱庄负责企业融资超过二十年，眼见各媒体对雷曼迷你债券都没有正确报道。笔者读毕其issue prospectus和programme prospectus，并尝试用知识拆解它的谜团（系列 36）。不过，笔者要提醒大家，雷曼迷债还有很多资料是没有在该两本说明书列出的。
前阵子，有银行前线销售员工打电话到电台，说雷曼是大金融机构，有良好评级，甚至优于很多本地银行，因此去年他们一直用雷曼这块招牌去招徕生意，只是没有人能料到他会倒下来。事实上，这批销售员并不了解此产品。这也难怪。结构性产品根本是企业融资或专业赌徒的专门工具，一般人根本难以理解，遑论参与。
回报小风险高
其实很多人到现在还不知道，雷曼根本不是借款人或担保人。在整系列的迷债中，雷曼都只是安排行，透过一间表面独立、没有任何关连的空壳公司 Pacific International Finance Limited（PIF），去买一些抵押债务证券（CDO）。不过，雷曼非但没有发任何担保给小投资者，更甚的是，雷曼机关算尽，把所有CDO的利益都拿走了，风险就全留给散户，而报酬就是那区区的5%年息！换言之，即使雷曼目前还健在，按现在的CDO市场，迷债仍然是亏本的。且看下面分解。
1．雷曼利用一招信贷违约掉期（CDS），以低廉息口（港元5%、美元5.5%），透过PIF借（实际上应是拿）小投资者的钱去投资一些CDO，然后抵押予散户。散户在到期还本日有没有钱收，就列明要看这批CDO的造化。
2．PIF代散户用CDS，以5%的代价，把CDO一切利息收益转让予雷曼。
3．不过，这CDS只是掉换利息不换本，即CDO的拥有权还在PIF，即散户的手中。就是说，CDO价格的下跌风险仍由小投资者一力承担，如在迷债到期时，这些CDO在PIF收回或卖得多少，散户就收多少；就算金额不及原来的本金，也不关雷曼的事。
4．一旦这些CDO期内有什么冬瓜豆腐，即如CDO发行机构破产或不能履行合同，小投资者便要承担损失。也就是这样，PIF把这些CDO卖得多少，散户就收多少；还有，散户也要付予雷曼提早中断CDS的termination fee（分手费，计算方法极为复杂，暂且按下不表）。
从上面看来，迷债徒有债券之名，表面上，散户好像是借了钱予PIF。实情是，散户透过PIF投资了一些CDO，但CDO的收益，PIF已帮散户在与雷曼签的CDS中，以五厘息让与雷曼。不过，这些CDO本金和违约风险，仍然是散户的！还有，迷债无论有什么问题，PIF都只赔散户那些CDO和其跟雷曼 CDS订下的权益。 PIF其他的资产，散户无权拿，也即是说，散户也没有权利把PIF清盘。笔者明白此举原意是保障其他投资者，用来作为不同系列的防火栏（ring- fencing），即系列36有事也不会影响其他系列1至35 。但此等细节事前肯定无人告知散户，现在便变成了PIF的金钟罩。但话得说回来，PIF根本是一间空壳公司，那里还有另外的资产还钱予散户？看过上面的条款，散户还怎么说此等迷债是普通的债？完全是委托投资。
那么，那些CDO又是什么？章程可没有详细透露，只知是火箭专家设计的产品，有3A评级。但产品章程这么空泛，连买什么都不知道，银行又何以推荐予公众呢？
吊诡之处就是，在CDS中，CDS订下的信贷违约参考机构，全是本地大蓝筹或知名大银行〔中电（002）、汇控（005）、星展、港铁（066）等〕。雷曼说，如任何一间参考机构发生了违约事件，不能偿还他们自己的借贷（不是散户的迷债，因他们跟散户和迷债完全没有关系）或破产，散户就再没有那五厘息了；散户也要把持有的CDO拿出来，与雷曼交换那个已出事机构的债务，即坏债（实情是那笔坏债到时再定！）。还有就是，如散户的CDO已跌价，就要在散户要收那些坏债的价值中，扣回有关差价。
转移散户视线
这似乎很公平、很吸引。中电、汇控、港铁都关门大吉的话，香港和我俱可休矣。这样的话，收五厘息可真是差不多。但且慢！散户可能忘记了（或不知道）自己是投资一些高风险的CDO，而非借钱予PIF或任何由雷曼担保的机构。散户面对的第一风险不是中电、汇控、地铁倒闭，而是CDO。雷曼成功转移了散户的视线，散户连买什么CDO都不知道，就“中招”了。
笔者上世纪九十年代便开始向本地和跨国企业或半官方法定机构销售结构性产品。大致上团队可分为两组人，一班是设计产品的火箭专家，全是银行祖家总行的老外；另一班就是本地的客户经理，主要是把产品微调再包装，以符合客户和本地法例要求。打个比方，火箭专家负责设计赌局（赌具和赌法），笔者等推销员就装修赌场，以符合法例要求和吸引客人，并向他们解释产品。
做文件时，客户和银行都要另聘律师，把整套文件从头看到尾，翻来覆去，历时两三个月也是等闲事！除非散户是业界中人或专门做金融合约的律师，否则根本不可能看得明这些文件。
现在，雷曼的火箭专家设计或看中了一些CDO，就利用CDS再加上本地推销员的财技，尽拿这些CDO的好处。不过，雷曼并不留下或承担风险（无担保、无举债），更不用为PIF的融资入账（在CDS订下的付款责任只按加权方程式入账），真是机关算尽，合法并合理（如小投资者一早认清并接受这种结构的话）。
条款公平与否？是商业决定，是当事人的判断。但有否误导？谁在误导？读者自己下结论吧。很多基本资料如投资者买什么CDO，又或CDS下面收什么坏债，都并没有说清楚，这是否公平呢？还有，结构性产品根本是给专业投资者的，而非普罗大众，他们哪有能力和时间看那些法律文件？他们也不可能找律师帮忙，因为收益只有5厘，抵销不了律师费。就算雷曼没有倒闭，这些迷债（CDO）根本是超高风险，买了输光的机会也是超高。
最后，迷债投资者投资前，其实应问一问下面几个问题，而答案全是负面。
1. 散户跟谁赌？
在迷债中，是空壳公司Pacific International Finance Limited，雷曼没有任何担保。
2. 赌什么？
在迷债中，是CDO和CDS两项投资。最惨是散户不知那些CDO是什么，CDS怎计算也不大清楚。
3. 最后回报？
只有5厘息，还要承担上面的不明风险。
上面的问题，其实毋须什么专业知识也懂得回答，不然，那些推销员就是无知和误导了！
2008年10月20日<信报>
迷宗
笔者在各大小钱庄负责企业融资超过二十年，眼见各媒体对雷曼迷你债券都没有正确报道。笔者读毕其issue prospectus和programme prospectus，并尝试用知识拆解它的谜团（系列 36）。不过，笔者要提醒大家，雷曼迷债还有很多资料是没有在该两本说明书列出的。
前阵子，有银行前线销售员工打电话到电台，说雷曼是大金融机构，有良好评级，甚至优于很多本地银行，因此去年他们一直用雷曼这块招牌去招徕生意，只是没有人能料到他会倒下来。事实上，这批销售员并不了解此产品。这也难怪。结构性产品根本是企业融资或专业赌徒的专门工具，一般人根本难以理解，遑论参与。
回报小风险高
其实很多人到现在还不知道，雷曼根本不是借款人或担保人。在整系列的迷债中，雷曼都只是安排行，透过一间表面独立、没有任何关连的空壳公司 Pacific International Finance Limited（PIF），去买一些抵押债务证券（CDO）。不过，雷曼非但没有发任何担保给小投资者，更甚的是，雷曼机关算尽，把所有CDO的利益都拿走了，风险就全留给散户，而报酬就是那区区的5%年息！换言之，即使雷曼目前还健在，按现在的CDO市场，迷债仍然是亏本的。且看下面分解。
1．雷曼利用一招信贷违约掉期（CDS），以低廉息口（港元5%、美元5.5%），透过PIF借（实际上应是拿）小投资者的钱去投资一些CDO，然后抵押予散户。散户在到期还本日有没有钱收，就列明要看这批CDO的造化。
2．PIF代散户用CDS，以5%的代价，把CDO一切利息收益转让予雷曼。
3．不过，这CDS只是掉换利息不换本，即CDO的拥有权还在PIF，即散户的手中。就是说，CDO价格的下跌风险仍由小投资者一力承担，如在迷债到期时，这些CDO在PIF收回或卖得多少，散户就收多少；就算金额不及原来的本金，也不关雷曼的事。
4．一旦这些CDO期内有什么冬瓜豆腐，即如CDO发行机构破产或不能履行合同，小投资者便要承担损失。也就是这样，PIF把这些CDO卖得多少，散户就收多少；还有，散户也要付予雷曼提早中断CDS的termination fee（分手费，计算方法极为复杂，暂且按下不表）。
从上面看来，迷债徒有债券之名，表面上，散户好像是借了钱予PIF。实情是，散户透过PIF投资了一些CDO，但CDO的收益，PIF已帮散户在与雷曼签的CDS中，以五厘息让与雷曼。不过，这些CDO本金和违约风险，仍然是散户的！还有，迷债无论有什么问题，PIF都只赔散户那些CDO和其跟雷曼 CDS订下的权益。 PIF其他的资产，散户无权拿，也即是说，散户也没有权利把PIF清盘。笔者明白此举原意是保障其他投资者，用来作为不同系列的防火栏（ring- fencing），即系列36有事也不会影响其他系列1至35 。但此等细节事前肯定无人告知散户，现在便变成了PIF的金钟罩。但话得说回来，PIF根本是一间空壳公司，那里还有另外的资产还钱予散户？看过上面的条款，散户还怎么说此等迷债是普通的债？完全是委托投资。
那么，那些CDO又是什么？章程可没有详细透露，只知是火箭专家设计的产品，有3A评级。但产品章程这么空泛，连买什么都不知道，银行又何以推荐予公众呢？
吊诡之处就是，在CDS中，CDS订下的信贷违约参考机构，全是本地大蓝筹或知名大银行〔中电（002）、汇控（005）、星展、港铁（066）等〕。雷曼说，如任何一间参考机构发生了违约事件，不能偿还他们自己的借贷（不是散户的迷债，因他们跟散户和迷债完全没有关系）或破产，散户就再没有那五厘息了；散户也要把持有的CDO拿出来，与雷曼交换那个已出事机构的债务，即坏债（实情是那笔坏债到时再定！）。还有就是，如散户的CDO已跌价，就要在散户要收那些坏债的价值中，扣回有关差价。
转移散户视线
这似乎很公平、很吸引。中电、汇控、港铁都关门大吉的话，香港和我俱可休矣。这样的话，收五厘息可真是差不多。但且慢！散户可能忘记了（或不知道）自己是投资一些高风险的CDO，而非借钱予PIF或任何由雷曼担保的机构。散户面对的第一风险不是中电、汇控、地铁倒闭，而是CDO。雷曼成功转移了散户的视线，散户连买什么CDO都不知道，就“中招”了。
笔者上世纪九十年代便开始向本地和跨国企业或半官方法定机构销售结构性产品。大致上团队可分为两组人，一班是设计产品的火箭专家，全是银行祖家总行的老外；另一班就是本地的客户经理，主要是把产品微调再包装，以符合客户和本地法例要求。打个比方，火箭专家负责设计赌局（赌具和赌法），笔者等推销员就装修赌场，以符合法例要求和吸引客人，并向他们解释产品。
做文件时，客户和银行都要另聘律师，把整套文件从头看到尾，翻来覆去，历时两三个月也是等闲事！除非散户是业界中人或专门做金融合约的律师，否则根本不可能看得明这些文件。
现在，雷曼的火箭专家设计或看中了一些CDO，就利用CDS再加上本地推销员的财技，尽拿这些CDO的好处。不过，雷曼并不留下或承担风险（无担保、无举债），更不用为PIF的融资入账（在CDS订下的付款责任只按加权方程式入账），真是机关算尽，合法并合理（如小投资者一早认清并接受这种结构的话）。
条款公平与否？是商业决定，是当事人的判断。但有否误导？谁在误导？读者自己下结论吧。很多基本资料如投资者买什么CDO，又或CDS下面收什么坏债，都并没有说清楚，这是否公平呢？还有，结构性产品根本是给专业投资者的，而非普罗大众，他们哪有能力和时间看那些法律文件？他们也不可能找律师帮忙，因为收益只有5厘，抵销不了律师费。就算雷曼没有倒闭，这些迷债（CDO）根本是超高风险，买了输光的机会也是超高。
最后，迷债投资者投资前，其实应问一问下面几个问题，而答案全是负面。
1. 散户跟谁赌？
在迷债中，是空壳公司Pacific International Finance Limited，雷曼没有任何担保。
2. 赌什么？
在迷债中，是CDO和CDS两项投资。最惨是散户不知那些CDO是什么，CDS怎计算也不大清楚。
3. 最后回报？
只有5厘息，还要承担上面的不明风险。
上面的问题，其实毋须什么专业知识也懂得回答，不然，那些推销员就是无知和误导了！
2008年10月20日<信报>
Monday, October 20, 2008
Volunteers Needed
I have met up with some of the Minibond holders and those who are affected by the various structured financial products. Many of them are not able to read English nor understand English at all, least write English.
Thus I am thinking ahead and feel that they may have problems writing a proper complain letters to the various financial institutions. I have discussed with Mr. Tan Kin Lian and we agreed that we could have volunteers to offer help to these people at our next meeting at Hong Lim Park this coming Saturday.
I am calling for interested readers here to volunteer your help. I am expecting about a couple of hundreds, if not more, to approach us for this little service. Thus, due to time constrain, we may need more than 20 volunteers to help out.
This is a strictly volunteering work and we will not allow soliciting of any business in whatsoever ways through this process.
For those who are interested, please email at chirongoh@gmail.com
Please include in your email:
Name, HP number and email address (please use a valid return email address)
Goh Meng Seng
Thus I am thinking ahead and feel that they may have problems writing a proper complain letters to the various financial institutions. I have discussed with Mr. Tan Kin Lian and we agreed that we could have volunteers to offer help to these people at our next meeting at Hong Lim Park this coming Saturday.
I am calling for interested readers here to volunteer your help. I am expecting about a couple of hundreds, if not more, to approach us for this little service. Thus, due to time constrain, we may need more than 20 volunteers to help out.
This is a strictly volunteering work and we will not allow soliciting of any business in whatsoever ways through this process.
For those who are interested, please email at chirongoh@gmail.com
Please include in your email:
Name, HP number and email address (please use a valid return email address)
Goh Meng Seng
迷你债券10月25日芳林公园集会事项
对于那一些需要帮忙写投诉信的迷你债券或结构金融产品的苦主，陈钦亮先生和我都在召集义务员，在10月25日到芳林公园的集会帮助你们起草投诉信件。到时候，你们可以把你所购买的金融结构产品的资料，包括合约、宣传册子、广告传单、每月的结账单等相关文件到方林公园去。我们会在傍晚5时左右开始帮忙你们草拟投诉信。
陈钦亮先生的演讲依旧是在6时正进行。
对于那一些苦主需要金融调节中心的地址，联络电话如下：
Registered Address
112 Robinson Road #13-03
HB Robinson
Singapore 068902
Tel: (65) 63278878
Fax: (65) 63278488
Email: info@fidrec.com.sg
Opening Hours:
Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays 9.00 a.m to 6.00 p.m
Tuesdays, Thursdays 9.00 a.m to 7.30 p.m
(prior appointment required after 6.00 p.m)
苦主最好是先打电话到金融调解局询问详情才前去。
吴明盛
陈钦亮先生的演讲依旧是在6时正进行。
对于那一些苦主需要金融调节中心的地址，联络电话如下：
Registered Address
112 Robinson Road #13-03
HB Robinson
Singapore 068902
Tel: (65) 63278878
Fax: (65) 63278488
Email: info@fidrec.com.sg
Opening Hours:
Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays 9.00 a.m to 6.00 p.m
Tuesdays, Thursdays 9.00 a.m to 7.30 p.m
(prior appointment required after 6.00 p.m)
苦主最好是先打电话到金融调解局询问详情才前去。
吴明盛
Sunday, October 19, 2008
TOC: MAS——像只绝望的无头鸡 (Translated)
A translated article from TOC
MAS——像只绝望的无头鸡
2008年10月18日 星期六
● 卢鸿佩 /副编辑
任何紧跟雷曼兄弟倒闭新闻的本地人一定看得不断搔头，他会对金管局（MAS）的作为或不作为感到无所适从。
从一开始，金管局就毫无主张——不懂得如何应付金融和信用危机、不懂得应对申告无门的愤怒苦主、不懂得在波诡云谲的时候挑起领袖的重担。
或许我在两个礼拜前，陪陈钦亮先生到珊顿大道金管局办公室代苦主们提交请愿书就该嗅出端倪。我在那里等候已经提前进去交请愿书的陈钦亮先生，以便和他会合。就在外面闲逛的当儿，我就被保安人员问了三次，还有一位小姐自称来自comms department，大概就是所谓的公关部门。她显然很担心我会拍下金管局大厦的照片，或者有关陈先生在里面交涉过程的任何照片。
她问了两次：我是不是来自媒体？而且不断提醒我不可拍照，因为那是“他们的大厦”。意识到她因我的存在而局促不安（加上那个保全不停地看着我），我问：是不是我该到别处去等？她说随我的便，所以我选择留下来。
我的感觉就是，这个大概就是金管局混乱和惊慌的征兆吧。接下来的一周，发生了很多事，引起更多人怀疑金管局到底有什么作为？
如陈幸运在他的博客 Minibonds : No leadership in times of trouble....! 所写：咱们政府好像跟香港政府亦步亦趋，有时落后一步，有时则两步。
当丑闻爆开的时候，金管局根本不理睬苦主的投诉，叫他们径自去和银行交涉。可是另一方面，香港政府则对银行售卖结构性金融商品给毫无防备心的公众采取严厉的措施。事实上，国务资政吴作栋，现任金管局主席，竟惹众怒说：“那是命，你要高回报，你就得冒高风险。要不然，就乖乖把钱放在公积金就好了。”我所遇到的人都对这些话觉得很感冒。
金管局接着告诉银行（那些被投资者投诉的银行）设立他们自己的“独立调查组”来接受苦主的投诉。当苦主们决定走上街头，金管局又U转，说要设立由他们指派的调查员。可是就如陈露西所观察的一样，金管局的这些瞎忙活，其实他们一个也没有接触过受影响的苦主。
当香港政府宣布保障所有存户的存款时，新加坡政府却对新加坡人说他们保证这里的金融和银行的结构健全，就如大家所理解的，政府不打算学香港政府那样保障所有银行存款。就在紧挨着的第二天，新加坡又来个U转，新加坡政府宣布保障所有银行存款，这是独立43年来从未做过的一件大事。这不免带来一些疑问：新加坡政府真的关心新加坡人，还是担心千百万元的存款被海外抽走？当市场激烈波动，存户当然要选择把钱放在有保障的国度，这样一个道理，用膝盖想都知道。所以真正的问题是，既然香港和一些其他国家都毅然采取这些措施，金管局之前在犹豫些什么呢？
这个风暴的最新发展，金管局显然又从香港那边“偷桥”。香港特区政府展开迷债调查的次日，金管局也跟进，在新闻发布会中，他们宣布也会这么做。
看来金管局所能做的就是等待香港同侪的下一步。香港政府给当地银行下了最后通牒，是否接受建议中的买回债券？也准备增加法律援助金，以备苦主们通过法律途径起诉银行业主。这在新加坡简直不可思议，在我的记忆中，这样的事在这里还没发生过。
鉴于新加坡政府缺乏领袖素质，接下来唯有指望苦主和公共知识分子如陈钦亮先生，去争取他们认为的公正与公平。
至于金管局，也只能祈望他们多些主动性。要不然，或许如陈幸运所说的，我们虽然付出世界最高薪给这些部长们，实际上新加坡人在“困难时期是群龙无首的”。
迄今，金管局与其权威地做个领头人，倒像只绝望的无头鸡到处乱窜。
我觉得1万名苦主不该就这样牺牲掉。
MAS——像只绝望的无头鸡
2008年10月18日 星期六
● 卢鸿佩 /副编辑
任何紧跟雷曼兄弟倒闭新闻的本地人一定看得不断搔头，他会对金管局（MAS）的作为或不作为感到无所适从。
从一开始，金管局就毫无主张——不懂得如何应付金融和信用危机、不懂得应对申告无门的愤怒苦主、不懂得在波诡云谲的时候挑起领袖的重担。
或许我在两个礼拜前，陪陈钦亮先生到珊顿大道金管局办公室代苦主们提交请愿书就该嗅出端倪。我在那里等候已经提前进去交请愿书的陈钦亮先生，以便和他会合。就在外面闲逛的当儿，我就被保安人员问了三次，还有一位小姐自称来自comms department，大概就是所谓的公关部门。她显然很担心我会拍下金管局大厦的照片，或者有关陈先生在里面交涉过程的任何照片。
她问了两次：我是不是来自媒体？而且不断提醒我不可拍照，因为那是“他们的大厦”。意识到她因我的存在而局促不安（加上那个保全不停地看着我），我问：是不是我该到别处去等？她说随我的便，所以我选择留下来。
我的感觉就是，这个大概就是金管局混乱和惊慌的征兆吧。接下来的一周，发生了很多事，引起更多人怀疑金管局到底有什么作为？
如陈幸运在他的博客 Minibonds : No leadership in times of trouble....! 所写：咱们政府好像跟香港政府亦步亦趋，有时落后一步，有时则两步。
当丑闻爆开的时候，金管局根本不理睬苦主的投诉，叫他们径自去和银行交涉。可是另一方面，香港政府则对银行售卖结构性金融商品给毫无防备心的公众采取严厉的措施。事实上，国务资政吴作栋，现任金管局主席，竟惹众怒说：“那是命，你要高回报，你就得冒高风险。要不然，就乖乖把钱放在公积金就好了。”我所遇到的人都对这些话觉得很感冒。
金管局接着告诉银行（那些被投资者投诉的银行）设立他们自己的“独立调查组”来接受苦主的投诉。当苦主们决定走上街头，金管局又U转，说要设立由他们指派的调查员。可是就如陈露西所观察的一样，金管局的这些瞎忙活，其实他们一个也没有接触过受影响的苦主。
当香港政府宣布保障所有存户的存款时，新加坡政府却对新加坡人说他们保证这里的金融和银行的结构健全，就如大家所理解的，政府不打算学香港政府那样保障所有银行存款。就在紧挨着的第二天，新加坡又来个U转，新加坡政府宣布保障所有银行存款，这是独立43年来从未做过的一件大事。这不免带来一些疑问：新加坡政府真的关心新加坡人，还是担心千百万元的存款被海外抽走？当市场激烈波动，存户当然要选择把钱放在有保障的国度，这样一个道理，用膝盖想都知道。所以真正的问题是，既然香港和一些其他国家都毅然采取这些措施，金管局之前在犹豫些什么呢？
这个风暴的最新发展，金管局显然又从香港那边“偷桥”。香港特区政府展开迷债调查的次日，金管局也跟进，在新闻发布会中，他们宣布也会这么做。
看来金管局所能做的就是等待香港同侪的下一步。香港政府给当地银行下了最后通牒，是否接受建议中的买回债券？也准备增加法律援助金，以备苦主们通过法律途径起诉银行业主。这在新加坡简直不可思议，在我的记忆中，这样的事在这里还没发生过。
鉴于新加坡政府缺乏领袖素质，接下来唯有指望苦主和公共知识分子如陈钦亮先生，去争取他们认为的公正与公平。
至于金管局，也只能祈望他们多些主动性。要不然，或许如陈幸运所说的，我们虽然付出世界最高薪给这些部长们，实际上新加坡人在“困难时期是群龙无首的”。
迄今，金管局与其权威地做个领头人，倒像只绝望的无头鸡到处乱窜。
我觉得1万名苦主不该就这样牺牲掉。
陈钦亮先生芳林公园演讲译稿Translated Script of Mr. Tan Kin Lian
The following is the translated speech I have presented on behalf of Mr. Tan Kin Lian in Hong Lim Park this evening:
以下是今天在芳林公园为陈钦亮先生翻译和演讲的内容：
6 p.m. Saturday 18 October 2008
昨天，十月17日，金管局开了一个关于销售结构金融产品的记者会。
金管局的新闻稿是这么说的：
7。 金管局呼吁那一些真正被误导销售结构金融产品的苦主去你所认购的金融公司去投诉。金管局要求这一些金融公司严格审慎的对每个投诉作出合理的处理。他们必须认真给予独立人士的意见一定分量的重视。
8。很明显的，在众多投资者当中，有一些是受高深教育者，更有一些是经验丰富的投资者。我们最关注的是那一些弱势投资者。我们正专注于那一些金融公司错误销售给弱势投资者的个案和那一些把产品销售给那些明显不符合投资者寻求的个案。我们已经要求有关金融公司给予这一些个案优先处理。他们不应该采取过于法律定义的态度来处理这一些错误销售的案子。
9。至于那一些有足够迹象显示这一些金融产品是被误销或者产品明显不符合投资者的背景概况的案例，这些金融公司应该负起应有的责任。有几间金融公司已经向金管局表明他们会对此类案件负起全部责任。我们很高兴收到这一些承诺并且希望其它有参与销售这类结构产品的金融公司都能效仿而作出这样的承诺。
马上去投诉
每一位这里的苦主首要优先处理的事情是到你的金融公司去呈上正式的投诉书，清清楚楚的列明你是在什么样的情况下被误导买下这一些结构产品的。金管局已经要求这一些金融公司尽快处理这一些案件而避免用太过严谨的法律准则来处理。他们也说你们无需交上宣示申明。
诚实作出供证是非常重要的。你必须把你怎么被误导买进这一些金融产品一五一十的列明。很多投资者告诉我他们被广告、销售册子、保证和销售代表的解释(包括口头和电邮)给误导的。
很多投资者被告知或被错误引导，致使他们相信
a) 这一些资金是投资在那一些涉及信贷机构的债券
b) 所有的相关信贷机构必须倒闭后，他们才会损失所有的本金
c)如果他们把投资持有至期满，他们的本金将受到保护
我希望以下的指导方针能帮助你们准备一个完整的投诉报告给有关的金融公司。你一定要以你最大的能力据实无欺的写这份报告。
你的投诉报告应具备以下的重点：
1。名字，居民证号码，地址，电话
2。你怎么接触到这一些投资
3。你是向那一间金融公司购买，那间分行，投资数额，日期
4。你在购买过程
5。你购买时有没有人与你同伴？如果有，是谁？
6。行销员跟你说了些什么关于产品的资料
7。行销员有没有明确的告诉你这产品是有担保？
8。他们有没有给你签任何关于投资产品的表格？你是否完全明白这表格里头的所有条款？你是在决定投资前或后收到这表格？你有仔细阅读这表格码？
9。你是否依赖行销员的解释和意见来决定投资？那一些意见或讲解对你是至关重要的？
10。任何其它具有误导性的销售情况你都可以写下来
我会要求个别根据不同金融公司分组的联络员帮助其它投资者，尤其是那些受教育不多的成员，准备他们的投诉报告。
弱势投资者
金管局已要求金融公司优先处理弱势投资者的投诉。弱势投资者是指年长者，受低教育者和第一次作投资的人。这些金融公司已经承诺对这些弱势投资者所投诉的误导销售案件负起全部的责任。这责任包括全数或局部赔偿他们的投资损失。这是令人鼓舞的第一步。
我希望那些不属于“弱势投资者”的苦主要坚强和耐心一点。如果你是同样的被误导投资这一些结构性金融产品的话，而且是很有很明显的迹象显示是如此的话，你也有很高的机会索偿。但是你必须要有心里准备和合理的期望，你也许必须接受比“弱势投资者”更低的部分赔偿。
就让我们按部就班，此时你应该尽快提出投诉。
金管局正式介入调查
金管局也提到他们已经针对某些有关违法、金融公司缺乏内部监管和恶劣行销手法的投诉正式展开调查。调查结束后，他们会公布调查结果。
如果发现有违法、缺乏内部监管或恶劣行销手法的话，投资者就有更高的机会对有关金融公司索取更高的赔偿。让我们拭目以待吧。
替代管理公司
金管局说雷曼迷你债券的信托法人真正仔细考量所有可行的方案而会以保障投资者的利益为上。如果出现新的掉期对手，投资者就有机会为这一选项投票表决。为了帮助投资者作出明智的决定，金管局已经委任了独立的专业投资顾问为投资者提供质询。这结果将在下个星期公布。
如果能找到一个替代管理公司，投资者也许能减少损失因为目前的投资资产就可以保存到一个更好的时机来兑现。我接触了一间有意接管的香港公司。他们现在正与信托法人和金管局接洽。
我也希望其它公司，尤其是新加坡的金融公司能对此作出竞标。
对媒体的呼吁
我也想在此呼吁媒体朋友们传达这项讯息给那一些买了结构性金融产品的投资者，尽快去作出他们的投诉。
请告诉他们如果他们是被误导购买这些产品的话，他们就应该马上去相关机构投诉。
陈钦亮
kinlian@gmail.com
www.tankinlian.blogspot.com
翻译： 吴明盛
Saturday, October 18, 2008
National Parks Website Down
After note: I finally managed to get into National Park website to register myself to speak at the very last minute before I set off to Hong Lim this evening. I shall be putting up Chinese translated of Mr. Tan Kin Lian's speech on my blog later.
I want to register to speak at Hong Lim Park today but it seems that the National Parks Website is down for the whole afternoon. I just cannot believe that with a World Class government, such things could actually happen and detrimental to our freedom of speeches at this little small park!
I will still go ahead to speak, basically to help Mr. Tan Kin Lian to translate his English speech into Mandarin, in order to help those who could not understand English well to get the necessary information for their next moves.
Mr. Tan Kin Lian has been doing a great job in helping Minibonds and Structured Deposits holders in this difficult times and I admire his courage and righteous spirit in helping out these Minibond holders. He has given me a call this morning to request for my help to address many of the Chinese educated elderly uncles and aunties. I have agreed to help him at short notice but unfortunately, the National Park website to register myself to speak at Hong Lim has been down for the whole afternoon!
I may risk charges for making an "illegal speech" at Hong Lim Park, all thanks to National Parks' faulty website, but I guess I am prepared to go to jail (nope, I am not going to pay the fines) for a righteous cause like this one.
Goh Meng Seng
I want to register to speak at Hong Lim Park today but it seems that the National Parks Website is down for the whole afternoon. I just cannot believe that with a World Class government, such things could actually happen and detrimental to our freedom of speeches at this little small park!
I will still go ahead to speak, basically to help Mr. Tan Kin Lian to translate his English speech into Mandarin, in order to help those who could not understand English well to get the necessary information for their next moves.
Mr. Tan Kin Lian has been doing a great job in helping Minibonds and Structured Deposits holders in this difficult times and I admire his courage and righteous spirit in helping out these Minibond holders. He has given me a call this morning to request for my help to address many of the Chinese educated elderly uncles and aunties. I have agreed to help him at short notice but unfortunately, the National Park website to register myself to speak at Hong Lim has been down for the whole afternoon!
I may risk charges for making an "illegal speech" at Hong Lim Park, all thanks to National Parks' faulty website, but I guess I am prepared to go to jail (nope, I am not going to pay the fines) for a righteous cause like this one.
Goh Meng Seng
Friday, October 17, 2008
A Nation in Gamble
The recent happenings have kept me thinking, are we a Nation in Gamble?
First, we have a million dollar man flip flop. One day claims that our financial system is very stable, we don't need 100% guarantee for bank deposits, but within 48 hours, a total U-turn and announce that MAS will provide 100% guarantee for all bank deposits after all. But wait, please notice the difference here. MAS is providing such guarantee not because it thinks that it has the obligations to local Singaporeans, but rather, it is because it is afraid that the exodus of foreign money will destabilize the whole financial system! Well, we have to settle for the fact that the PAP government will always take filthy rich foreigners' interests at first priority rather than local Singaporeans' interests. We will always be the last priority.
Some friends were making noise about this silly statements by MAS that it would not provide 100% guarantee to depositors because it believes that our financial system is very safe. Then it begs the question, if the system is so safe, it would be definitely "riskless" for MAS to give additional assurance to Singaporeans by providing that 100% guarantee, right?
And now, does it mean that since MAS finally did a total U-turn, would it imply that our financial system has suddenly become unstable? No, says MAS, its because we want to keep foreign money on our shores! Does it then mean that if all these foreign money vacate from Singapore, our financial system will become unstable?
This kind of attitude really reminds me of people gambling at the Black Jack table. They just could not think properly whether to take the card or not when they have 16 points at hand. I would expect that our people should get better judgment and performance from the million dollar ministers at such sensitive time. We are sitting right in the middle of the Crisis of Confidence (which I will write on it for my next post) and yet, they are giving out contradicting signals that may well shaken our confidence further.
This is especially true when we assess how MAS performs in this Minibonds issue. It would just push off responsibility and not act on it. It would be understandable for its "weak leadership" in such disputes because Singapore is dominated by Government Linked Companies. MAS, as a government agency, would not want to jeopardize its own money making machinery, would it? This is exactly the same problem I have mentioned in my previous post on Public Transport: how could we ever expect the government to regulate the companies that it owns? This is against human nature and totally absurd. Thus I could only advise Minibonds and other structured deposits holders to come together, stand in unity and go for class action lawsuit. They should not hold on the classic view that this PAP government will solve all these problems for them, especially so when it involves monies and interests of a stingy government. I know many of these people have not intended to gamble with their money when they first bought these Minibonds, but yet, I guess they are taking a big gamble if they think they could depend on MAS to help them out. Please remember, this government is more worried of foreigner's money than yours. It will only take less than 48hrs for them to make 180 degrees policy U turn when it involves foreign interests, but definitely not yours.
The fact that MAS actually allows Minibonds to be sold in Singapore, itself is a sign that we are fast becoming a Nation in Gamble. Minibonds is effectively a bet put on the reputation of some other bigger names. Minibonds holders effectively become the insurers of other bigger giant banks and financial institutions. It is absurd if you see it in its naked perspective but yet, these absurd instruments with many hidden risks are packaged as "medium-low risk investment" for our consumers. Even CPF allows such structured derivatives to be "invested" as "medium-low risk" instruments! And the fact that even some GLCs created their own version of structured products which is basically nothing but a financial bet, "invested" in CDS CDO with whatever names that are so complex to layman. Do all these relevant authorities, establishment and companies know exactly what they are doing? Are they pushing the whole Nation into Gambling?
Singaporeans are traditionally more conservative and risk adverse in their investment choice. How could they package such risky instruments (technically speaking, not even assets to speak of, but financial bets) to sell them to our citizens is something I could not really fully understand.
Well, talking about Gambling, no bigger and prominent Gambling is more obvious than our two Casino resorts, building in process. It seems that all hopes are pinned on these two gigantic projects that the whole Nation has taken up as their engine towards "Golden Period". But the recent news report worries me. Some foreign workers were protesting outside MOM against their employers who intend to cut their pay or even force them to be sent back to their country of origins. These foreign workers work for one of the big construction company which I believe is one of the main contractors of the Casino resort at Marina. And it was reported that when the matter has been settled, the workers return to their construction site, doing nothing more than AREA CLEANING! I mean, 100 people doing AREA CLEANING?
It worries me. I was thinking to myself, WHAT IF, a BIG BIG IF, any of these two Casino resorts failed to take off even before they are built, what will happen to us? Our schools and polytechnics has trained so many students ready to be employed for these casino resorts. Our banks have given out so much loans to finance these casino resorts construction (not only the owners, but constructors, subcontrustors...etc). What IF anyone of them or even Both of them fail? Are we staking our whole economy on these Casino resorts?
Well, maybe some may say I am really paranoid, how could these BIG casino companies go bust? This is especially so when our PAP government has claimed to conduct all due diligence in screening these casino companies.
It seems a little bit unbelievable but nowadays, when even the big 4 investment banks in USA could go bust, what else isn't possible? Anyway, with this little question in mind, I did a research. I have found that LV SANDS, the owner of Singapore Marina's Casino Resort, has filed for Chapter 11 (bankruptcy protection) in USA before! It was 1998 when Sands filed for bankruptcy, right after the 1997 financial crisis, though we all believe that USA is not affected by this financial crisis at all. Then there is another recent article I have found on the net. Its entitled "Is LV Sands headed for Bankruptcy?"
In this article, it claims that LV Sands' share price has dropped from a high of $148 to $14.05! It has lost a lawsuit without allocating the amount of money to pay for the damages. Its earnings has plunged dramatically, with Return on Equity (ROE) dropping from 67% to a mere 5.38%. All these are worrying signs, not only for LV Sands, but the whole Singapore!
I could hardly imagine what would happen to Singapore IF, a BIG IF, Sands goes under. The PAP government has put Singapore into a BIG GAMBLE that we may be ill afford to play.
On the other hand, we have the most direct impact on our pockets from absurd electricity tariff pricing. We were told that for this quarter, we will be paying our electricity bill based on future price of US$155 per barrel of oil when the oil price right now is US$71 per barrel! How absurd this could be? Well, should we feel "lucky" because there is someone who makes claim that the price of oil could well reach US$200 this year end? So is this future price of US$155 based the "discount" from US$200 per barrel? Is this another GAMBLE that went wrong and innocent Singaporeans have to paid for such losses?
These are the events that have more direct impact on our lives to be mentioned here. There are more gambles going on, taking up by GIC and Temasek Holdings all around the world. Our SWF has thrown billions of dollars into failing companies and later getting their shares diluted by injection of rescue funds by the various government agencies. My gut feeling is that our GIC and Temasek have taken up these gambles too early with too much money thrown in. We are a small country in the world with limited resources. We must be extremely prudent in investing whatever we have. Plunging ourselves at the start of this financial turmoil will definitely cost us dearly and force us to take up unnecessary risks. Could we really afford to take up all these gambles?
With the total melt down of the current financial markets, I really doubt that those investments done by GIC and Temasek would come up good. We thought we could save UBS but eventually Swiss Government has to step in to take over the bank. We thought we could save US banks, but it seems that the more merger and take overs occur, our shares in them would be totally diluted. How much more Gamble should we take as a Nation before we could shout STOP? I suspect one day, we would wake up as a Nation, just like all Minibonds holders, having a shock that we have actually lost so much in all these Gambles when in the first place, we are just a Nation of conservative and risk adverse citizens. That would be a day of reckoning, shock and devastation.
Goh Meng Seng
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
迷债事件 “七宗罪”
This is an article from Ming Pao, Hong Kong stating the root of the problem: Lapses in in the regulatory role of HK Monetary Authority.
迷债事件 “七宗罪”
2008年10月13日
【明报专讯】上周本栏假设零售银行有员工可能会因为投资银行回馈的利益而对散户作出不恰当的衍生产品销售，是希望推动衍生产品销售制度的改进。为此现尝试较尖锐地为机制及迷债事件作出以下的七无概括，供有关人士参考。
无审批——监管机构表示并无为任何衍生产品把关的职责，亦无审批公开发售使用的销售单章。
无申报——投资者无从知晓零售银行对其销售衍生产品会收取多少投资银行的回馈，包括已出事的迷债。
无监管——销售一般是以面谈形式进行，但无任何的录音或会议纪录要求，事问如何监管前线人员有否作不恰当的陈述，有争执时又如何有证据。
无责任——一银行高层上周据报道表示，即使迷债事件有不恰当的前线销售，责任在于前线，会对违规销售人员作内部处分；银行高层的责任由于“产品经过发行商的内部严格审批及监管机构认可，在这个层面上已经做得足够”。
无赔偿——监管机构表示无权力要求银行向被误导的迷债投资者作赔偿，而银行高层表示“会否赔偿投资者则视乎证据而定”。城安恐怕举证的困难令一般投资者即使被误导也难以获得赔偿。
无公开——城安有一亲友不幸持有迷债，但多次查询托管人及零售银行后仍未有相关资料，惟上周初据报银行已在计算迷债的回购价。
无改变——在本年头传媒亦广泛报道有病重的八旬老妇遭私人银行销售Accumulator，但事件并未为制度带来任何改变。
城安担心的是，监管机构过分执覑市场的无为而治，而在既得利益集团的游说下忽略对小投资者的保障。在遇上如狼似虎的营销人员时，香港的小投资者就仿似是群小羊牯。
城安曾于一饭局中遇上雷曼的营销人员。当时侍应送上一碟略嫌未煮透的肉食，该人员就将其打回头，然后大有反应的向我们说“唔熟点食呀！ ”城安当时自然礼貌陪笑，但心里就觉得此人相当厉害，说不定睡梦中也会在讨价还价云云。
城安
迷债事件 “七宗罪”
2008年10月13日
【明报专讯】上周本栏假设零售银行有员工可能会因为投资银行回馈的利益而对散户作出不恰当的衍生产品销售，是希望推动衍生产品销售制度的改进。为此现尝试较尖锐地为机制及迷债事件作出以下的七无概括，供有关人士参考。
无审批——监管机构表示并无为任何衍生产品把关的职责，亦无审批公开发售使用的销售单章。
无申报——投资者无从知晓零售银行对其销售衍生产品会收取多少投资银行的回馈，包括已出事的迷债。
无监管——销售一般是以面谈形式进行，但无任何的录音或会议纪录要求，事问如何监管前线人员有否作不恰当的陈述，有争执时又如何有证据。
无责任——一银行高层上周据报道表示，即使迷债事件有不恰当的前线销售，责任在于前线，会对违规销售人员作内部处分；银行高层的责任由于“产品经过发行商的内部严格审批及监管机构认可，在这个层面上已经做得足够”。
无赔偿——监管机构表示无权力要求银行向被误导的迷债投资者作赔偿，而银行高层表示“会否赔偿投资者则视乎证据而定”。城安恐怕举证的困难令一般投资者即使被误导也难以获得赔偿。
无公开——城安有一亲友不幸持有迷债，但多次查询托管人及零售银行后仍未有相关资料，惟上周初据报银行已在计算迷债的回购价。
无改变——在本年头传媒亦广泛报道有病重的八旬老妇遭私人银行销售Accumulator，但事件并未为制度带来任何改变。
城安担心的是，监管机构过分执覑市场的无为而治，而在既得利益集团的游说下忽略对小投资者的保障。在遇上如狼似虎的营销人员时，香港的小投资者就仿似是群小羊牯。
城安曾于一饭局中遇上雷曼的营销人员。当时侍应送上一碟略嫌未煮透的肉食，该人员就将其打回头，然后大有反应的向我们说“唔熟点食呀！ ”城安当时自然礼貌陪笑，但心里就觉得此人相当厉害，说不定睡梦中也会在讨价还价云云。
城安
Tuesday, October 14, 2008
联合报选读：李家同—那些金钱游戏者我们应该鄙视！
联合报选读：李家同—那些金钱游戏者我们应该鄙视！
李家同：那些金钱游戏者我们应该鄙视！
在全世界为这次的金融风暴伤脑筋的时候，我们终于听到了一些将风暴连结到道德的言论。
首先，教宗提醒世人不要盲目地追求财富。身为教宗，他的这种谈话乃是意料中的。比较特别的是英国布朗首相的谈话，他说世人应该建立一种基于道德感的金融制度，在做冒险性投资时，一定要负责任。
银行倒闭 雷曼老董无伤
在美国国会的听证会上，一位议员指出雷曼兄弟的董事长从公元二千年到现在，一共拿到了将近五亿美金的钱，银行最后倒闭，他的财产丝毫无损，而股东所持有的股票却化为乌有。他说这种做法是利润私有化、损失公有化，极不道德。
更深沉的问题乃是在于这一代年轻人的价值观。在我的时代，美国的菁英分子也喜欢冒险，但他们多半在科技上努力工作，设法造出最好的电脑、最快的战斗机、送人入太空、建造网际网路等等。当时，菁英分子都想成为科学家或是工程师。他们都是辛勤工作者，他们所追求的是科技上的卓越。美国之所以强盛，就是因为有这些人在埋头苦干，使美国在科技上遥遥领先。
菁英分子 华尔街纸醉金迷
曾几何时，在科技上追求卓越，已不是美国菁英分子的兴趣，他们人人想去华尔街。在华尔街，当然不是做一个存款银行的行员，而是要做一个操盘手，大做垃圾债券、连动性债券、衍生性金融产品、债务抵押债券、信用违约交换等等。这些五花八门的花招，外人很少搞得懂，他们却美其名为“产品”。只是，这些产品和引擎、积体电路和特用化学品不可同日而语。
美国社会 拜金主义正横流
为何现在的菁英分子如此喜欢玩金钱游戏，而不肯辛勤地从事科技研究？谁也不能精确地回答这个问题。我想最重要的是美国社会最近拜金主义的流行。
在过去，甘迺迪总统曾试图注射一些理想主义进入了美国的社会，使美国人多多少少注意到公益。遗憾的是，现在，这种理想主义已经没有任何社会的意见领袖倡导，难怪很多年轻的菁英分子变成了庸俗不堪的惟利是图者。
辛勤工作者 我们才该崇拜
最重要的问题；我们该崇拜谁？我们应该尊敬那些在田野里和工地里流汗工作的农人和工人，在学校里认真教书的老师，建立工厂和各种企业的企业家，在各企业里小心翼翼工作的工人、工程师和管理人员，在研究室内绞尽脑汁的研发人员，在政府服务的公务员，在金融机构真正替企业和人民服务的人员，带给我们快乐的演艺人员、音乐家和运动员。凡是努力工作者，都应是我们尊敬的对象，因为是他们使我们能过好日子，是他们替我们建造了一个很不错的国家。
我们应该鄙视那些用我们的钱豪赌的金钱游戏者，他们最多能替我们打造虚幻而短暂的繁荣，但他们却会在一夜之间使无数辛劳的人民受到严重的打击。
（本文作者为暨南、清华、静宜大学荣誉教授）
李家同：那些金钱游戏者我们应该鄙视！
在全世界为这次的金融风暴伤脑筋的时候，我们终于听到了一些将风暴连结到道德的言论。
首先，教宗提醒世人不要盲目地追求财富。身为教宗，他的这种谈话乃是意料中的。比较特别的是英国布朗首相的谈话，他说世人应该建立一种基于道德感的金融制度，在做冒险性投资时，一定要负责任。
银行倒闭 雷曼老董无伤
在美国国会的听证会上，一位议员指出雷曼兄弟的董事长从公元二千年到现在，一共拿到了将近五亿美金的钱，银行最后倒闭，他的财产丝毫无损，而股东所持有的股票却化为乌有。他说这种做法是利润私有化、损失公有化，极不道德。
更深沉的问题乃是在于这一代年轻人的价值观。在我的时代，美国的菁英分子也喜欢冒险，但他们多半在科技上努力工作，设法造出最好的电脑、最快的战斗机、送人入太空、建造网际网路等等。当时，菁英分子都想成为科学家或是工程师。他们都是辛勤工作者，他们所追求的是科技上的卓越。美国之所以强盛，就是因为有这些人在埋头苦干，使美国在科技上遥遥领先。
菁英分子 华尔街纸醉金迷
曾几何时，在科技上追求卓越，已不是美国菁英分子的兴趣，他们人人想去华尔街。在华尔街，当然不是做一个存款银行的行员，而是要做一个操盘手，大做垃圾债券、连动性债券、衍生性金融产品、债务抵押债券、信用违约交换等等。这些五花八门的花招，外人很少搞得懂，他们却美其名为“产品”。只是，这些产品和引擎、积体电路和特用化学品不可同日而语。
美国社会 拜金主义正横流
为何现在的菁英分子如此喜欢玩金钱游戏，而不肯辛勤地从事科技研究？谁也不能精确地回答这个问题。我想最重要的是美国社会最近拜金主义的流行。
在过去，甘迺迪总统曾试图注射一些理想主义进入了美国的社会，使美国人多多少少注意到公益。遗憾的是，现在，这种理想主义已经没有任何社会的意见领袖倡导，难怪很多年轻的菁英分子变成了庸俗不堪的惟利是图者。
辛勤工作者 我们才该崇拜
最重要的问题；我们该崇拜谁？我们应该尊敬那些在田野里和工地里流汗工作的农人和工人，在学校里认真教书的老师，建立工厂和各种企业的企业家，在各企业里小心翼翼工作的工人、工程师和管理人员，在研究室内绞尽脑汁的研发人员，在政府服务的公务员，在金融机构真正替企业和人民服务的人员，带给我们快乐的演艺人员、音乐家和运动员。凡是努力工作者，都应是我们尊敬的对象，因为是他们使我们能过好日子，是他们替我们建造了一个很不错的国家。
我们应该鄙视那些用我们的钱豪赌的金钱游戏者，他们最多能替我们打造虚幻而短暂的繁荣，但他们却会在一夜之间使无数辛劳的人民受到严重的打击。
（本文作者为暨南、清华、静宜大学荣誉教授）
Saturday, October 11, 2008
佘长年—我们需要一个民主的政体
The following is not my article but re-posted article.
● 佘长年
看到美国众议院推翻7000亿美元援救配套时，我不禁想到，这件事要是发生在新加坡，那么国会到底会怎么做呢？
当然，这只是用了我几秒钟的时间，我就十分确定行动党一定会像美国共和党那么大手笔。
他们一定赶去拯救大企业——特别是那些政联公司（GLCs）——据说是为了“避免经济整个崩溃”。
美国民主党则要求一个比较公平的配套，而不只是救出那些信用破产的华尔街大鳄。
他们要求为那些因次贷风暴而失去家园的人赎回房子，还要那些享受可耻高薪和花红的企业总裁大幅度减薪。
美国共和党传统上都是比较保守和亲商的（这和行动党差不多），而民主党则崇尚自由和亲民。
虽然这两个政党经常斗得头破血流，但是他们最后还是会打落牙齿和血吞达成某种妥协，是负责任两党制的好榜样。
大多数美国人还是很气愤政府动用纳税人的钱来拯救那些邪恶公司，而惨被波及的老百姓则被撂在一旁，根本没人理睬。
民主党人扳回了这种局面。
要是这样的拯救配套在新加坡的国会里提出，我敢打包票一定是会从84席里获得82席的赞成票，也省去了啰唆的辩论，或者从所谓的“成熟的两党制”获得不同观点的补益。
这里没有“民主党”来辩论任何过失或不足。这么一来，新加坡全民（一个都不能少）就得买单。
也不可能有什么其他的选择来平衡老百姓的利益和所谓大财团、整体经济的利益。
这个灾难正逐步走向新加坡，而新加坡人都会受苦。
一个长期的衰退即将来临，而新加坡人也随着面对低工资、失业和生意失败的噩运。他们其实需要一个强大和有才干的反对党来反映他们的心声和照顾他们的利益。
陷入困境的美国已经示范两党制如何会有效地保护新加坡人民，不仅仅是大生意而已，而是源源不断地产生应对危机的解决办法。
实际上新加坡人还比美国人更需要保护，因为这里的政策更倾向于保护企业利益多过关心人民的福利。
许多提供公共服务的大企业，如公共交通、能源（记得最近的21%调涨）、租赁等等，都是政府控制的，再不然就是政府拥有的。
在这个困难时期，这些公司都急着涨价来维持利润。所以政治上更需要一个适任的反对党来提供一种制衡。
要是这个艰难时期是被一个权威政府主导，排除（或者“整”）反对党进行有效的监督，那么大家就只好自求多福了。
这时候需要一个“美国民主党”式的反对党来和行动党协作，制定出一个包容和尽可能照顾大多数人的方案。
一个成熟的两党制虽然不容易，但是新加坡人还是有能力和准备好扮演这样的角色。
很显然，这和李光耀资政反对多党制民主的看法是抵触的。
他已经不止一次暗示过，要是新加坡不是一人一票制，他能够做也许更多。
许多年来，李资政认为他的行动党不强调意识形态，只是务实和为新加坡谋福利。
这虽然在过去是对的，但是今天却不同了。
近年来，他们把新加坡当成一个大企业来管理，为了累积利润和储备金而不余遗力。这个城市国家完全可以叫做新加坡大企业。
到了现阶段，它不能再依赖一党独大。
一个美国式的民主政体或许可以把它的注意力摆正，并产生一个包容性的社会。
至少它可以满足大多数人的利益，而不再是一家大公司而已
● 佘长年
看到美国众议院推翻7000亿美元援救配套时，我不禁想到，这件事要是发生在新加坡，那么国会到底会怎么做呢？
当然，这只是用了我几秒钟的时间，我就十分确定行动党一定会像美国共和党那么大手笔。
他们一定赶去拯救大企业——特别是那些政联公司（GLCs）——据说是为了“避免经济整个崩溃”。
美国民主党则要求一个比较公平的配套，而不只是救出那些信用破产的华尔街大鳄。
他们要求为那些因次贷风暴而失去家园的人赎回房子，还要那些享受可耻高薪和花红的企业总裁大幅度减薪。
美国共和党传统上都是比较保守和亲商的（这和行动党差不多），而民主党则崇尚自由和亲民。
虽然这两个政党经常斗得头破血流，但是他们最后还是会打落牙齿和血吞达成某种妥协，是负责任两党制的好榜样。
大多数美国人还是很气愤政府动用纳税人的钱来拯救那些邪恶公司，而惨被波及的老百姓则被撂在一旁，根本没人理睬。
民主党人扳回了这种局面。
要是这样的拯救配套在新加坡的国会里提出，我敢打包票一定是会从84席里获得82席的赞成票，也省去了啰唆的辩论，或者从所谓的“成熟的两党制”获得不同观点的补益。
这里没有“民主党”来辩论任何过失或不足。这么一来，新加坡全民（一个都不能少）就得买单。
也不可能有什么其他的选择来平衡老百姓的利益和所谓大财团、整体经济的利益。
这个灾难正逐步走向新加坡，而新加坡人都会受苦。
一个长期的衰退即将来临，而新加坡人也随着面对低工资、失业和生意失败的噩运。他们其实需要一个强大和有才干的反对党来反映他们的心声和照顾他们的利益。
陷入困境的美国已经示范两党制如何会有效地保护新加坡人民，不仅仅是大生意而已，而是源源不断地产生应对危机的解决办法。
实际上新加坡人还比美国人更需要保护，因为这里的政策更倾向于保护企业利益多过关心人民的福利。
许多提供公共服务的大企业，如公共交通、能源（记得最近的21%调涨）、租赁等等，都是政府控制的，再不然就是政府拥有的。
在这个困难时期，这些公司都急着涨价来维持利润。所以政治上更需要一个适任的反对党来提供一种制衡。
要是这个艰难时期是被一个权威政府主导，排除（或者“整”）反对党进行有效的监督，那么大家就只好自求多福了。
这时候需要一个“美国民主党”式的反对党来和行动党协作，制定出一个包容和尽可能照顾大多数人的方案。
一个成熟的两党制虽然不容易，但是新加坡人还是有能力和准备好扮演这样的角色。
很显然，这和李光耀资政反对多党制民主的看法是抵触的。
他已经不止一次暗示过，要是新加坡不是一人一票制，他能够做也许更多。
许多年来，李资政认为他的行动党不强调意识形态，只是务实和为新加坡谋福利。
这虽然在过去是对的，但是今天却不同了。
近年来，他们把新加坡当成一个大企业来管理，为了累积利润和储备金而不余遗力。这个城市国家完全可以叫做新加坡大企业。
到了现阶段，它不能再依赖一党独大。
一个美国式的民主政体或许可以把它的注意力摆正，并产生一个包容性的社会。
至少它可以满足大多数人的利益，而不再是一家大公司而已
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